ISSN 2321-2209

प्रतिपित्सा
Pratipitsā

अन्ताराष्ट्रिया मूल्याङ्कित-शोधषाण्मासिकी
International Refereed Research Halfyearly

प्रधानसम्पादकः
प्रो. राजारामशुक्लः

वैदिकदर्शनविभागः
काशीहिन्दूविश्वविद्यालयः वाराणसी

व.-I; अं.-2, जुलाई-दिसम्बर, 2013

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परामर्शदातृमण्डलम्

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अन्तःसिद्धान्तीयचिन्तनोन्मुखाः विवादरहिताश्च शोधलेखाः प्रकाश्यन्ते।
भाषा संस्कृतं, हिन्दी, आङ्ग्ली चानुमता-सं.)

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आयुशी कम्प्यूटर्स

इन्दिरानगर, चितईपुर

सम्पादकीयम्

परप्रतिपत्तिर्हि शब्दप्रयोगस्य मुख्यं प्रयोजनम्। स्वात्मस्थान् विचारान् परं प्रति बोधयितुं वक्ता शब्दानुपादत्ते। जगति यावानपि व्यवहारोऽनुभवविषयः स सर्वोऽपि प्राधान्येन शब्दाधारित एव भवति। व्यवहारसमर्थचेष्टादिकमपि वस्तुतः शब्द एवान्तर्भवति। वयं हि तादृशचेष्टया तदर्थबोधकान् शब्दान् अनुमाय तदनुसारं प्रवर्तामहे। चेष्टा-शब्दयोरस्ति कश्चन अव्यभिचारसम्बन्धः। अत एव यदा चेष्टया प्रतिपिपादयिषितोऽर्थो नावबुद्ध्यते तदा शब्दा उपादीयन्ते, यत्र च प्रयुक्तैः शब्दैरर्थो नावगम्यते तत्र चेष्टया स बोध्यते। वस्तुतो जगति नहि कोऽपि तादृशः प्रत्ययोऽस्ति यः शब्दानुगमादृते स्यात्। अत एव असङ्गतामात्मन इच्छन्तो योगिनः बाह्यजगतो मन आकृष्य निश्चेष्टा मौनमालम्बन्ते। दिव्यदृष्टयो हि ते योगदृशा सकलमतीतानागतादिप्रपञ्चं किं बहुना परमात्मस्वरूपमपि च साक्षात्कृत्य तत्तद्वस्तुस्वरूपं परिचाययितुं कांश्चन शब्दान् शब्दसमूहात्मकानि वाक्यानि वा प्रयुञ्जते। तानि वाक्यानि तत्तत्पदार्थानुगतधर्मबोधकत्वात् लक्षणानीत्युच्यन्ते, यदाधारेण वयं वस्तुनः स्वरूपं परिचिनुमः। अत एव वयं लक्षणैकचक्षुष्काः स्मः। ते च योगिनः लक्ष्यस्वरूपसाक्षात्कर्तृत्वात् लक्ष्यैकचक्षुष्काः भवन्ति। लक्षणं हि लक्ष्यमभिव्याप्य भवेदिति नियमः, किन्तु तन्नातिव्याप्नुयात् लक्ष्यमिति त्वावश्यकमेव। अतएव लक्षणकरणात्प्राग् यावल्लक्ष्यस्वरूपज्ञानपमेक्षितम्। परिमित-मतीनामस्माकं तन्न सम्भवति, लक्ष्याणामनन्तत्वाद् विप्रकृष्टत्वाच्च। अस्माभिस्तु पुरतः स्थितानि कानिचन लक्ष्याणि साक्षात्कृत्य सत्सादृश्येनान्यान्यपि सम्भाव्य तदनुगततया लक्षणानि क्रियन्ते। अत एव तत्र अव्याप्यतिव्याप्ती अपि सम्भाव्येते। तन्निवृत्तये तत्र परिष्काराः क्रियन्ते, पुनस्तत्र दोषाशङ्कायां परिष्कारान्तरमित्येवं रीत्या वस्तुनो निष्कृष्टं स्वरुपं लभ्यते। परिष्काराणामियं पद्धतिः भारतीयचिन्तनधाराया विश्वस्य कृते अत्युत्तममवदानमस्ति। अस्माकमायार्यैस्तादृशीयं पद्धतिराविष्कृता यया विषये परिशील्यमाने मनागप्यर्थसन्देहः (Ambiguity) न भवति। अत्र हि अर्थस्वरूपप्रतिपादनाय तादृशानां शब्दानां सन्निवेशः क्रियते येऽर्थान् न व्यभिचरन्ति। अत एवाधुनातनैः वैज्ञानिकैः विशेषतः सङ्गणकविज्ञैः पद्धतिमिमामाश्रयितुं प्रयत्यते। विश्वेऽद्यत्वेऽस्मिन् विषये नैका योजनाश्चलन्ति। किन्तु सार्थकस्य सम्वादस्याभावाद् अपेक्षितं साफल्यमितोऽपि प्रतीक्ष्यते।

एतादृशानां सम्वादानां कृते प्रतिपित्सा सुदृढो मञ्चः। वयं विमर्शकाँश्चिन्तकान् मुक्तचर्चार्थमामन्त्रयामहे।

राजारामशुक्लः

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आनुभविकमद्वैतम्[1]

वेम्पटिकुटुम्बशास्त्री

श्रीमच्छङ्करभगवत्पादाः जन्माद्यधिकरणे अनुभवस्यापि ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां प्रमाणभावमभ्युपगच्छन्ति, हेतुमपि तथाङ्गीकारे स्पष्टीकुर्वन्ति ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः अनुभवावसानत्वकथनेन। श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एवानुभवस्तथा न तु श्रुत्यननुगृहीत इत्यन्यदेतत्। अतः अनुभवद्वारा अद्वैतं साधयितुं प्रयतामहे।

सर्वे प्राणिनः आत्मनः अस्तित्वं प्रतियन्ति। न खलु कोऽप्यनुभवति 'नाहमस्मि' इति। तञ्च आत्मानम् अहमिति व्यवहरन्ति इति सर्वजनविदितमेतत्। अथ कोऽसावहं-शब्दबोध्य इति विचारयामः। सार्वजनीनानुभवबलेन क्वचिदसावहंशब्दः देहरूपमर्थम् अवलम्ब्य प्रयुज्यते, यथा 'स्थूलोऽहं' 'कृशोऽहम्' इत्यादिषु व्यवहारेषु, स्थौल्य-कार्श्यादीनां देहधर्मत्वाङ्गीकारे विवादाभावात्। क्वचिदसावहंशब्दः इन्द्रियाण्यवलम्ब्य प्रयुज्यते, यथा 'काणोऽहं' 'मूकोऽहम्' इत्यादिषु व्यवहारेषु। काणत्व-मूकत्वादीनाम् इन्द्रियधर्मत्वस्य सर्वसम्मतत्वम्। क्वचिदसावहंशब्दः मनः तथा मनोधर्मानवलम्ब्य प्रयुज्यते, यथा 'सुख्यहं' 'दुःख्यहम्' इत्यादिषु व्यवहारेषु, सुखदुःखादीनां मनोधर्मत्वाङ्गीकारस्य सार्वजनीनत्वात्।

सर्वे चेमे व्यवहाराः बाधिता बोद्धव्याः। तथाहि- 'स्थूलोऽहं' 'कृशोऽहम्' इत्यादयो देहधर्मावलम्बिनो व्यवहाराः बाधिताः एव। बाल-वृद्ध-देहयोः शरीरभेदे प्रसिद्धेऽपि शरीरिणः आत्मनः अभेदेन अनुभूयमानत्वात्। सर्वोऽपि जनः बालस्य वृद्धस्य च शरीराकारे भेदमनुभवति। स्वयमपि च सर्वे तथानुभवन्ति। तथापि, 'स एवायम्' इत्येव सर्वे अनुभवन्ति व्यवहरन्ति च। अपि च स्वप्ने स्वविलक्षणं भव्यं शरीरमनुभूय, प्रतिबुद्धः, स्वप्नदृष्टविलक्षणं स्वसहजं शरीरमनुभवन्नपि 'स्वप्ने भव्यशरीरवानहमासम्' इति व्यवहरति। तथा च, शरीरगतभेदमनुभवन्नपि तदनुरूपं व्यवहरन्नपि अवस्थाद्वये अनुभूतमात्मानम् अभिन्नत्वेनानुभवति, व्यवहरति चाभिन्नतया। अत एव च देहात्, देहधर्मेभ्यश्च भिन्न एव आत्मा अङ्गीकार्यो भवति, भिद्यमानेषु देहेषु देहधर्मेषु च अभिद्यमानत्वेन तेषु अनुस्यूततया च आत्मनः प्रतीतेः, येषु भिद्यमानेषु यद् अनुवर्तते

तद् भिद्यमानेभ्यः तेभ्यः भिन्नं स्यात् इति नियमात्, लोके तथा अनुभूयमानत्वात्। तथा हि पुष्पमालायां ग्रथितानि पुष्पाणि जात्या, वर्णेन, आकारेण च परस्परं भिद्यन्ते। किन्तु यस्मिन् एकस्मिन् सूत्रे तानि ग्रथितानि तत् सूत्रम् तेषु पुष्पेषु अनुस्यूतं सत् तेभ्यो भिन्नम् अनुभूयते व्यवह्रियते च। तत्समान्यात् भिद्यमानेषु देहेषु देहधर्मेषु च अभिद्यमानः सन् अनुस्यूततया तेषु भासमानः आत्मा देहात् देहधर्मेभ्यश्च भिन्नः इति अङ्गीकरणीयम्। एवञ्च देहात् देहधर्मेभ्यश्च पृथग्भूतः आत्मा इति सिद्ध्यति।

एवमेव 'काणोऽहं' 'मूकोऽहम्' इत्यादयः इन्द्रिय-इन्द्रियधर्मावलम्बिनो व्यवहाराः अपि बाधिता वेदितव्याः, चक्षुश्श्रोत्रादीनाम् इन्द्रियाणां परस्परभेदे अनुभूयमानेऽपि अनुभवितुः आत्मनः सर्वत्रानुस्यूततया अभिन्नत्वेन एकत्वेन च प्रतीयमानत्वात्। अत एव "योऽहं पूर्वमपश्यं स एवाहमिदानीं स्पृशामि" इति व्यवहरति, आत्मनः प्रत्यभिज्ञां चानुभवति। प्रत्यभिज्ञा चैषा न सम्भवति यदि इन्द्रियाण्येव आत्मा इत्यङ्गीकुर्याम। किञ्च, अनुभवसाधनानि इन्द्रियाणि बहूनि अनुभविता आत्मा चैक एव। अतोऽपि हेतोः आत्मा इन्द्रियेभ्यः पृथग्भूतः इति अङ्गीकरणीयम्।

एवमेव, 'सुख्यहं' 'दुःख्यहम्' इत्यादयो मनोधर्मावलम्बिनो व्यवहाराः अपि बाधिता वेदितव्याः, सुखदुःखादीनां मनसैव अन्वयव्यतिरेकदर्शनात् आत्मना च तथाऽदर्शनात्, तेषां मनोधर्मत्वाङ्गीकारस्यावश्यकत्वात्। तथा हि सत्सु सुखादीनां कारणेषु सति च मनसि सुखादयोऽनुभूयन्ते। सत्सु सुखादीनां कारणेषु असति च मनसि (मनोव्यापारे) सुखादयो नानुभूयन्ते, यथा मूर्छितावस्थापन्नानाम्। आत्मा तु मूर्छिताद्यवस्थापन्नानामपि भवत्येव। अतः अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां मनोधर्मत्वमेव सुखादीनामिति 'सुख्यहं' 'दुःख्यहम्' इत्यादयोऽपि व्यवहाराः बाधिता एव ज्ञेयाः। एवञ्च, आत्मा मनसः मनोधर्मेभ्योऽपि पृथग्भूत एवेति सिद्ध्यति।

एवञ्च, पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेण देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिभ्योऽतिरिक्तः आत्मासौ कः किंरूपः इति जिज्ञासा उपजायते।

सन्दर्भेऽस्मिन्, अन्यमपि कञ्चिद् अनुभवं परिशीलयामः। जाग्रत्स्वप्न-सुषुप्ति-नामकमवस्थात्रयमपि सर्वप्राणिसाधारणं सर्वविदितञ्चास्ति। एतासामवस्थानां सम्यग् विश्लेषणेनापि अनुभवबलेन आत्मनः स्वरूपज्ञानं भवितुमर्हति। तथा हि, जाग्रद्दशायां सर्वोऽपि जन्तुः देहेन्द्रियमनसां सहयोगेन स्वदेहात् बहिर्भूतं जगदनुभवन् 'अहं जानामि'

'अहं पश्यामि' 'अहं जिघ्रामि' 'अहं स्पृशामि' 'अहं गच्छामि' 'अहं घटं करोमि' 'अहं वदामि' इत्यादिव्यवहारान् करोति। जाग्रद्दशायाम् इन्द्रियाणां मनसश्च प्रवृत्तिरस्त्येव। एतद्विलक्षणतया स्वप्ने इन्द्रियाणि न व्याप्रियन्ते। मनस्तु व्याप्रियते। केवलमनसः साहाय्येनैव जाग्रदवस्थासमकक्षान् अनुभवाननुभवति। अन्तरेव बाह्यजगत्सदृशं मनसः साहाय्येन विलक्षणं जगत् सृष्ट्वा उपरतेष्वपीन्द्रियेषु इन्द्रियव्यापारम् अनुभवन्निव भवति। सुप्तोत्थितस्तु 'स्वप्ने गजमन्वभवम्' 'रथमन्वभवम्' इति परामृशति। अस्मिंश्च परामर्शे आत्मापि भासते एव। अतः देहस्य इन्द्रियाणाञ्च अनुभवाभावेऽपि आत्मनोऽनुभवसत्त्वात् आत्मा देहेन्द्रियपृथग्भूतः इति सिद्ध्यति। सुषुप्तावस्थायां तु मनसोऽपि लयकारणात् शरीरबन्धकारणीभूताविद्यामात्रसहायो भूत्वा अविद्याम् आनन्दं चानुभवति। न तु बाह्यमान्तरं वा जगदनुभवति। अत एव तत उत्थितो भूत्वा परामृशति 'गाढं मूढोऽहमासं, न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति। अत्र बाह्याभ्यन्तर-प्रपञ्चाभावम् अनुभवन्नपि आत्मानं त्वनुभवत्येव। एतेनेदं सिद्ध्यति यत्, जाग्रत्स्वप्न-सुषुप्तीनाम् अवस्थानां भिद्यमानत्वेऽपि आत्मानमभिद्यमानम् अवस्थात्रयेऽपि अनुस्यूततया भासमानमनुभवामः। अतोऽपि कारणात् आत्मासौ देहेन्द्रियमनोभ्यः अतिरिक्तः, ततः पृथग्भूतश्च इति सिद्ध्यति।

अनेनैव प्रकारेण शरीरत्रयकल्पनां पञ्चकोशकल्पनामपि अनुभवबलेनापि साधयितुं प्रभवामः। जाग्रदवस्थायां बहिरिन्द्रयाणां साहाय्येन यानि पाञ्चभौतिकानि असङ्ख्यानि शरीराणि अनुभूयन्ते तानि स्थूलशरीराणीति व्यवपदिश्यन्ते। यानि खलु अन्नमयकोशे अन्तर्भवन्ति। प्रत्यक्षतः अनुभवाभावेऽपि ज्ञानसाधनत्वेन क्रियासाधनत्वेन च हेतुना सिद्धानि दशेन्द्रियाणि, ज्ञानसामान्यकारणं मनः, तथा देहेन्द्रियमनसामवस्थितेः कारणभूताः पञ्च प्राणाश्च, आहत्य षोडशपदार्थसङ्घातः सूक्ष्मशरीरमिति व्यपदिश्यते। यत् खलु प्राणमय-मनोमय-विज्ञानमय-कोशेषु अन्तर्भवति। 'गाढं मूढोऽहमासं, न किञ्चिदवेदिषम् इति सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शात्मकानुभवसिद्धम् अज्ञानम् अविद्याशब्दवाच्यं कारणशरीरमिति कथ्यते। यच्च 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति सुप्तोत्थितपरामर्शानुभवसिद्धे आनन्दमयकोशे अन्तर्भवति।

एवञ्च, 'येषु भिद्यमानेषु यद् अनुवर्तते तद् भिद्यमानेभ्यः तेभ्यः भिन्नं स्यात्' इति लोकानुभवसिद्धन्यायबलेन, अवस्थात्रय-शरीरत्रय-पञ्चकोशानाम् अनुभवाधारितेन

विश्लेषणेन च आत्मा देहेन्द्रियमनस्सङ्घातात्, अवस्थात्रयाच्च पृथग्भूतः तद्व्यतिरिक्तश्चेति सिद्ध्यति। स च किंरूपः इति विचारे नामरूपयोः शरीरोत्पत्तिनाशाभ्याम्, अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ अनुभवसिद्धौ इत्यतः नामरूपविमुक्तः एव आत्मा इत्यङ्गीकर्तव्यं भवति। सुषुप्तौ तु पूर्वप्रदर्शितानुभवद्वयबलेन आनन्दः आत्मनः स्वरूपमिति सिद्ध्यति। यतोऽहि, तस्यामवस्थायाम् अविद्यां चात्मानञ्च अतिरिच्य किमप्यन्यत् नानुभूयते। अविद्या च आनन्दरूपिणी इत्यङ्गीकारः सर्वजनानुभवविरुद्धः। परिशेषात् आत्मा एवानन्दस्वरूप इत्यायाति। एवमेव आत्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वमपि सिद्ध्यति। सुषुप्तौ आत्मनः प्रकाशस्तु सुप्तोत्थितानुभवबलेनैव अङ्गीक्रियते। तत्र च आत्मारिक्तः प्रकाशकः नास्त्येव। आत्मातिरिक्तायाः अविद्यायाः जडत्वात् अप्रकाशकत्वात्। अतः आत्मना स्वप्रकाशेन भाव्यमेव। सुप्तोत्थितस्य सौषुप्तिकात्मानुभवपरामर्शबलादेव आत्मनः ज्ञानरूपत्वमपि सिद्ध्यति, सुषुप्तौ आत्मातिरिक्तप्रकाशकाभावात्।

एवञ्च, आत्मा सत्-चिद्-आनन्दस्वरूपः, निर्गुणः, निष्क्रियः, शुद्धः, शान्तः इति सिद्ध्यति। अत एव तद्भिन्नानि देहेन्द्रियमन आदीनि, ततोऽपि बहिर्भूतं जगच्च जडानि दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपाणि प्रकाशकेन आत्मना प्रकाश्यमानानि इत्यपि सिद्ध्यति। एतदेव तेषां मिथ्यात्वं नाम। पूर्वप्रदर्शिताः सर्वजनसाधारणाः व्यवहाराः सर्वेऽपि अनात्मभूत-देहेन्द्रियमनसाम् आत्मनि आरोपद्वारा एव निर्वोढव्या इत्यपि सिद्ध्यति। अयमेव आत्मानात्मनोः अभेदारोपः अध्यासः इति शास्त्रे परिभाष्यते।

पिण्डाण्ड-ब्रह्माण्डयोः स्वरूपसाम्यकारणात् ज्ञाताद् अज्ञातस्य अनुमितिः इति न्यायबलेन च परमात्मापि निर्गुणः, निष्क्रियः, शुद्धः, शान्तः, सत्-चिद्-आनन्दस्वरूपः इत्यायाति।

अपि च बहूनां जागतिकवस्तूनाम् उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशाः सर्वेषामनुभवे सन्तीति अनित्यत्वं सर्वकार्यजातस्य सिद्धम्। दृष्टबलेन च येषामुत्पत्तिनाशाः नास्माकमनुभवे सन्ति तेषामपि कार्यरूपाणाम् अनित्यत्वमनुमानबलेन अवगम्यते। अतश्च कारणमेकमेव सत्यं कार्याणां सत्यत्वं त्वधिष्ठानभूतकारणसत्यत्वानतिरिक्तमेव इति निश्चीयते। जडचेतनात्मकतया अनुभूयमानस्य शरीरेन्द्रियकार्यजातस्य यथा मूलकारणमेकं शुद्धं चैतन्यमात्रं पूर्वं प्रतिपादितं, तथा जडचेतनात्मकतया परिदृश्यमानस्य निखिलजगतः मूलकारणमपि शुद्धमेकं चैतन्यमात्रमिति दृष्टसाम्यात् अनुमिनुमः। तदेव मूलकारणं

ब्रह्मेति परिभाष्यते। सत्-चिद्-आनन्दात्मकतया सकलकार्याधिष्ठानतया च जीवब्रह्मणोः स्वरूपसाम्यमपि अनुभवामः जीवस्तावत् व्यष्टिप्रपञ्चस्य, ब्रह्म तु समष्टिप्रपञ्चस्य तथेत्यन्यदेतत्। स्वरूपसाम्यस्य निदिध्यासनेन च जीवब्रह्मणोः अभेदज्ञानं भवति।

किञ्च, सौषुप्तिकानुभवबलेन इदं निश्चित्य वक्तुं प्रभवामः यत् शरीरेन्द्रिय-मनस्सङ्घातः बाह्यप्रपञ्चश्च अस्माकमनुभवसमसमयमेव वर्तते। यदा खल्वेतान् अनुभवामः तदा सन्ति यदा नानुभवामः तदा सन्तीति वक्तुं प्रमाणं नास्ति। तथा च, येन यदा दृश्यन्ते तेन तदा एते सृज्यन्ते, यदा च न दृश्यन्ते तदा प्रलीयन्ते इत्यङ्गीकर्तुं शक्नुमः। पक्षे चास्मिन् ईश्वरादिबहिर्जगत् सर्वमपि आत्मनैव अनुभवसमसमयं सृज्यते इत्यङ्गीकारात् आत्मातिरिक्तस्य द्वितीयस्य वस्तुनः एवाभावात्, जीवब्रह्माभेदसाधकस्य प्रमाणस्य अन्वेषणमेव न प्रसज्यते इति स्वतः सिद्धं भवति अद्वैतम्। अत एव अयमेव सिद्धान्तः वेदान्तिनां मुख्यः सिद्धान्त इति मधुसूदनसरस्वतीश्रीचरणैः अभिहितमिति।

सन्दर्भसूची–

१. न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्, किन्तु, श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह प्रमाणम्, अनुभवावसानत्वात् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य।
ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्यम्, जन्माद्यधिकरणम्, पृ. ८.

संस्कृत-छन्दश्शास्त्र का उद्भव एवं विकास

प्रो. अभिराज राजेन्द्रमिश्र

छन्द शब्द का प्रयोग पुलिङ्ग तथा नपुंसकलिङ्ग दोनों में ही मिलता है। पुलिङ्ग छन्द शब्द का अर्थ है इच्छा। स्वच्छन्द तथ स्वच्छन्दता आदि प्रयोगों का अर्थ है- अपनी इच्छा से कार्य करने वाला व्यक्ति, अर्थात् स्वतन्त्र, स्वाधीन।[1] क्लीबान्त छन्दस् शब्द का अर्थ है पाठकों को आह्लादित करने वाला एक काव्यतत्त्व जिसका उपयोग पद्यरचना में किया जाता है। चूँकि वेद-मन्त्रों में इस छन्दस् का बाहुल्येन उपयोग था, इसीलिये वेदसंहिता का एक नाम ही विख्यात हो गया- छन्दस् अथवा छान्दस। अष्टाध्यायीकार महर्षि पाणिनि ने वेद के लिये छन्दस् शब्द का प्रयोग अनेकशः किया है।[२]

छन्दस् का अभिप्राय क्या है? प्राचीन आचार्यों ने कई प्रकार से व्याख्या की है। एक मत के अनुसार तो 'चदि आह्लादने धातु' से 'चादयति आह्लादयति पाठकान् श्रोतॄन् इति चन्दः' व्याख्या के साथ 'चन्दस्' शब्द बना है। चकार का छकार पृषोदरादि (Irregularly) नियम से हो गया है। कहीं-कहीं 'चन्दयति आह्लादयति' व्याख्या भी मिलती है। एक अन्य व्याख्या के अनुसार 'छाद् आच्छादने' धातु से छादयति काव्यरसमिति छन्दः' व्याख्या के साथ यह शब्द निष्पन्न हुआ है। इसमें नुमागम अनियमवश हो गया है। काव्यरसाच्छादन के ही कारण इसे छन्द कहते हैं। जैसे कोई चषक अथवा मल्लक पेय रस को बहने, नष्ट होने से बचाता है- अपने आवरण (Cover) के कारण उसी प्रकार छन्द भी काव्यरस को अपने कंचुक अथवा सम्पुट में सुरक्षित रखता है, नष्ट नहीं होने देता। इसीलिये उसे 'छन्दस्' कहते हैं।

छन्दस् को समधिक ख्याति वेद-पर्याय बनने से ही मिली। वेदमन्त्रों की विविध जटिलताओं, रहस्यों एवं प्रविधियों को बोधगम्य बनाने के लिये जब षड् वेदाङ्गों का उदय हुआ तब छन्दस् की प्रतिष्ठा प्रथम वेदाङ्ग के रूप में हुई–

छन्दः पादौ तु वेदस्य हस्तौ कल्पोऽथ पठ्यते।
ज्योतिषामयनं चक्षुर्निरुक्तं श्रोत्रमुच्यते।।
शिक्षा घ्राणं तु वेदस्य मुखं व्याकरणं स्मृतम्।
तस्मात्साङ्गमधीत्यैव ब्रह्मलोके महीयते।।

– पाणिनीय शिक्षा

* वैदिकसंशोधनमण्डल, पुणे में प्रदत्त व्याख्यान (२०११) का लिखित रूप।

छन्द का यह वर्णन एक सांग रूपक का अंश है। इसमें वेदपुरुष की कल्पना करके, उसके विविध शरीरावयवों की चर्चा की गई है जो अत्यन्त साकूत एवं साभिप्राय है। इसमें छन्द को वेदपुरुष का चरण निरूपित किया गया है। जैसे चरणों से ही पुरुष गतिमान् होता है, ठीक उसी प्रकार वेद भी छन्दों से गतिमान् होता है। पद्यबद्ध रचना में ग्रन्थ का कथानक, छन्दोबद्ध पद्यों के ही माध्यम से, आगे बढ़ता है। गद्यात्मक कथा तो अनुच्छेदों से अग्रसर होती है परन्तु पद्यात्मक कथा छन्दों से। इस प्रकार, इतिवृत्त की यात्रा में छन्द अथवा छन्दोबद्ध पद्य पाद अथवा चरण का काम करते हैं।

वेदाङ्गों में छन्द का इदम्प्रथमतया स्थानापन्न होना भी कुछ कम महत्त्वपूर्ण नहीं है। चरणहीन (पंगु) व्यक्ति का जीवन भला किस काम का? नेत्र, मुख, हस्त, कर्ण, हृदय- सबके रहते हुए भी उसका जीवन निरुद्देश्य हो उठता है- गतिहीन होने के कारण! ठीक उसी प्रकार साहित्य अथवा वाङ्मय (काव्य) भी गतिहीन हो जाता है छन्दस् के अभाव में। इसीलिये छन्दस् को शिक्षाकार ने प्रथमाऽभिकांक्ष्य काव्यतत्त्व बताया।

लौकिक संस्कृत में छन्द की प्रतिष्ठा शास्त्र एवं काव्य (लेखनशैली) के रूप में विक्रमसंवत् के उदय से पूर्व ही हो चुकी थी। जैसे महर्षि बादरायण ने ब्रह्मसूत्र का, कपिल ने सांख्यसूत्र का, गौतम ने न्यायसूत्र का, कणाद ने वैशेषिकसूत्र का, पतञ्जलि ने योगसूत्र का तथा जैमिनि ने मीमांसासूत्र का प्रवचन कर तत्तद् दर्शनों का सूत्रपात किया अथवा महर्षि पाणिनि ने अष्टाध्यायी का प्रणयन कर व्याकरणशास्त्र को व्यवस्थित किया, उसी प्रकार महर्षि पिङ्गल ने छन्दस्सूत्रों का प्रवचन कर छन्दश्शास्त्र की नींव डाली। प्रो० विण्टरनित्ज पिंङ्गल का समय १५० वर्ष ई.पू. मानते हैं। परन्तु जनश्रुति पिङ्गल को पाणिनि का सहोदर सिद्ध करती है। यदि यह बात सत्य है तो डॉ. वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल द्वारा निश्चित पाणिनि का समय (ई.पू. आठवीं शती) ही पिङ्गल का भी समय होना चाहिए।

महर्षि पिङ्गल ने छन्दस्सूत्रों का प्रणयन कर छन्दश्शास्त्र को स्थिरता प्रदान की। यद्यपि उनसे पूर्व भी, शौनकप्रणीत प्रातिशाख्य में, कात्यायनप्रणीत सर्वानुक्रमणी में, सामवेदीय निदानसूत्र में तथा शाखायन श्रौतसूत्र में भी कई अध्याय छन्दों पर लिखे जा चुके थे। अग्निपुराण (अ.३२८-३३५) में छन्दोविषयक प्रभूत सामग्री विवेचित है।

फिर भी पिङ्गलप्रणीत छन्दस्सूत्र एक युगप्रवर्तक ग्रंथ सिद्ध हुआ, क्योंकि परवर्ती आचार्यों ने पिङ्गल को ही प्रमाण मानकर तथा उसके आधार पर अवान्तर ग्रन्थों का प्रणयन किया। छन्दश्शास्त्रीय वाङ्मय का एक संक्षिप्त विवरण प्रस्तुत है–

	आचार्य	ग्रन्थसंज्ञा	रचनाकाल
१.	कालिदास	श्रुतबोधः	ई.पू. द्वितीय शती
२.	क्षेमेन्द्र	सुवृत्ततिलकम्	११वीं शती
३.	गङ्गादास	छन्दोमञ्जरी	१२वीं शती
४.	हेमचन्द्राचार्य	छन्दोऽनुशासनम्	१२वीं शती
५.	केदारभट्ट	वृत्तरत्नाकरः	१५वीं शती
६.	बलदेवविद्याभूषण	छन्दः कौस्तुभम्	१६वीं शती
७.	जयकीर्ति	छन्दोऽनुशासनम्	–
८.	जयदेव	छन्दोविचितिः	–
९.	यादवप्रकाश	पिङ्गलच्छन्दोविचितिभाष्यम्	
१०.	विरहाङ्क	वृत्तचन्द्रोदयः	–
११.	चन्द्रशेखर	वृत्तमौक्तिकम्	–
१२.	छन्दश्शेखरम्	वृत्तमञ्जरी	(अज्ञातकर्तृक)
१३.	छन्दोरत्नावली	वृत्तशिल्पम्	(अज्ञातकर्तृक)
१४.	छन्दोमञ्जरीसञ्जीवनी		
१५.	अभिराज राजेन्द्र	छन्दोऽभिराजीयम्	२०वीं शती

छन्दशास्त्र के विवेच्य विषयों की चर्चा आगे की जायेगी। जैसा कि हमने पूर्व अनुच्छेद में कहा कि छन्द का विकास सिद्धान्त एवं व्यवहार- दोनों ही रूपों में हुआ। उसी सन्दर्भ में छन्दशास्त्रीय ग्रन्थों का संक्षिप्त परिचय दिया गया। परन्तु यह विवरण सांगोपांग (Exhaustive) नहीं है। छन्दश्शास्त्र के प्रथम प्रवचनकार आचार्य पिङ्गल स्वयमेव छन्द के पर्याय बन गये जैसा कि 'प्राकृतपैङ्गलम्' (प्राकृत छन्दश्शास्त्र) संज्ञा से सिद्ध होता है। उत्तरभारत के गाँवों में आज भी अनेक मुहावरे आचार्य पिङ्गल का स्मरण करते हैं जैसे- पिङ्गल गढ़ना, पिङ्गल पादना (विपरीत लक्षणा) चूँकि छन्द-रचना में कभी-कभी उचित शब्द न मिलने पर बड़ा उद्वेग, श्रम एवं संकट होता है अतः किसी भी व्यक्ति के पहेली बुझाने पर अथवा अस्पष्ट बात करने पर प्रायः यह व्यङ्ग्य बोला जाता है कि 'पिङ्गल मत गढ़ो, साफ-साफ कहो।' आदि।

इस शास्त्र में लघु-गुरू-अक्षर-लक्षण, गणविधान, गणसंख्या यतिविधान वृत्त-जातिलक्षण, एक से छब्बीस अक्षर लम्बे छन्दों की सामान्य संज्ञा, सामान्य छन्दों के विशेष भेद, समवृत्त, अर्धसमवृत्त, विषमवृत्त छन्दों के लक्षण, छन्दों के वर्ण, देवता, रसानुकूल्य तथा वर्ण्यविषयानुसारी प्रयोगौचित्य आदि विषयों का गहन विवेचन आचार्यो द्वारा किया गया है।

जहाँ तक व्यवहार में छन्द के प्रयोग का प्रश्न है उसमें भी आचार्यों की दो दृष्टियाँ है। एक दृष्टि से तो छन्दोयुक्त एवं छन्दोविहीन बन्ध पृथक् होते हैं तथा परस्पर विसंवादी भी। परन्तु दूसरी दृष्टि यह है कि कोई भी अक्षर अथवा पद (शब्द) छन्दोहीन होता ही नहीं। छन्द एक साङ्गीतिकगुण (Mucical Quality) है जो अक्षर-अक्षर में व्याप्त होती है। अतः किसी बन्ध (Composition) को छन्दोयुक्त (पद्य) तथा दूसरे को छन्दोहीन (गद्य) मानना उपचार मात्र है। आचार्य भरत का मत द्रष्टव्य है–

छन्दोहीनो न शब्दोऽस्ति न च्छन्दः शब्दवर्जितम्।
तस्मात्तूभयसंयुक्ते नाट्यस्योद्योतके स्मृते।।

–नाट्य. १४.४०.

इस मान्यता के बावजूद आचार्य भरत, व्यवहार में बन्ध के दो रूप मानते ही हैं- निबद्धबन्ध एवं चूर्णबन्ध। आचार्य भरत पुनः इन्हीं दोनों को (प्रमाण) **नियताक्षरबन्ध** तथा **अनियताक्षरबन्ध** नाम देते हैं।

प्रमाण अर्थात् छन्दश्शास्त्रीय व्यवस्था के अनुसार नियत है, निश्चित है अक्षरों की संख्या (तथा स्थान) जिसमें उसे नियताक्षरबन्ध कहते हैं। उदाहरणार्थ वंशस्थ छन्द को लें। इसमें प्रमाण (लक्षण) क्या है? प्रमाण है- **जतौ तु वंशस्थमुदीरितं जरौ**। अब इस प्रमाण से ही वंशस्थ के प्रत्येक पाद में अक्षरों की संख्या (जगण, तगण, जगण, रगण। एक गण में तीन अक्षर होते हैं, अतः एक चरण में कुल बारह अक्षर होंगे।) निश्चित है।

यद्यपि आचार्य भरत पद्य का नाम नहीं लेते। केवल नियताक्षर की चर्चा करते हैं। पद्य चतुष्पाद होता है और उसके प्रत्येक पाद में अक्षरों की संख्या नियत अथवा निश्चित होती है। परन्तु मेरी दृष्टि में अक्षरों की संख्या ही नहीं, उनका स्थान भी निश्चित होता है। उदाहरणार्थ वंशस्थ का लक्षण है- जतौ तु वंशस्थमुदीरितं जरौ। अर्थात् वंशस्थ के चारों चरणों में अक्षर जगण, तगण, जगण तथा रगण के क्रम में आयेंगे। इसका अर्थ यह हुआ कि प्रत्येक अक्षर का स्थान (लघुत्व एवं गुरुत्व) भी निश्चित ही हैं- गणस्वरूप के कारण। **गुरुमध्यगतः** अर्थात् जगण में गुरुवर्ण मध्य में आता है। **अन्तलघुस्तः** अर्थात् तगण में लघुवर्ण अन्त में आता है। **रलमध्यः** अर्थात् रगण में लघु अक्षर मध्य में आता है। इस व्याख्या से स्पष्ट है कि प्रमाणनियताक्षर-बन्ध में अक्षरों की संख्या तथा स्थान-दोनों ही नियत होते हैं। वस्तुतः इसी कारण इस बन्ध में लय, प्रवाह, माधुर्यादि गुण भी उत्पन्न होते हैं।

अनियताक्षरबन्ध अथवा चूर्णपदबन्ध में ऐसा नहीं होता। उसमें तो अर्थ (अभिप्राय) की अपेक्षा से ही अल्प अथवा अनल्प अक्षरों का आदान होता है।

अवान्तरकाल में गद्य के जो चार भेद आचार्यों द्वारा व्याख्यात किये गये- मुक्तक, वृत्तगन्धि, चूर्णक तथा उत्कलिकाप्राय- उनमें चूर्णकगद्य, **अल्पसमासात्मक** तथा **उत्कलिकाप्राय** दीर्घसमासात्मक होता है। चूर्णक गद्य में अर्थ अथवा अभिप्राय सीमित होता है (जैसे कादम्बरी में पुण्डरीक को कपिञ्जल का उपदेश अथवा कुमार चन्द्रापीड को शुकनास का उपदेश) परन्तु उत्कलिकाप्राय गद्य में अर्थ की विपुलता होती है। कादम्बरी के विन्ध्याटवीवर्णन अथवा जाबालिआश्रम-वर्णन में हम ऐसा ही गद्य पाते हैं।

भरत (ई.पू. चतुर्थ शती) के अनन्तर काव्यविभाजन प्रस्तुत किया भामह तथा दण्डी ने। इन दोनों ही आचार्यों ने नियताक्षर तथा अनियताक्षर-बन्ध को क्रमशः पद्य एवं गद्य कहा। भामह ने चार प्रकार के काव्यविभाजनों की बानगी प्रस्तुत की। **छन्द** के आधार पर पद्य एवं गद्य। **भाषा** के आधार पर संस्कृत, प्राकृत एवं अपभ्रंश। **प्रतिपाद्य** के आधार पर देवचरिताश्रित, कल्पितवस्तु, कलाश्रित तथा शास्त्राश्रित। **स्वरूप** के आधार पर सर्गबन्ध (महाकाव्य), अभिनेयार्थ (रूपक) आख्यायिका, कथा तथा अनिबद्ध (मुक्तक)।

आचार्य दण्डी ने पद्य एवं गद्य के ही साथ मिश्रकाव्य को भी प्रतिष्ठित किया जिसे बाद में चम्पूकाव्य कहा गया।[३] पद्यविद्या में दण्डी ने सर्गबन्ध महाकाव्य तथा तदंगभूत मुक्तक, कुलक, कोष तथा संघातकाव्य को प्रतिष्ठित किया। गद्य में उन्होंने कथा एवं आख्यायिका की परिगणना की और अन्ततः समूचे वाङ्मय को चतुर्विध बताया- संस्कृत प्राकृत अपभ्रंश तथा मिश्र।

काव्यविभाजन का यह प्रकरण ध्वन्यालोक, सरस्वती-कण्ठाभरण तथा साहित्यदर्पणादि में भी है, उत्तरोत्तर संवर्धित रूप में। परन्तु पद्य एवं गद्य का भेद सभी आचार्यों ने स्वीकार किया है।[४]

प्रस्तुत विवेचन से, बन्धरचना में छन्द की भूमिका स्पष्ट हो जाती है। छन्द की आवश्यकता पद्य-निर्माण में होती है। यह पद्य पादों से बनता है- **पादैः चरणैर्नियम्यत इति पद्यम्**। ये पाद चार होते हैं, इसीलिये पद्य को चतुष्पदी भी कहते हैं। यदि पाद का निर्माण अक्षर-संख्या पर आधारित हो तो उसे वार्णिकच्छन्द अथवा वृत्त कहते हैं। परन्तु अक्षरों की मात्राओं पर यदि पादनिर्माण किया जाय तो उसे मात्रिकच्छन्द अथवा जाति कहते हैं।[५]

जैसा प्रारंभ में ही बताया गया, वेद को महर्षि पाणिनि छन्दस् कहते हैं। संभवतः इसका कारण यही था कि वेदमंत्र छन्दोबद्ध थे। वेदों में मुख्यतः सात

छन्दों का उपयोग मिलता है- गायत्री (षडक्षर) उष्णिक् (सात अक्षर) अनुष्टुप् (आठ अक्षर) बृहती (नौ अक्षर) पङ्क्ति (१० अक्षर) त्रिष्टुप् (११ अक्षर) तथ जगती (१२ अक्षर)।

अतिजगती, शक्वरी, अतिशक्वरी, अष्टि, अत्यष्टि, धृति, अतिधृति के भी सन्दर्भ वेदों में मिलते हैं। गहन परीक्षण से ज्ञात होता है कि वेदों में कुल ७१ छन्दों का प्रयोग हुआ है।

वेदों के अनन्तर आते हैं आर्षकाव्य- रामायण एवं महाभारत तथा अष्टादश पुराण। रामायण में मुख्यतः तेरह छन्द प्रयुक्त हैं- अनुष्टुप्, इन्द्रवज्रा, उपेन्द्रवज्रा, वंशस्थ, इन्द्रवंशा, वैश्वदेवी, प्रहर्षिणी, रूचिरा, वसन्ततिलका, पुष्पिताग्रा, अपरवक्त्र, सुन्दरी तथा औपच्छन्दसिक।

महाभारत में कुल १८ छन्दों का प्रयोग दीखता है- अनुष्टुप्, इन्द्रवज्रा, उपेन्द्रवज्रा, वंशस्थ, इन्द्रवंशा, रथोद्धता, शालिनी, भुजङ्गप्रयात, द्रुतबिलम्बित, मालिनी, पञ्जचामर, वैश्वदेवी, रुचिरा, वसन्ततिलका, पुष्पिताग्रा, अपरवक्त्र, शार्दूलविक्रीडित, प्रमाणिका।

कालिदासोत्तर युग में छन्दों की संख्या उत्तरोत्तर बढ़ती गई है- आविष्कार तथा प्रयोग दोनों ही दृष्टियों से। महाकवि माघ ने तो शिशुपालवध महाकाव्य के तृतीय सर्ग में, रैवतक पर्वत के वर्णन-सन्दर्भ में, कुल उन्तीस छन्दों का प्रयोग किया। वैसे, प्रयोग की दृष्टि से, महाकाव्यलक्षणकारों ने छन्दोवैविध्य का अधिक पक्ष नहीं लिया है। वे तो बस इतना ही कहते हैं कि प्रत्येक सर्ग में एक ही छन्द का प्रयोग होना चाहिये। हाँ, सर्गान्त में छन्द का परिवर्तन अवश्य करना चाहिये। यह निर्देश सर्वथा स्वाभाविक भी है। क्योंकि सम्पूर्ण सर्ग में एक ही छन्द के उपयोग से कथाप्रवाह में समरसता बनी रहती है। पाठक की रुचि तथा अभिप्राय-ग्रहण में भी विषमता नहीं आती। अन्यथा वह अभिप्राय को छोड़ पहले छन्द की ही प्रविधि को समझने में प्रयत्नशील हो उठता है।

छन्दोरचना के विषय में कुछ विशेष कहने से पूर्व हम पुनः पूर्वोल्लिखित तथ्य पर आते हैं कि संस्कृत में ये छन्द एक से छब्बीस अक्षर तक लम्बे होते हैं- वार्णिक छन्द में[६]। इसका स्पष्टतर अभिप्राय यह है कि किसी वार्णिक छन्द (वृत्त) का एक चरण, एक से छब्बीस अक्षर तक लम्बा हो सकता है। इन छब्बीसों भेदों के पृथक् नाम हैं। अक्षरों की इस लम्बी संख्या को जिस मानक या इकाई (Unit) से

नापा जाता है उसे गण कहते हैं जो तीन अक्षरों का होता है। ये गण आठ होते हैं अक्षरों के स्थान (आदि-मध्य-अन्त) तथा उच्चारण-गुण (लघुत्व-गुरुत्व) के कारण। उदाहरणार्थ–

आदिगुरु	भगण	SII	वेश्मनि
मध्यगुरु	जगण	ISI	विधाय
अन्तगुरु	सगण	IIS	कमला
आदिलघु	यगण	ISS	विधाता
मध्यलघु	रगण	SIS	श्यामला
अन्तलघु	तगण	SSI	आदाय
सर्वगुरु	मगण	SSS	वैधेयैः
सर्वलघु	नगण	III	क्व खलु

मस्त्रिगुरुस्त्रिलघुश्च नकारो मादिगुरुः पुनरादिलघुर्यः।
जो गुरुमध्यगतो रलमध्यः सोऽन्तगुरुः कथितोऽन्तलघुस्तः।।
आदिमध्याऽवसानेषु भजसा यान्ति गौरवम्।
यरता लाघवं यान्ति मनौ तु गुरुलाघवम्।।

एक से छब्बीस अक्षर लम्बे चरणों में, जब चरणाक्षरों की संख्या तीन से आगे बढ़ने लगती है तब उनमें विकल्प बनने लगते हैं। उदाहरणार्थ ग्यारह अक्षर के त्रिष्टुप् नामक वृत्त में कई विकल्प बन सकते हैं–

भगण + भगण + भगण + दो अक्षर = ११

भगण + जगण + जगण + दो अक्षर = ११

भगण + सगण + सगण + दो अक्षर = ११

भगण + यगण + यगण + दो अक्षर = ११

भगण + रगण + रगण + दो अक्षर = ११ आदि।

विकल्पों की इन सम्भावनाओं के कारण ही, एक सामान्य छन्द के ही अनेक विशेष (उपभेद) सम्भव होने लगते हैं। परिणामतः छन्दों की शाखा-प्रशाखा का विस्मयावह विस्तार होने लगा। यह सुनकर किसी को भी अविश्वसनीय आश्चर्य होना स्वाभाविक है कि संस्कृत छन्दों की कुल संख्या **तेरह करोड़ बारह लाख सत्रह हजार छ सौ छब्बीस** बनती है। निम्नलिखित विवरण से इस तथ्य को समझा जा सकता है–

क्रम	सामान्य संज्ञा	पादाक्षर-संख्या	उपभेद-संख्या
१.	उक्ता	०१	०२
२.	अत्युक्ता	०२	०४
३.	मध्या	०३	०८
४.	प्रतिष्ठा	०४	१६
५.	सुप्रतिष्ठा	०५	३२
६.	गायत्री	०६	६४
७.	उष्णिक्	०७	१२८
८.	अनुष्टुप्	०८	२५६
९.	बृहती	०९	५१२
१०.	पङ्क्ति	१०	१०२४
११.	त्रिष्टुप्	११	२०४८
१२.	जगती	१२	४०९६
१३.	अतिजगती	१३	८१९२
१४.	शक्वरी	१४	१६३८४
१५.	अतिशक्वरी	१५	३२७६८
१६.	अष्टि	१६	६५५३६
१७.	अत्यष्टि	१७	१३२०७२
१८.	धृति	१८	२६२१४४
१९.	अतिधृति	१९	५२४२८८
२०.	कृति	२०	२०४८५७६
२१.	प्रकृति	२१	२०९७१५२
२२.	आकृति	२२	४१९४३०४
२३.	विकृति	२३	८३८८६०८
२४.	संकृति	२४	१६७७७२१६
२५.	अतिकृति	२५	३३५५४४३२
२६.	उत्कृति	२६	६७१०८८६४
		कुल योग	१३,१२,२७,६२६

यदि वृत्त में, एक चरण में अक्षरों की संख्या २६ से अधिक हो जाय अथवा कोई समर्थ प्रयोक्ता वैसा करना चाहे तो? यह प्रश्न है। इसका उत्तर है- हाँ, ऐसा हो सकता है। उस स्थिति में अर्थात् चरण में अक्षरसंख्या २६ से अधिक होने पर उसको

'दण्डक' कहा जायेगा। इस दण्डक के भी कुछ उपभेद (चण्डवृष्टि-प्रपातादि) आचार्यों द्वारा व्याख्यात किये गये हैं। 'सच तो यह है कि छन्दों की इस भूयसी संख्या के बावजूद, प्रायः पाँच हजार वर्षों का विशाल संस्कृत काव्यसाहित्य मात्र तीस-चालीस लोकप्रिय छन्दों में ही लिखा गया है। रामायण तथा महाभारत जैसे कालजयी ग्रन्थों में भी क्रमशः पन्द्रह एवं अठारह छन्दों का प्रयोग किया गया है।

संस्कृत में वार्णिक छन्द की रचना असम्भव कार्य नहीं। फिर भी अपनी अभिरुचि एवं वागधिष्ठात्री की कृपा तो अपेक्षित है ही। छन्दरचना असम्भव इसलिये नहीं है कि रचना का नियम-निर्देश तथा छन्दों का लक्षण हमारे आचांर्यों ने पहले से ही निश्चित कर रखा है। जैसा कि पूर्व अनुच्छेद में ही हमने निर्दिष्ट किया है छन्दरचना में आठ गणों के माध्यम से ही हम अपना अभिप्राय काव्य में उपन्यस्त कर सकते हैं। ये गण तीन अक्षर के होते हैं। दो या चार अक्षर के क्यों नहीं? इसलिये कि छन्दशास्त्र में अक्षरों को, उच्चारण के अनुसार, दो प्रकार का ही माना गया है- एकमात्रिक लघु तथा एकाधिकमात्रिक गुरू। व्याकरण में एक मात्रिक, द्विमात्रिक तथा बहुमात्रिक को क्रमशः ह्रस्व, दीर्घ एवं प्लुत माना गया है। परन्तु छन्दशास्त्र में दीर्घ तथा प्लुतवर्ण की समन्वित संज्ञा है गुरु। अब लघु तथा गुरु को परस्पर जोड़ा भी जाय तो दोनों की समन्वित मात्राएँ तीन होंगी (अथवा यह कहा जाय कि दोनों का योग तीन लघु अक्षरों के बराबर है। वस्तुतः इसीलिये तीन ही अक्षरों का गण बनाना विज्ञानसम्मत होगा। दो अक्षरों के गण से संकीर्णता तथा चार अक्षरों के गण से अतिव्याप्ति का दोष उत्पन्न होगा।

अब यदि गण अक्षर होगा तो उनके तीन स्थान भी होंगे आदि, मध्य तथा अन्त। इन तीनों स्थानों पर लघु तथा गुरू वर्णों का सन्निवेश करने में हमें गणों के विकल्प प्राप्त हो जायेंगे। हमने देखा कि इस प्रक्रिया से हमें आठ गण प्राप्त होते हैं (न सात, न ही नौ) छन्दों के लक्षण हमें आकर ग्रन्थों से ही प्राप्त हैं। जैसे वंशस्थ का लक्षण है- जतौ तु वंशस्थमुदीरितं जरौ। अर्थात् वंशस्थ के प्रत्येक चरण में क्रमशः जगण, तगण, जगण तथा रगण आयेंगे। इतना सब जान लेने के बाद हमें वंशस्थ छन्द की रचना में अपने वर्ण्यविषय को दृष्टि में रखकर, गणानुक्रम में शब्दसंयोजन मात्र करना होता है। सामान्य छन्दोरचना के लिये इतना ही पर्याप्त है। हाँ, काव्य में आलंकारिक छटा, शब्दच्छल, अर्थच्छल तथा भावगाम्भीर्य प्रकट करने के लिये प्रतिभा की आवश्यकता है जो दैवी तथा पूर्वजन्मार्जित (सांस्कारिकी) होती है।

छन्द-रचना में **गुरुवर्ण का निर्णय तथा यतिविधान** भी आवश्यक है। यूँ तो दो या दो से अधिक मात्रा वाले अक्षर को छन्दशास्त्र में गुरु बताया गया है। लघु

तथा गुरु को वाचिक रूप में न व्यक्त कर, संकेततः प्रकट किया जाता है। लघु को खड़ी पाई (।) के रूप में तथा गुरू को अवग्रह (S) के रूप में। परन्तु कुछ और भी विशेष स्थितियाँ हैं जिनमें कोई वर्ण (मूलतः) ह्रस्व होते हुए भी गुरु माना जाता है। परन्तु यह व्यवस्था मात्र छन्दःशास्त्र में ही वैध है अन्यत्र नहीं। वे स्थितियाँ इस प्रकार हैं-

सानुस्वारश्च दीर्घश्च विसर्गश्च गुरूर्भवेत्।
वर्णः संयोगपूर्वश्च तथा पादान्तगोऽपि वा।।

अर्थात् अनुस्वार से युक्त (कं) दीर्घ (का) विसर्गान्त (कः) संयुक्तवर्ण का पूर्ववर्ती (जैसे अक्रमः शब्द में अ) तथा चरण के अन्त में आने वाला लघुवर्ण (जैसे अलं महीपाल तव श्रमेण में ण) ये पाँच प्रकार के वर्ण छन्दोविधा में गुरु माने जाते हैं।

छन्दोरचना में दूसरा महत्त्वपूर्ण तत्त्व है यति। यति का अर्थ है (श्वाँसवायु का) विश्रमस्थान। पाद के उच्चारण में जहाँ जिह्वा विराम लेती है (सहज भाव से) उसे यति कहते हैं। छन्दों में यह यति द्विविध होती है- पादान्तयति तथा मध्ययति। पादान्तयति तो एक अनिवार्य स्थिति है। जब चरण ही समाप्त हो गया तब तो श्वाँस को विश्रान्त होना ही है। परन्तु यदि चरण में अक्षरों की संख्या अधिक है तो मध्य यति भी सम्भव है। मध्ययति का निर्णय भी पाठक नहीं करेगा। वस्तुतः वह तो प्रत्येक छन्दलक्षण में, आचार्य द्वारा ही, निर्दिष्ट कर दी गई है। जैसे-

रसैः रूद्रैश्छिन्ना यमनसभलागः शिखरिणी।

अर्थात् रस (=६) तथा रूद्र (=११) संख्यक अक्षरों के बाद जिसमें छिन्नता (यति) हो उस यगण, मगण, नगण, सगण, भगण, लघु तथा गुरू अक्षर से युक्त छन्द को शिखरिणी कहते हैं। इसमें छः अक्षरों के बाद वाली यति तो मध्ययति है तथा दूसरी ग्यारहवें अक्षर के बाद वाली पादान्तयति है।

छन्दों के प्रयोगौचित्य के विषय में भी आचार्यों ने हमारा ध्यान आकृष्ट किया है-

काव्ये रसानुसारेण वर्णनाऽनुगुणेन च।
कुर्वीत सर्ववृत्तानां विनियोगं विभागवित्।।

अर्थात् काव्य में छन्द का प्रयोग रस एवं वर्ण्य-विषय के आनुगुण्य (आनुकूल्य) से ही करना चाहिये। इसका अभिप्राय यही है कि आचार्यगण रस एवं छन्द को अन्तस्सम्बद्ध मानते हैं। ध्वनिकार आचार्य आनन्दवर्धन तो स्पष्टतः कहते हैं-

अनौचित्यादृते नान्यद् रसभङ्गस्य कारणम्।

यह अनौचित्य छन्दविषयक भी हो सकता है। शृङ्गार को पृथ्वी अथवा स्रग्धरा में नहीं लिखा जा सकता। वीररस की अभिव्यक्ति भी शिखरिणी में होनी दुष्कर है। यदि हम छन्दों की संज्ञाओं पर ही विचार करें तो उनका वैशिष्ट्य समझ में आ जाता है। आचार्य क्षेमेन्द्र ने सुवृत्ततिलक में इस सन्दर्भ की युक्तियुक्त समीक्षा की है।

मन्दाक्रान्ता का अर्थ है- मन्दम् असमम् आक्रान्तं गतिर्यस्याः सा। अर्थात् जिसमें पदगति मन्द (Slow moving) हो। सचमुच मन्दाक्रान्ता छन्द में पदगति अत्यन्त बोझिल, मन्द, मंथर तथा अलस होती है। संभवतः इसीलिये यह छन्द विप्रलम्भ के अनुकूल माना गया है। यह सत्य व्याख्येय कम, अनुभवसंवेद्य अधिक है-

श्यामास्वङ्गं चकितहरिणीप्रेक्षणे दृष्टिपातं
वक्त्रच्छायां शशिनि शिखिनां बर्हभारेषु केशान्।
उत्पश्यामि प्रतनुषु नदीवीचिषु भ्रूविलासान्
हन्तैकस्मिन् क्वचिदपि न ते चण्डि सादृश्यमस्ति।।

परन्तु त्वरितगति छन्द को आप मन्दगति से पढ ही नहीं सकते। उसमें प्रयुक्त गण ही इस प्रकार के हैं कि उन्हें भागते हुए पढ़ना पड़ता है-

त्वरितगतिर्व्रजयुवतिस्तरणिसुतापुलिनगता।
मुररिपुणा रतिगुरुणा सह मिलिता प्रमदमिता।।

द्रुतविलम्बित (Fast and slow) में प्रारम्भिक गण या अक्षर तो द्रुतियुक्त हैं परन्तु बाद वाले विलम्बित-

विपदि धैर्यमथाभ्युदये क्षमा सदसि वाक्पटुता युधि विक्रमः।
यशसि चाभिरूचिर्व्यसनं श्रुतौ प्रकृतिसिद्धमिदं हि महात्मनाम्।।

भुजङ्गप्रयात (A Serpents moving) छन्द में अक्षरवृन्द सचमुच साँप की तरह भागते प्रतीत होते हैं। इस छन्द के उच्चारण में तो चाह कर भी, बीच में रूका नहीं जा सकता-

न तातो न माता न बन्धुर्न दाता न पुत्रो न पुत्री न भृत्यो न भर्ता।
न जाया न विद्या न वृत्तिर्ममैव गतिस्त्वं गतिस्त्वं गतिस्त्वं भवानी।।

छन्दों के वर्ण तथा देवता की भी गहन समीक्षा छन्दश्शास्त्रीय ग्रन्थों में की गई है। परन्तु सुकुमारमति पाठकों के लिये लिखे गये इस परिचयात्मक आलेख में वे विषय विवेचित नहीं किये जा रहे हैं। उनकी पृथक् समीक्षा की जायेगी।

सन्दर्भसूची–

१. प्रयोग द्रष्टव्य- स्वच्छन्दोच्छलदच्छकच्छकुहरच्छातेतराम्बुच्छटा आदि। काश्मीर प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शन का ग्रंथ- स्वच्छन्दतन्त्र।

२. तात्स्थ्यात् वेदराशिरेव छन्दस्। बहुलं छन्दसि। छन्दसि च। छन्दसि परेऽपि। नेतराच्छन्दसि। णेश्छन्दसि। -अष्टाध्यायी।

३. गद्यं पद्यं च मिश्रञ्च त्रिधा काव्यं व्यवस्थितम्।
पद्यं चतुष्पदं तच्च वृत्तं जातिरिति द्विधा।।
छन्दोविचित्यां सकलस्तत्प्रपञ्चो निदर्शितः।
सा विद्या नौस्तितीर्षूणां गम्भीरं काव्यसागरम्।। -आचार्यदण्डी

४. सविस्तर द्रष्टव्य- अभिराजयशोभूषणम् (निर्मित्युन्मेषः) अभिराजराजेन्द्र- प्रणीत। वैजयन्त प्रकाशन, इलाहाबाद। २००६ ई.।

५. पिङ्गलादिभिराचार्यैर्यदुक्तं लौकिकं द्विधा।
मात्रावर्णविभेदेन छन्दस्तदिह कथ्यते।। -भट्टकेदारः

६. उर्दू गजलो में इस लम्बाई (Length) को बहर कहते हैं।

७. दण्डकविषयक विस्तृत विवरण द्रष्टव्य- अभिराजदण्डकम्। भूमिका-भाग। राष्ट्रियसंस्कृतसंस्थान, नई दिल्ली। २०१३ ई.।

Some Thoughts on a Pseudo-adjunct

Kisor K. Chakrabarti

In this article we first look at a pseudo-adjunct (*upādhyābhāsa*) mentioned in Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmṇi*(TCM). (N1) Towards the very end of the discourse on adjuncts (*upādhiāda*) Gangeśa discusses pseudo-adjuncts that share some features of an adjunct but still lack some required feature and, therefore, are not faults proper. Briefly, an adjunct pervades the probandum (*sādhya*) and does not pervade the inferential mark (*hetu*). This proves that the inferential mark is not pervaded by the probandum and the inference of the probandum based on the putative pervasion is not sound. The wording for a pseudo-adjunct is similar to that of a psedo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*). A pseudo-probans is similar to a probans (*saddhetu*) in that the former has some features of a probans but still lacks some required feature and, therefore, is not a probans. Briefly, a probans is neither counterbalanced nor countermanded, is pervaded by the probandum and belongs to the inferential subject (*pakṣa*) and is capable of showing in a sound way that the probandum belongs to the inferential subject. A pseudo-probans is not capable of that. On the other hand, presence of an adjunct proves that the inference is faulty. But a pseudo-adjunct falls short of that: an inference may not be faulty in spite of the presence of a pseudo-adjunct. The guiding insights for the exploration of pseudo-adjuncts are similar to those for pseudo-probantia. Although an adjunct is a fault, it successfully blocks the inference of the probandum by way of showing absence of the probandum on the ground of absence of the adjunct itself. For an adjunct proper the latter inference of absence of the probandum is a sound inference. Hence all the norms of a sound inference apply here and such an inference should be free from all the pseudo-probantia. Accordingly, Gangesa discusses the pseudo-adjuncts on the basis of the underlying principles for the pseudo-probantia themselves.

We now take a look at the seventh pseudo-adjunct in Gangeśa's discourse on adjuncts. The relevant text is: *Pakṣa-vipakṣa-anyatara-*

anyah, yathā prasiddha-anumāne parvata-jalahrada-anyatara-anyatvam. (TCM 403-404)

We translate it as: being different from (the pair of) either the inferential subject or the negative instances (disni), e.g., being different from (the pair of) either the hill or a lake with reference to the stock inference (of fire in the hill from smoke).

We elucidate as below. Being different from both the inferential subject and a negative instance (*vipakṣa*: a place where absence of the probandum is certain or reliably known) can be a pseudo-adjunct. A positive instance is a place where presence of the probandum is certain or reliably known. Hence a positive instance (*sapakṣa*) is different from both the inferential subject (where presence or absence of the probandum is dubious) and a negative instance and the property of being a positive instance can be a pseudo-adjunct. Being a positive instance too seems to pervade the probandum, for every place where the presence of the probandum is certain is a positive instance. Thus from the very nature of the case the property of being a positive instance is co-located with the probandum in all such cases. At the same time, since the inferential subject is not a positive instance, the property of being a positive instance is absent in the inferential subject where the mark is taken to be present and thus the said property does not pervade the mark. Nevertheless, not being the hill or a lake and so on is a pseudo-adjunct for the inference of fire in the hill from smoke. If it were an adjunct proper, absence of the probandum fire in the inferential subject the hill could be inferred soundly from absence or negation in the inferential subject of the adjunct of not being the hill or a lake. For this to be possible absence of fire should pervade the absence or negation of not being the hill or a lake. That is, absence of fire should pervade being the hill or a lake. But this is not so, for the property of being the hill or a lake is present in the hill where absence of fire is uncertain (and is eventually negated if fire is soundly inferred in the hill). Accordingly, in such a case there is suspicion (*śamkā*) of deviation (*vyabhicāra*) and the said generalization is not sound.

This does not happen in the case of an adjunct proper. That is, neither the induction that the probandum is pervaded by the adjunct nor the contraposed version that absence of the adjunct is pervaded by

absence of the probandum is open to suspicion of deviation. Take the stock example of inferring that the hill is smoky because of being fiery where wet fuel is an adjunct. [The required induction that all fiery things are smoky is false as the counterexample of a hot iron ball having fire but not smoke shows.] Here the induction that all smoky things have wet fuel and the contraposed version that nothing without wet fuel is smoky are both adequately supported and are free from suspicion of deviation.

This case shows that Gangeśa and others are at home in using complex terms built out of connectives within a general proposition (unlike the Aristotelian and peripatetic logical tradition where such use of complex terms is missing in early stages). The pseudo-adjunct is a complex property built with the connective "or". One implied generalization is that the probandum is pervaded by disni. In the given example this translates into the general proposition that wherever there is fire with certainty there is difference from either the hill or a lake where the predicate is a complex term. The contraposed version of the latter needed for showing why the said property is a pseudo-adjunct is that wherever there is lack of the difference from either the hill or a lake there is lack of fire. All this is clearly necessary for understanding this kind of pseudo-adjunct and in spite of the brevity of the text must be included in Gangeśa's theory. The specimen also implicitly uses the formal law that a disjunction is true if either disjunct is true. That is, S is P or Q if S is P or if S is Q; similarly, S or P is Q if S is Q or if P is Q. Alternatively, if interpreted as a law of propositional logic, if P, then P or Q and if Q, then P or Q. There is also an implicit use of the so called De Morgan law that not (P or Q) if not P and not Q. A positive instance is not either the inferential subject or a negative instance because it is different from both. This follows from the very concepts or definitions of a positive instance, the inferential subject and a negative instance. Without doubt advanced formal analysis underlies the recognition of this kind of pseudo-adjunct. Gangesa has first indicated this kind of pseudo-adjunct in general terms as disni. Then he has given an example that is a substitution instance of the general schema.

Although the said property can be a pseudo-adjunct, it can also be an adjunct proper in some cases. Take the inference that the iron ball is smoky because it is fiery. Here the property of not being

either the iron ball or a lake is an adjunct that shows that the inference is faulty. [*Pakṣa-vipakṣa-anyatara-anyatvam ... kvacit upādhyābhāsa iti śeṣah, tena ayogolakam dhūmavat vahneh ityādau ayogolaka-hrada-anyatara-anyatvasya sat-upādhitve api na kṣatih*, TCM *Māthurī*, 405.] All places like kitchens using wet fuel where the presence of smoke is certain are also places that are different from the iron ball and a lake. Thus the probandum smoke is pervaded by the property of not being either the iron ball or a lake. However, the mark fire is taken to be present in the iron ball where the said property is absent. Thus the mark is not pervaded by that property. Since the said property is reliably known to pervade the probandum smoke, from absence of the said property in the iron ball, the inferential subject, absence of the probandum smoke may also be inferred in the inferential subject.

We now move on to explore if some of the insights in the above discussion can throw light on a contemporary philosophical problem, the so called "new" riddle of induction introduced by Goodman. Goodman's new riddle highlights the problematic nature of the relation between observed evidence and future prediction in a specific way. (N 2) Suppose that all emeralds observed so far are green. This seems to confirm that all emeralds are green and permit the prediction that the next emerald to be seen will be green. But now consider the concocted predicate 'grue'. Something is grue iff it has been found to be green whenever it has been observed so far or it is not yet observed and will be observed to be blue. Clearly, the observed evidence that seems to confirm that all emeralds are green also seems to confirm that all emeralds are grue. But then we seem to have two conflicting predictions equally confirmed by the same inductive evidence. If all emeralds are green, the next one should be green; but if all emeralds are grue, the next one should be blue. It can be easily seen that we can concoct an indefinite number of grue-like predicates and the same difficulty will arise in each case. That is, if we want to, we can always come up with new, fabricated predicates incorporated into empirical hypotheses that will lead to predictions conflicting with those based on commonly accepted empirical hypotheses while both sets of hypotheses seem to be equally consistent with the observed data. Can induction be rational when it seems to produce such contradictory results?

Goodman's own solution is that the riddle does not invalidate induction or the generalization formula as such but presses home the need for criteria to separate projectible predicates like green from cooked-up, nonprojectible predicates like grue. The projectible predicates are essentially the well-entrenched one. (N 3) What makes a predicate better-entrenched? Essentially that it has a longer history. In Goodman's own words:

We must consult the record of past projections... Plainly, "green", as a veteran of earlier and many more projections than "grue", has the more impressive biography. The predicate "green", we may say, is much better entrenched than the predicate "grue". (N 4)

Some critics have complained that such an account of entrenchment leaves the progress of science to luck. Is it merely a stroke of luck that "green" has a longer and more impressive history and biography than "grue"? If so, there is the danger that growth of science may be stultified for excluding hypotheses with unfamiliar or new predicates. Goodman has responded to the criticism by arguing that entrenchment and familiarity are different concepts. (N 5) An unfamiliar predicate may turn out to be well entrenched if the coextensive or parent or comparable predicates are already in frequent and wide circulation. Although Goodman's theory is more elaborate than our sketch suggests, the criticism, however, has a point. First, Goodman does not show how the danger of excluding new predicates that are not coextensive with or derived from or comparable to other predicates that are already in circulation can be avoided. Second, projectibility and entrenchment are, because of the emphasis on the history, overly dependent on past projection. But for classical skeptical critics of induction like Carvaka or Hume past regularity alone fails to provide rational ground for future regularity and Gangesa too concurs with that.

Quine has offered to explain the distinction between projectible and nonprojectible predicates by saying that while the former are true of things of a kind the latter are not. (N 6) Being of a kind depends on similarity. The more similar things are the more reason that they are of the same kind. Accordingly, a kind is a set of objects that are more similar to a paradigmatic member of the set than they are to something

else (called a foil) that is not a member of the set and is too dissimilar to the paradigm. But the difficulty in this view centers round the basis of choosing the paradigm. Is the paradigm chosen because it has certain features or not? If the first, objects should become members of a set by virtue of having most or all of the paradigmatic features which, then, are the family of common features that account for membership of the set. Projectibility thus depends on sharing some common features. But objects in a nonprojectible set too may be said to share some common features, such as (at least trivially) that they are grue. So unless we have some reasonable criteria to separate the "right" kind of common features from the "wrong" ones (and none are provided by Quine), the division between projectible and nonprojectible predicates would collapse. If the second, someone may have chosen the paradigm for no reason and others may have followed suit merely for personal reasons. Projectibility then may not have any rational foundation and even inductions with projectible predicates may be irrational. So once again it needs to be shown that although the paradigm is chosen not because it has certain features the set still has a rational foundation but Quine has not done that and it is unclear that a rational basis can be provided. Undoubtedly, a skeptic would like to utilize the situation to press home the irrationality of induction.

The "new" riddle of induction has generated considerable debate in recent decades and it will take a lot of space to consider it in detail. Instead of that we look at the viewpoint of Gangesa hoping to find a solution.

Let us again take the problematic property of "not being either the inferential subject or a negative instance" (disni: *pakṣa-vipakṣa-anyatara-anyah*). This property in a typical case is true of any positive instance: a positive instance (being where presence of the probandum is reliably known) is not either the inferential subject (where neither presence nor absence of the probandum is reliably known) or a negative instance (where absence of the probandum is reliably known). In the above stock example a case of disni is not being either the hill or a lake: the latter is true of a fiery kitchen hearth that is neither the hill nor a lake. It should be clear that by definition in typical cases disni is present wherever the probandum is reliably known to be present before

the inference. [Disni is also not true of any negative instance: it is not true of any negative instance that it is neither the inferential subject nor a negative instance, for it is a negative instance and if something is a negative instance, it is also either the inferential subject or a negative instance (i.e., an inclusive disjunction is true iff either disjunct is true). Thus by definition in typical cases wherever there is absence of disni there is absence of the probandum.] It seems to follow that there is warrant for the generalization that wherever there is the probadum there is disni or that disni pervades the probandum. In the said example then it seems proper to generalizing that no fiery things are either the inferential subject or a negative instance.

At the same time, disni cannot be true of the inferential subject. If disni pervades the probandum, absence of the probandum in the inferential subject then follows from absence of disni. But we also reliably know that the probans belongs to the inferential subject (in the stock example: the hill is smoky) and that wherever there is the probans there is the probandum (in the same example: all smoky things are fiery). Thus the above set of facts seems to warrant both inference of the probandum and its absence in the same thing at the same time—a contradiction. We symbolize this by replacing the inferential subject with 'this', the probans with 'M', the probandum with 'P' and being either the inferential subject or a negative instance with 'Q' and letting "=" to stand for material implication as follows.

(x) (Mx = Px).

Ma.

Therefore, Pa.

But also

(x) (Px = -Qx).

Qa.

Therefore, -Pa.

The problem is mainly due to that the same generalization formula that permits the induction that wherever there is the probans there is the probandum also permits the induction that wherever there is the probandum there is disni. It is in this respect that this problem is similar to the "new" riddle of induction. In Goodman's example the

observed facts seem to support both that all emeralds are green and that all emeralds are grue. If all emeralds are green, the next emerald should be green. But if all emeralds are grue, the next emerald should be blue. This is a contradiction pointing to some possible gap in the generalization formula. In Gangeśa's example the observed facts seem to support in a typical case both that all smoky things are fiery and that no fiery things are either the inferential subject or a negative instance. If all smoky things are fiery, then (since the hill is reliably known to be smoky) the hill is fiery. But if no fiery things are either the inferential subject or a negative instance, then (since it is true of the hill that it is either the inferential subject or a negative instance), the hill is not fiery. Here too is a contradiction pointing to some possible gap in the generalization formula.

As another example (freely coined by utilizing Nyāya views) take the inference that this mango is colored because of being a fruit. Here an instance of disni is 'not being either the mango or an air molecule.' [In the Nyāya view air is colorless.] "Not being either the mango or an air molecule' is true of any reliably known colored thing, such as a banana or a pebble. [As already said, the inferential subject is not included in the class of positive instances in a typical case.] So it seems to be permissible to generalize that nothing colored is either a mango or an air molecule. If this is accepted, it follows that this mango is not colored. But at the same time it is reliably known that this mango is a fruit and that all fruits are colored. Given these premises it follows that this mango is colored. Once again we have a contradiction pointing to some possible gap in the generalization formula. [Needless to say, in this example as well as in the previous example of inference of fire from smoke in a hill the singular conclusion could be replaced by a universal or a particular statement requiring appropriate changes in the rest of the argument as well.]

The following is a solution (among others) that can be found in Gangesa's TCM. (N 7) Induction does need the support of observation of positive instances or negative instances. Further, there should be non-observation of any counterexample. Thus the generalization formula so far comprises observation of positive instances or observation of negative instances and non-observation of any counterexample. The assumption that this is the whole story, however, leads to the problem. To solve the

problem it needs to be added [we leave out other factors such as universal based extraordinary perception (if admitted) due to lack of space.] that a reliable induction must also have the support of additional reasoning to counter the doubt that the induction may be false. The doubt that an induction may be false is reasonable; an induction includes a claim about future countless cases based on favorable observation of a limited number of past or present cases. But sometimes an induction confirmed in a large number of cases is found later to have a counterexample. So it is reasonable to suppose that a counterexample may be found in other cases where none has been found so far. Such doubt should be countered by additional reasoning that explores the consequences of supposing that an induction is false and shows that an undesirable consequence results from that. Such additional reasoning is called *tarka* that we translate (for the lack of any better short expression) as counterfactual reasoning: CR. It includes a counterfactual conditional the antecedent and the consequent of which are false.

Now let us look at the grue case. So far as the support from observation of at least one positive instance and non-observation of any counterexample is concerned, both that all emeralds are green and that all emeralds are grue appear to have that support. But there is a difference when it comes to the support from counterfactual reasoning. Suppose that "all emeralds are Green" is false and that the next emerald to be seen is not green. Then that emerald will not complement red, for only green complements red. But the next emerald may be observed to complement red and that would conflict with the supposition that it is not green. Thus the assumed denial of the induction that all emeralds are green has the undesirable consequence that it invites the risk of conflict with what may be observed in the next case. Now suppose that "all emeralds are grue" is false and that the next emerald to be seen is not blue. No undesirable consequence follows. Even if the next emerald is observed to complement red, there is on incongruence: something not blue may complement red. Hence "all emeralds are grue" fails to qualify as a reliable induction.

Further, compared to grue green is simpler with respect to constitution (*śarīra*), i.e., grue appears to contain more concepts than green. Compared to grue there is also greater economy in the cognitive link/order (*upasthiti*) so far as ordinary discourse is concerned: in

ordinary discourse awareness of grue cannot take place without - awareness of green; but awareness of green can take place without awareness of grue. [In the light of Nyāya ontology there will be moreover greater economy in relationship (*sambandha*). But exploration of Nyāya ontology will take more space here and must be skipped.] So green is preferable to grue in terms of the principles of economy (*lāghava*) as well.

It may be noted that unlike Quine's position the Nyāya solution does not hinge on deciding which predicate represents a kind and which predicate does not—a task that appears to be fraught with difficulties to say the least. [Nyāya philosophers have developed a theory of preventive conditions for universals (*jātibādhaka*) that we do not have the space to discuss here.] Again, unlike Goodman's position this solution is not pinned down to checking the past history of how often a particular predicate has been projected and does not leave the choice between two predicates to counting which predicate (along with coextensive or parent or comparable predicates) has been projected more often in the past. So the test that an induction is not reliable unless the assumed denial leads to undesirable consequence, does not leave the progress of science to luck and does not forbid the introduction of new predicates. It appears then that compared to the solutions suggested by Quine or Goodman the solution that can be gleaned from the work of Gangesa is more promising and rewarding.(N8)

Notes

1. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (TCM) of Gangeśa with *Māthurī*, ed. Tarkavagīśa, K.N., Vol. II, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1990.
2. *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, abbreviated as FFF, Chapter III.
3. Goodman himself holds that the classical Humean problem of induction has generated much fruitless discussion and should be dissolved. FFF, Chapter III. But Goodman's own solution to the new riddle is vulnerable to the Cārvāka-Humean critique. However, see the note 8 below for the point that elsewhere Goodman comes close to the Nyaya solution.
4. FFF, p. 94.
5. FFF. Chapter IV.

6. Quine, W.V., "Natural Kinds", in *Grue!* (GR), ed. Stalker, Douglas, Open Court, Chicago, 1994, pp. 41-56.
7. *Tatra anukūla-tarka-abhāvena sādhya-vyāpakatva-aniścayāt sahacāra-darśanādeh tena vinā samśāyakatvāt*: due to the lack of supportive CR pervasion of the probandum (by the said property) is uncertain; without that (CR) observation of co-presence and so on is subject to doubt (i.e., is a doubtful base for the inductive claim), TCM, p. 355.
8. D.H.H. Ingalls who taught at the Harvard University when Goodman and Quine too taught there, was trained in Nyaya philosophy by a traditional pundit in Kolkata. Goodman makes no reference to the Nyaya anywhere. Still it is quite possible that Goodman or Quine had some philosophical conversations with Ingalls. It is also quite possible that Goodman met B.K. Matilal, a specialist in Nyaya philosophy trained by traditional pundits in Kolkata, who spent several years at Harvard and was personally acquainted with Quine and Ingalls and that Goodman was influenced by Nyāya ideas in coining problematic predicates like the grue. Goodman holds: "A hypothesis is *projectible* if and only if it is supported, unviolated, and unexhausted, and all such hypotheses that conflict with it are overridden." (*Problems and Projects*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1972, p. 393). This is analogous to the Nyāya view that an induction (or a hypothesis: *kalpanā*) is not reliable unless it is supported by counterfactual reasoning that shows that the denial leads to an undesirable consequence. It is worth noting that the Nyāya theory of undesirable consequence is highly developed. Briefly, an undesirable consequence may be a contradiction or a belief-behavior conflict or a conflict with something reliably accepted or acceptance of something uneconomical.

शिक्षा, प्रातिशाख्य तथा व्याकरण के अनुसार 'ऋकार' तथा 'लृकार' का स्वरूप

विन्ध्येश्वरीप्रसाद मिश्र 'विनय'

समस्त वैदिक तथा लौकिक वाङ्मय की प्रसवित्री संस्कृत-भाषा के आधारभूत तत्त्व हैं- 'वर्णमातृका' तथा 'वर्णसमाम्नाय', इन दोनों में ही संस्कृत-वाणी के मूल वर्णों का वैज्ञानिक परिगणन या सङ्ग्रह किया गया है।

वर्णमातृका शब्द में गृहीत 'मातृका' शब्द तथा वर्णसमाम्नाय का 'समाम्नाय' पद इन दोनों की आधारभूतता तथा श्रेष्ठता को सङ्केतित करते हैं।

प्राचीन भारत में संस्कृत-भाषा के भाषा-वैज्ञानिक अध्ययन की तीन दिशाएँ रही हैं- व्याकरण, निरुक्त तथा शिक्षा। ये तीनों वेद के महत्त्वपूर्ण अङ्ग हैं, इनके बिना वैदिक अध्ययन सार्थक नहीं माना जा सकता। इन तीनों में व्याकरण को वेद के मुख के रूप में, निरुक्त को श्रोत्र के रूप में तथा शिक्षा को घ्राणेन्द्रिय अर्थात् नासिका के रूप में उपकल्पित किया गया है-

'...................... निरुक्तं श्रोत्रमुच्यते।
शिक्षा घ्राणं तु वेदस्य मुखं व्याकरणं स्मृतम्।।'[1]

इसमें निरुक्त मूलतः अर्थविज्ञान का शास्त्र है। इसमें वैदिक शब्दों के निर्वचन करते हुए प्राकरणिक अर्थों के तार्किक अर्थावबोध का प्रयास किया गया है, जबकि व्याकरण शब्दविद्या है, अर्थात् इसमें शब्दों के साधुत्व और असाधुत्व की प्रक्रिया पर वैज्ञानिक विचार किया गया है। इसलिए दोनों के लिए दिए गए 'श्रोत्र' और 'मुख'-उपमान-पद निश्चय ही सार्थक तथा महत्त्वपूर्ण हैं, किन्तु प्राणन-व्यापार की साधिका घ्राणेन्द्रिय स्वस्थ न हो तो शब्द की प्रादुर्भूति नहीं हो सकती और न ही उससे सम्यक् अर्थावगति ही सम्भव है, इसलिए महर्षि पाणिनि ने शिक्षा को वेदपुरुष का घ्राण अर्थात् नासिका कहा है। शिक्षा के अन्तर्गत अधुना प्राप्त पाणिनीय शिक्षा, याज्ञवल्क्य शिक्षा, नारदीय शिक्षा आदि अनेक श्लोकबद्ध शिक्षा-ग्रन्थ आते हैं, प्रत्येक वेद के प्रातिशाख्य-विशेष भी इसी में अन्तर्भुक्त हैं, इनमें 'ऋग्वेद-प्रातिशाख्य' का अत्यन्त महत्त्वपूर्ण स्थान है।

व्याकरण-शास्त्र की अनादि-परम्परा में सम्प्रति पाणिनीय व्याकरण ही हमारी शब्द-प्रक्रिया का मूलाधार तथा अध्ययन विवेचन का विषय बन चुका है। इसके आधार चतुर्दश माहेश्वर सूत्र हैं, जो भगवान् शिव के डमरू से निःसृत होकर महर्षि पाणिनि को प्राप्त हुए थे-ऐसी मान्यता है।[२] इन चौदह माहेश्वर-सूत्रों को ही सम्पूर्ण व्याकरण का आधार माना जाता है और इनको पारिभाषिक-रूप से 'वर्ण-समाम्नाय' या 'अक्षर-समाम्नाय' कहा जाता है।

व्याकरणशास्त्र में भाषा के आधारतत्त्व के रूप में जैसे वर्ण-समाम्नाय को आधार माना गया वैसे ही शिक्षा-ग्रन्थों तथा प्रातिशाख्यों में वर्णों की मातृकाओं को प्राणतत्त्व के रूप में स्वीकृत किया गया है। वर्ण-समाम्नाय में वर्णमाला को व्याकरण की प्रक्रिया के अन्तर्गत सोद्देश्य व्यवस्थित करते हुए अनुबन्धादि से युक्त करके उसे प्रत्याहारों की पारिभाषिकता के अनुकूल ढाला गया है, जबकि शिक्षाओं में प्रतिपादित वर्ण-मातृकाओं में सम्पूर्ण वर्णमाला को सङ्गृहीत किया गया है। वर्ण-समाम्नाय के अन्तर्गत केवल मूल स्वर ही ग्रहण किये गये हैं, किन्तु वर्ण मातृकाओं में प्रायः उकारादि स्वरों के ह्रस्व-दीर्घ भेदों को भी सङ्कलित किया गया है। इसलिये प्रातिशाख्य आदि में प्रतिपादित वर्णमाला में अनेक बातें नवीन तथा विस्तीर्ण हैं।

संस्कृत-वर्णमाला में 'ऋकार' और 'लृकार' ये दो ऐसे वर्ण हैं, जिनके स्वरूप एवं प्रकृति के विषय में व्याकरण, शिक्षा तथा प्रातिशाख्य ग्रन्थों में विभिन्न विचार पाए जाते हैं। यहाँ इन सभी विचारों का संक्षिप्त सङ्कलन करते हुए इनके सम्बन्ध में प्राप्त तथ्यों की युक्ति-परकता और दृष्टिभेद का समीक्षण अभिप्रेत है।

व्याकरण के अनुसार वर्ण-समाम्नाय में 'ऋ' और 'लृ' इन दोनों वर्णों को द्वितीय माहेश्वर सूत्र "ऋलृक्" में एक साथ सङ्गृहीत किया गया है। ये दोनों वर्ण 'अच्' अर्थात् स्वरों के अन्तर्गत आते हैं।[३] उच्चारण-स्थान की दृष्टि से ये दोनों वर्ण भिन्न-भिन्न हैं। **"ऋटुरषाणां मूर्धा"** (सिद्धान्तकौमुदीवृत्ति) के अनुसार 'ऋ'-वर्ण मूर्धन्य तथा **"लृतुलसानां दन्ताः"** के अनुसार 'लृ'-वर्ण दन्त्य है, किन्तु जैसा कि पहले कहा जा चुका है माहेश्वर-सूत्रों में एक ही सूत्र 'ऋलृक्' के अन्तर्गत इन दोनों का एकत्रावस्थान निश्चय ही इनकी वैज्ञानिक सदृशता का परिचायक है। इसलिए 'सवर्ण'-संज्ञा-विधायक सूत्र की परिधि में न आने पर भी वार्तिककार ने इन दोनों को 'सवर्ण' मानने की सम्मति दी है। **"ऋलृवर्णयोर्मिथः सावर्ण्यं वाच्यम्"** अष्टाध्यायी की १.१.५ सङ्ख्या पर पठित **"उरणरपरः"** सूत्र-वृत्ति में आचार्य भट्टोजिदीक्षित 'ऋकार' के ३० सवर्ण स्वीकारते हैं। **"ऋ इति त्रिंशतः संज्ञा"**[४] महाभाष्यकार ने 'ऋलृक्'-

सूत्र की व्याख्या करते हुए अचों के मध्य लृकारोपदेश पर प्रश्न उठाया है और इस प्रश्न का वार्तिकमुख से समाधान करते हुए यदृच्छा, अशक्ति, अनुकरण आदि के प्रयोगों हेतु इसकी सार्थकता बतलाई है।[५]

उनके अनुसार यदि 'लृ' वर्ण को अचों में पाठ न किया जाये तो यह कार्य सिद्ध नहीं हो सकता। 'कृपोरोलः' (अष्टाध्यायी ८.२.८) सूत्र से 'कृप्' धातु के 'ऋकार' के स्थान में 'लृकार' आदि जो प्रयोग होते हैं, उनसे भी ऋकार और लृकार की एकता का प्रमाण मिलता है। फिर भी महाभाष्य में लृकारोपदेश-खण्डक पूर्वपक्ष के विस्तार के प्रसंग में वर्णित होने के कारण 'ऋकार' और 'लृकार' दोनों की एकता निःसन्दिग्ध नहीं मानी जा सकती। 'पाणिनीय-शिक्षा' में वर्णों की गणना करते समय इक्कीस स्वरों को माना गया है। यहाँ स्पष्ट रूप से 'ऋकार' के तो ह्रस्व, दीर्घ एवं प्लुत ये ३ भेद माने गए हैं, किन्तु 'लृकार' को केवल ह्रस्व और प्लुत ही माना है।[६] इसके पीछे शिक्षाकार का क्या आशय है- यह स्पष्ट नहीं होता। इसी प्रकार 'याज्ञवल्क्य-शिक्षा' में भी 'लृकार' के दीर्घत्व का निषेध किया गया है-

"लृकारस्य तु दीर्घत्वं नास्ति"[७]

'ऋग्वेद-प्रातिशाख्य' में वर्णमाला का परिगणन करते हुए प्रातिशाख्यकार ने ऋकार को तो स्पष्ट रूप से स्वर स्वीकार किया है, किन्तु पद के आदि और अन्त में विद्यमान लृकार को स्वरवर्णों के अन्तर्गत नहीं माना।[८] जैसा कि पहले बताया गया है कि संस्कृत के वैयाकरणों ने 'ऋ'-वर्ण को मूर्धन्य तथा 'लृ' को दन्त्य कहा है, किन्तु प्रातिशाख्यों ने इन दोनों को तथा इन दोनों के क्रमशः दीर्घप्लुतादि-भेदों को जिह्वामूलीय ही माना है।[९] किन्तु जो 'ऋकार' के गुणधर्म हैं वे कहीं 'लृकार' के विषय में सङ्गत नहीं भी होते, जैसे- 'नति सन्धि-प्रकरण' में 'ऋकार' 'रेफ' और 'षकार' पद के मध्य में वर्तमान 'नकार' को मूर्धन्य 'णकार' बना देते हैं, किन्तु 'लृकार' ऐसा कुछ परिवर्तन नहीं करता।[१०]

इसी प्रकार संज्ञा-परिभाषा पटल में आचार्य शौनक 'ऋकार' को तो दशनामिक स्वरों के अन्तर्गत रखते हैं, किन्तु 'लृकार' वहाँ नहीं आता।[११] इस प्रकार उच्चारण-स्थान की दृष्टि से तो ये दोनों वर्ण समान सिद्ध होते हैं, किन्तु प्रक्रियागत-गुणधर्मों के अनुसार इनमें न केवल पर्याप्त पार्थक्य देखा जाता है, बल्कि 'लृकार' को तो पूरी तरह से स्वर भी नहीं माना गया है। शिक्षापटल में ऋग्वेद प्रातिशाख्यकार 'ऋकार', "ॠकार' तथा 'लृकार' के स्वरूप को स्पष्ट करते हुये कहते हैं–

रेफोऽस्यकारे च परस्य चार्धे
पूर्वे ह्रसीयांस्तु न वेतरस्मात्।
मध्ये स तस्यैव लकारभावे
धातौ स्वराः कल्पयताल्लृकारः।।

अर्थात् "'ऋकार' में रेफ होता है किन्तु 'लृकार' में वही 'रेफ' 'ल'-भाव को प्राप्त हो जाता है।" इससे सिद्ध होता है कि इन दोनों वर्णों को, जिन्हें सामान्यतः व्याकरण के स्वरों के बीच में पढ़ा गया है, प्रातिशाख्यों में मूलतः स्वर और व्यञ्जन के सन्ध्यक्षर मानने की सम्मति दी गई है।

'ऋग्वेद-प्रातिशाख्य' के 'उच्चारणदोष-पटल' में 'ऋ' तथा 'ॠ' के उच्चारण दोषों पर विचार करते हुए यह बताया गया है कि यद्यपि ये वर्ण मूर्धन्य हैं, फिर भी कुछ लोग इनका 'औष्ठ्यनिभ' उच्चारण करते हैं।

औष्ठ्यनिभ शब्द का अर्थ करते हुए भाष्यकार उवट[12] ने **'उवर्णसदृशौ'** अर्थात् उकार जैसा माना है। यहाँ पर स्पष्ट रूप से **"रेफयुतौ स्वरौ कुर्वन्त्योष्ठनिभौ सरेफौ"** कहकर प्रातिशाख्यकार महर्षि शौनक ने 'ऋकार' और 'ॠकार' की सन्ध्यक्षरता स्वीकार कर ली है, किन्तु प्रश्न यह होता है कि यदि 'ऋ' या 'लृ' में से आद्यक्षर-रूप-व्यञ्जक-वर्ण 'रेफ' को निकाल दिया जाय तो फिर जो स्वरांश है वह क्या होगा, या तो यह 'इकार' सदृश होगा या 'उकार' सदृश। प्रातिशाख्य ने 'उकार' सदृश उच्चारण को अप-उच्चारण कहा है, अत एव इसका साधु उच्चारण 'र् + इ = रि' जैसा ही होना चाहिए। वर्तमान हिन्दी-भाषा में प्रायः यही उच्चारण प्रचलन में है, किन्तु यदि 'ऋ' का यही स्वरूप है तो फिर 'इ' स्वरघटित 'रेफ' 'रि' में और 'र्' तथा 'इ' के सन्ध्यक्षर रूप 'ऋ' वर्ण में क्या अन्तर होगा? यह प्रश्न शिक्षा प्रातिशाख्य तथा व्याकरण के विद्वानों के बीच आज भी जागरूक है। दूसरी ओर आधुनिक मराठी आदि भाषाओं में इसका रेफ + उकार घटित उच्चारण 'रु' ही प्रचलित है। ध्यातव्य यह है कि जिस प्रकार प्रातिशाख्य में 'ऋ' के उच्चारण-दोषों पर विचार किया गया है उस प्रकार 'लृ-कार' के उच्चारण दोषों पर विचार नहीं किया गया। इससे भी यही सिद्ध होता है कि प्रातिशाख्यकार ने भी इन दोनों वर्णों को कहीं न कहीं अभिन्न स्वीकार किया है।

इस विवेचन का फलितार्थ यही है कि 'ऋ' और 'लृ' वर्ण यद्यपि उच्चारण स्थानों की दृष्टि से भिन्न हैं, किन्तु 'रेफ' और 'लकार' की सन्ध्यक्षरता और 'रलयोरभेदः' की अभिस्वीकृति के कारण दोनों को एक जैसा मानने की स्वीकृति शिक्षा तथा प्रातिशाख्य तीनों को अभिप्रेत है। इसलिए **"ऋलृवर्णयोर्मिथः सावर्ण्यं वाच्यम्"**

महर्षि कात्यायन का यह वार्तिक तथा माहेश्वर-सूत्रों में दोनों का एक ही सूत्र 'ऋलृक्' में पढ़ा जाना सङ्गत होता है। वस्तुतः इन दोनों का वास्तविक उच्चारण स्वरूप आज भी अनुसन्धान तथा प्रयोग का विषय है।

सन्दर्भ-सूची–

१. पाणिनीयशिक्षा, कारिका, ४१, ४२.

२. 'ननाद ढक्कां नवपञ्चवारम्।' (नन्दिकेश्वर की काशिका)

३. "तुल्यास्यप्रयत्नं सवर्णम्'- अष्टाध्यायी-सूत्र १.१.९.

४. सिद्धान्तकौमुदी (संज्ञाप्रकरण) 'उरणरपरः' सूत्र पर वृत्ति।

५. "लृकारोपदेशो यदृच्छाशक्तिजानुकरणप्लुप्याद्यर्थः।"

६. "लृकारः प्लुत एव च" (पाणिनीयशिक्षा, कारिका ५)

७. याज्ञवल्क्यशिक्षा १२६.

८.क. "अकारार्कारावि उ ए ओ ऐ औ।"

ख. "पदान्यन्तयोर्न लृकारः स्वरेषु।"
उवट-भाष्य सहित ऋग्वेदप्रातिशाख्य- ८/१ तथा २ (सम्पा. डॉ. वीरेन्द्रकुमार वर्मा)

९. ऋकारत्कखथषष्ठऊष्मा जिह्वामूलीयाः प्रथमञ्चवर्गः।
(ऋग्वेदप्रातिशाख्य-सञ्ज्ञा-परिभाषा-पटल ४१)

१०. ऋकार-रेफ-षकार-नकारं समानपदेऽवग्रहो नमन्ति
अन्तः पदस्थमककारपूर्वा आदिसन्ध्याः।
(ऋग्वेदप्रातिशाख्य नतिसन्धि पटल ४०)

११. "लृकारादयो नामनिःस्वरा" (ऋग्वेदप्राति. सञ्ज्ञा-परिभाषा-पटल ६५)

१२. उवटभाष्य- 'ऋग्वेदप्रातिशाख्य'- उच्चारण दोषपटल-३८.

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Dialogue in the Indian Philosophical Tradition[1]

P. K. Mukhopadhyay

It appears that there is growing ignorance as well as progressive unconcern regarding the actual state of Indian philosophy – its study, teaching and research – among us including a large number of teachers of philosophy in general and of Indian philosophy in particular. This is producing twofold results each of which is deplorable. Such ignorance creates a sense of alarm where there is only reason to feel concerned. Secondly, it is not allowing us to find the possible ways of improving the situation. We need to study seriously the actual causes of the decline in the teaching and research in this field.

Dialogue and the growth of knowledge.

To the question how we decide that there is such decline in the field of scholarship in Indian philosophy some answer that the decline in the practice of dialogue or debate in it indicates the decline in Indian philosophy or philosophical culture. But if one takes dialogue or debate as *a mere style* of writing or presenting philosophical thought then decline in the practice of dialogue need not represent actual decline in Indian philosophy and culture. What is important is the *spirit* of dialogue. With this in mind let us discuss a little if and how far dialogue is or can be regarded as a means of expanding knowledge and, as its corollary, the decline of it as an indication of the decline of knowledge.

It is a common belief among many Indians as well as non-Indians that practice of debate and dialogue is a unique mark of Indian culture. To cite just one example, Albert Wezler[2] who in a paper published in 2001[3], distinguished the oral tradition and the tradition of debate or dialogue in India, wrote "equally fundamental and lasting aspect of early Indian philosophical discourse ... is the dialectical tradition (*vāda*-tradition), the tradition of conducting discussions among experts in a field, the tradition of public debate which has shaped India to such an extent that it would be legitimate to call her culture a verifable ... 'culture of debate', of intellectual competition and clarification of

positions, propositions, implications, etc., in public discussions."[4] However, to keep the records straight, Wezler admitted that just the *oral* tradition is not really unique to Indian culture. He writes "The early transmission of and thus also the accumulation of knowledge, in fact of knowledge of all kinds, *everywhere in the world was necessarily oral* ... prior to the invention of script, and its use to write down, a particular kind of 'knowledge', religious, philosophical etc."[5] We would like to add that practice of debate also has not been confined only to India or only to the early days of a civilization.

It has become a common practice nowadays to render the word dialogue in Indian languages, including Saṃskṛta, as sammṃvāda[6] and not necessarily as vāda. Both these are correct. This I will show not separately but while illustrating the acknowledged importance of dialogue or saṃvāda across different cultures. Let me illustrate this with reference to two texts belonging to two different cultures and time. The first text is the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama, which belongs to the first century if not to a still earlier period of human history. The second text was written in late twentieth century by a scholar who belongs to modern Euro-American culture though in it reference has been made to early Greek culture. Gautama in the two aphorisms, 47 and 48, of the second section (āhnika) of the fourth chapter (adhyāya) of his *Nyāyasūtra* tells us about the means of enhancement or improvement of self knowledge (once it has been already obtained, through means discussed by him earlier, in the same text)[7]. In the next two aphorisms (sūtra-s) he tells us about the means of preserving[8] the knowledge in the matter which has been already gained. Gautama tells us that the means of enhancing or improving knowledge already gained is saṃvāda, though he hastens to add that the dialogue (saṃvāda) which could best yield this result is dialogue not with anyone but only with scholars who know the subject (*tadvidvyaih saha*). He states some other conditions also.

The next text I would like to mention is a 1974 paper by Kuhn[9], in which reference was made to Karl Popper's view about the means of growth of knowledge. According to Popper, Kuhn says, "the tradition of critical discussion represents the only practicable way of expanding our knowledge". This tradition Popper traces to the Greek philosophers between Thales and Plato, the men who, as he sees it, encouraged critical

discussion both between different schools and within the same school. Kuhn agrees that, at least, "the tradition of claims, counter claims, and debates over fundamentals..., except perhaps during the middle ages, have characterized philosophy and much of social science ever since.' Here Kuhn obviously had in his mind philosophy and social sciences of the Euro-American culture. It is not of any consequence to us that Kuhn in this paper has explained in addition where he agreed and where he disagreed with Popper.

The truth seems to be that neither the oral tradition nor the tradition of debate is unique to Indian culture[10]. The presence and importance of both is admitted in different traditions. It may be noted, however, even if incidentally, that the Indians did not only practice or use the method of dialogue and debate but they, at least the Naiyāyika-s, developed, for the first time, a full-fledged *theory* of debate or Kathā.[11] According to Vātsyāyana[12], Gautama has listed three forms of Kathā (in the first three sūtra-s of the second section of the first chapter of his *Nyāyasūtra*). Of these the first is vāda. It is the form of dialogue (primarily) between the preceptor and his disciple. This form of dialogue is most effective in arriving at and defending the truth or the correct position (tattvanirṇaya) in a matter of debate.

Importance of debate, as a means of increasing our knowledge, is accepted in the theoretical traditions of different cultures and times. Ordinarily dialogue brings to our mind a picture of two or more persons, who are initially not of the same opinion about a certain topic, discussing the matter among themselves *orally* and *face to face*. But the word dialogue was given a wider sense when it was adopted as a method of presenting one's thinking on a subject. So Plato and Berkeley and in recent time scholars like Derek Perfitt and David Lewis have presented their thought, at least sometimes, in the form of *written* dialogue or debate between different persons. The only difference is that in real debate the two persons holding rival positions are real or actual historical person which is not necessarily the case when the form of dialogue or debate is used as a mode of presentation of his thought by some thinker. In case of written dialogue the proponent normally represents the author himself but his rival or the opponent may not be a historical person, often he is a logical figure, an imagined opponent.

In the history of Philosophy of different cultures we find written records of debate between the actual writer and one or more persons, holding rival positions, who could be either historical or just logical figures. In India these forms of debate – the debate between real persons and debate between one real and one imaginary person or between two imaginary persons – are still found. In seminars, and śātrātha-s, scholars, representing opposite positions, debate face to face. In classical India, the usual practice of authors of written texts of philosophy was to express their own position as response to the actual or possible position of some actual or imagined rival character (pūrvapakśa). Author's own position or the position he writes to defend is called siddhāntapakśa (the position of the proponent which is finally upheld). Pūrvapakśa – the opponent or his position – is meant to be critically examined is usually ultimately rejected. Where there is no actual historical person as opponent the proponent himself imagines or anticipates some criticisms to his own position and answers or refutes them as if these have been offered by some opponent.

In a serious culture of intense and continued dialogue and debate, as in Indian philosophical tradition, these are usually more than freely chosen mere form or style of presentation of one's view. The authentic tradition of dialogue develops in and is found enshrined in the writings of large number of the writers of a certain culture (and more so in a certain age) which is basically rational. In such a culture free inquiry and criticism without any thought of favour or fear is and honoured and encouraged. Criticisms in theoretical circle were not viewed as a move to malign but an aid to the development and expansion of knowledge proper. According to the conception of it in such a culture, rationality is, as is evident from the actual practice of the people concerned, constructive and positive. Some modern scholars, particularly modern Indians, seem to hold that the Indian culture as such or as a whole is not rational; only the traditions of Chārvaka and Buddhism in it were or are traditions of rationality[13]. It seems that these thinkers are led to this conclusion because they take or understand (uncritically and against the evidence of history) rationality as a destructive and negative stance or approach. According to this approach efforts at *criticizing and rejecting* a rival position or any position for that matter, are viewed as evidence of the presence or operation of a rational spirit. On the contrary, any

attempt at defending a certain position is regarded as an evidence of dogmatism and bias which is normally displayed by the conservatives, revivalists and reactionaries to thwart any progressive movement of the revolutionaries. The truth of the matter, however, is that for a pseudo rational or imperfectly rational culture or man such a negative conception of rationality becomes the sole conception of it. Men who have such a conception of rationality invariably tend to find evidence of rationality in Indian culture only in the positions and practice of the nāstikas or who are opposed to the *Vaidika* culture. But from the authentic Indian standpoint, and for any unbiased man, and arguably even for the Cārvāka-s and Bauddha-s (at least many of them) who are authentically engaged in debate, the nāstikas engage themselves in authentic debate and dialogue for the sole purpose of *defending* their own positions against the objections and criticisms of their rivals, that is, the āstikas. Thus arguing for defending one's own position is not so much the mark of dogmatism as of authenticity and sincerity of purpose. In an authentic debate each party aims at defending its own position against its opponent; and each is an opponent and proponent from the appropriate point of view. In any authentic debate each party criticizes the position of the rivals not for the sake of criticism but as a part of the defense of his own position. He who does not have a rival position to defend is not an authentic and sincere rival but engages himself only in the exercise of sophistical reasoning for refuting any position for the sake of refutation. In classical Indian culture authentic debate was carried out by people who were both modest and confident. They were modest enough to honour and value the criticisms of opponents and granted initial plausibility of their positions, which were so far admitted to be rational, plausible and worth examining. At the same time they would engage in debate with the confidence that they would be able to defend, against all criticisms, the position they represent. One reason for their confidence is that the position in question had earlier been tested against many criticisms which were met by the previous scholars of great repute. These were the scholars who bequeathed to later scholars of the same lineage the position so far proved. Thus the present scholars who are bearer of their legacy find it their moral and academic duty to defend the view they have received from their predecessors against new attacks[14]. It is in this way and in this spirit that the traditions of rational

debate were developed in India and since then it is continuing for centuries. It is a lie to say that these traditions of Indian philosophy are dead. Any new scholar who aligns himself with a particular line or academic tradition accepts the tradition with reverence particularly because it has been earlier tested and defended by great scholars who deserve to be taken seriously. If one does not bear some such attitude to a position then he would hardly take it to be worth defending. Serious effort at defense is thus preceded by initial trust in the rationality or defensibility of the position in question and sense of obligation to defend it against rivals. Those who fail to understand this conception and nature of the positive and constructive rationality take it to be dogmatism of the reactionaries. Nothing can be further from the truth.

What then distinguishes India is not just the presence of oral tradition or tradition of debate in it but the sort of view about the nature and value of debate and further the full fledged Theory of debate (kathā) which discusses not only the nature of debate but also its varieties, the definition of each such variety and also conditions of success or failure of debate etc.

We need to note one more point which is already adumbrated in the previous account. In classical Indian culture philosophy was created and developed by thinkers who philosophized not just as stray and isolated individuals nor even as free inquirers or supporters or critics of a certain position they or their rival had. On the contrary they philosophized as members of a living and continuing line of thinkers (sampradāya) related to each other as direct or indirect teachers and disciples as the case might be. The word Vedānta or Sāmkhya is not just the name of a position but of a sampradāya (tradition or line) of scholars linked in the way stated. In India philosophy developed sampradāya wise and not individual wise. Even when we take the name of individuals like Prakāśātmā or Kaṇāda we do not know much about them as individual but they are basically viewed as belonging to a certain sampradāya. Here philosophers engage themselves in debate or dialogue as a committed member of a certain tradition, and carrying a great legacy of scholarship which it is their obligation to defend. If a person comes to be convinced at a certain point of time that the position he had been defending so long or the saṃpradāya he aligned himself with was not

rationally tenable then he was free to leave that saṃpradāya and join some other saṃpradāya. Individualism or free inquiry in the sense of freelance thinking, as distinct from committed thinking, was not considered as a value in classical Indian rational tradition of debate and dialogue. Though their number has become small yet there are persons who are still continuing this tradition of Indian philosophy.

It would be however wrong to think that all classical works of Indian philosophy are in the form of explicit dialogue. For example in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra very little explicit notice has been taken of any opponents. Same is nearly the case with the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and Yogasūtra. On the other hand that the Nyāyasūtra is targeting opponents is quite evident and explicit. This is also true about the Brahamasūtra, even if some find it to be true to somewhat less extent. Gaṇgeśa in his Tattvacintāmaṇi has clearly mentioned that he found it necessary to write the book *Tattvacintāmaṇi* because a number of new and difficult to refute objections have been raised against the Nyāyasampradāya which he felt obliged to defend.[15]

Decline of dialogue.

To come back to the claim that decline of the tradition of dialogue in Indian philosophy has resulted in the stunned growth or stagnation of it, my own position in this matter is a little cautious. Succinctly put, when I look at the present state of Indian philosophy I feel deeply concerned but not alarmed. The concern obliges me to take the trouble of examining thoroughly the actual state of things, do whatever I can in my individual capacity to improve the situation and suggest further lines of action which we should collectively follow to breathe new life to Indian Philosophy and revitalize it. For once we give vent to our sense of alarm people, who are generally indolent, would go on repeating in vague generalities the same alarm and excuse them of any serious and sustained effort to do something to improve the situation. However if we try to assess objectively the actual situation we will be immensely rewarded by some signs of hope. Let me present example of some such effort.

First we need to distinguish between notional decline of dialogue and actual decline of it (just as we distinguished between dialogue as a mere style of presentation and dialogue as serious effort

of made to enhance knowledge. The decline of this latter kind of dialogue or authentic debate hampers further growth of philosophy. In early days philosophers had little scope of holding debate and dialogue with scholars living beyond the neighborhood. The discovery of printing and subsequent shrinking of spatial and temporal distances, locally as well as globally, were yet to be achieved. During those days philosophical or even other theoretical traditions were mainly oral. In India the oral tradition was so perfected and made effective particularly by the students and teachers of the Veda or the S'ruti that this tradition continued even long after the printing as well as mode of travel by mechanical vehicles were introduced. One use which was made of this oral tradition in India by theoreticians afterwards, when writing was already introduced, was to retain it to some extent and write down only major points of their thought and theory in the form of aphorisms or short and terse sentences. Greater part of the supporting discussions and debates were continued in the oral form. Still later a system of teaching and writing was introduced in which oral tradition continued to play great role. Books were written in terse or pithy style which could not be understood without the help of a competent scholar who could explain the passages as and when needed. Only those who belonged to the oral tradition in which necessary explanations were retained as living memory could do the job of explaining. Only such persons were trusted as teachers because they knew and remembered all necessary elucidations already advanced and all points gained in debate with the adversaries (besides being able to contribute occasionally original arguments or insights). So only the direct students, belonging to a certain teacher student line, had access to those large bodies of often intricate thoughts remembered in the oral tradition. As a result nobody could learn a subject without joining the respective oral tradition and engaging in regular discussion with the teachers, fellow students, scholars and compatriots. When writings were introduced almost in equal proportion to oral teaching and discussion, even then earlier aphorisms or cryptic writings were made the starting point. Later writings often took the form of commentaries and sub-commentaries. These longer treatises and commentaries were not, nor were viewed as, materials for self study; these were not self explanatory texts. Advanced and longer texts had to be explained orally by teachers to their students directly. So the oral

tradition and the teaching mode of instruction continued and established themselves firmly in Indian culture. Not the oral tradition, which was common in every culture in its early days, but its long and uninterrupted continuation is what seems to be unique to Indian culture is its continuation even after the discovery of script, writing, paper and even printing.

Similarly commentarial literature are not totally unknown in classical Greek or Roman culture or even in later European culture yet no where outside India this form of literature is so vast. Tradition of composing commentary continued widely till the last century. It is still continuing today in a much diminutive form though. Some of the well known commentaries other cultures are the commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* in the Middle Age, commentary on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* in the late twentieth century, Broad's commentary on McTaggart's philosophy and Paton's commentary on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. The continuation of the oral tradition and commentarial literature which were by no means self explanatory, long after they were necessities of physical circumstances[16], is among the unique marks of India's intellectual culture. Tradition of debate has been pervasive both as a style of presentation as also the method of learning and knowing the truth. Some form of debate was also in use only for the destructive purposes but constructive use of debate was very familiar.

(There are many persons who believe that in the traditional Indian society and academic culture debate and its constructive use had been quite common. This however has declined since then, at least in the field of Indian philosophy. This is partly true and partly false. Today we have greater facilities for faster communication across vast physical distances. Debates through published papers in journals seem to outnumber earlier debates in the writings of single individuals or oral debates within small groups. Anyway, the scope of dialogue has increased rather than decreased. Earlier during the period of system philosophy protracted debate between philosophers were not so common in the West and in India it was not as many as we find today in the pages of journals which publish articles which are the preferred mode of doing philosophy these days.

With the discovery of printing and publication of journals and facility of distribution of journals among people of distant places there had to happen notional decline of face to face debate or dialogue. This does not necessarily mean the abandonment of dialogue or the spirit of dialogue. There was only change in form. Tradition of oral dialogue restricted in space and time was largely replaced by dialogue through writing. And with the advent of electronic media scope and facility of dialogue or exchange of critical comments have increased beyond what we could imagine even forty years before. What however continued in India is largely the method of direct teaching of classical texts by teachers to their immediate students. This could not be very easily replaced because to make the classical commentarial literature, and through them the aphorisms, intelligible through books proved very difficult. Easily intelligible elucidation of even commentarial literature would be unmanageably long. Or they would not be easily intelligible and as such could not be mastered independent of *teaching* by competent teacher. Besides, a large number of quality books of the required nature would be necessary. Some teacher requires large number of quality books whether in Saṃskṛta or in regional language or in English and these books would be many times longer than the most brief commentary in Saṃskṛta. My personal experience may be shared. Those who are acquainted with the texts in question know that for all practical purposes this is unachievable. However, new works can be written and are being written which one can master without the help of teacher, but by comparison these are no match for the classical Saṃskṛta texts. But even if we could write such books in good numbers we could compensate for notional decline of dialogue. We will come back to the need for such books again a little later. But it should be noted that only so long the real tradition of debate and dialogue is alive, philosophy will remain alive. Analytical subjects, unlike descriptive ones, like philosophy consist in rational inquiry. So in a subject like philosophy it is next to impossible to actually abandon dialogue and debate.

With the publication of more and more journals it has become a set pattern among philosophers of Europe and America to continue their debate and dialogue in the pages of these journals. In India on the other hand number of journals is very few and timely publication of even

these few journals is a challenging task as good number of papers worth publishing, on a regular basis, is still an unrealized dream. This is due to the fact that quality of teaching and research has fallen sharply and further we are yet to develop the habit of responding through writings to the views of others. Besides, very few are in the habit of reading journal articles regularly and responding to them. Otherwise there are now good incentives for writing and publishing papers for college and University teachers. Further there is enormous facility for communicating and debating with scholars all over the world. We need to develop the style and habit of on line debate and discussion.

In India in the classical period discussion and debate through writing had been as common as the direct and oral debate. In commentarial literature of one tradition notice used to be taken of relevant recent or earlier rival views. These would be regularly examined and responded to.

We may cite, for illustrative purpose, a few examples of debate between great personalities of Indian philosophy who were separated by long time gap between them. Śankara Miśra's fifteenth century work *Bhedaratnam* was criticized and attempted to be refuted almost word by word by Madhusūdan Saraswatī in his *Advaitaratnarakśaṇam* after about one hundred years. Śankara Miśra's time has been calculated to be 1472 A.D.[17] whereas that of Madhusudana is 1525 to 1632 A.D[18]. Similarly *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gangeśa who flourished in Mithilg in the thirteenth century A.D.[19] was later on criticized extensively by a critic of south India, Vyāsarāya, in the second half of fifteenth century,[20] in his *Tarkatāndavam*. Similar debate among scholars, often separated by wide time gap, and belonging to long and rival traditions of preceptors and disciples enriched and contributed to the growth of almost all the schools of Indian philosophy. Even when a certain work was not written to refute any particular text or views of a particular thinker it was written to answer many objections brought against the school to which the author belonged, by the scholars of rival schools. Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmani* is a good example[21].

The period of decadence.

It is commonly said and believed that there was already a decline of the tradition of the practice of debate and dialogue in Indian

philosophy during the middle age. The reason is that according to the historians, the middle age is the dark age of European culture. We have been conditioned by the European historians as well as by their Indian disciples, that the historical periodization based on European experience and the history of Europe has universal application. Middle of fourteenth century is commonly regarded as the beginning point of renaissance. Accordingly, thirteenth century and, at least, for about three to four hundred years preceding that was the dark age of European culture. During this period India was at least philosophically vibrant. If however it is meant that the decline in philosophy and activities in other culture areas marks the middle age then the middle age of Indian history and that of European history cannot be the same.

I feel concerned but *not* alarmed.

It may be said that it is not so important when exactly the decline of Indian philosophy begun. However, what is important is that at present Indian philosophy is in the state of decline. We need to recognize this and suggest remedy, if possible. We agree that it is as much an obligation of us to create awareness and sense of concern among all who would be involved, it is reasonable to think, in observing and examining the present state of Indian philosophy. It is a state of near stagnation and decay. But we insist that it is equally our duty to avoid creating a sense of alarm or panic in those who will improve the situation. For, that will be counterproductive as sense of alarm is likely to give rise to an attitude of resignation and hopelessness. What is necessary is to take stock of the situation as objectively as possible and circulate the result among all concerned. Preparing a careful, objective and critical survey of the current situation in the field of philosophical activity in our country and disseminating the report is a laborious job which can be best performed by a group rather than isolated individuals. So what I will present is just a sample – an unsystematic sample of what we need to do by way of keeping the record of philosophical activity straight with a view to avoid both sense of self complacence and panic.

I may as well say, to allay the fear that I am downplaying the miserable state of Indian philosophy, that I am fully aware of the situation in question. I had no option but to do so as my teacher who shaped my vision so far as the subject of philosophy is concerned had

said what I consider the final words in the matter. Let me quote the observation Professor G.N. Bhattacharya made in a lecture delivered in 1980 at Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Kolkata. The subject of his lecture was "Humanities including Fine Arts". He observed the following when talking about the last point of his lecture, "How much of the supposed ends of the several humanistic studies have actually been achieved in India and the world outside". He said "Regarding philosophy", one of the major humanistic studies, "in spite of its high pretensions, its study in modern India at least has not led to the general emergence of a community of illumined minds. In our country, it has led generally speaking, rather to the emergence of vain talkers and closed minds with a sickening apishness in regard to Western norms and forms of thinking coupled with an appalling ignorance of indigenous norms and forms. There is also a near-complete unfamiliarity with our vast legacy of ancient Saṃskṛta texts of Indian analytical philosophy. In the Euro-American countries, however, the situation is incomparably better. The philosophical training imparted to their native students do promote in a great many among them a healthy openness of mind, a habit of independent thinking and an indomitable spirit of enquiry. It is again the Western students of philosophy who have been the active creators of modern philosophy, while their Indian counterparts are generally contented with propagating it to their countrymen. As a matter of fact, generally speaking, Indian students of philosophy have for the greater part of the last two centuries taken up the unenviable role of 'purveyors' or 'brokers' of western philosophy. And 'brokers' to be sure, are hardly the persons who can claim to have intellectual illumination."

As I am intimately acquainted with these views of my teacher so also I have been witness to his enthusiasm and eagerness to train his students to learn and, if possible, do philosophy in the right way. He was not a man to give up. It is his example only which has taught me to be concerned but not alarmed.

Keeping the Records straight.

Just as we need to be aware of the fact that the state of teaching and research in philosophy, so far as Indian philosophy is concerned, leaves much to be desired so also we should take careful note of

whatever little is still being done in this area at this difficult time. We owe debt of gratitude and appreciation to those who have made important contributions to the continuation and growth of the tradition of teaching and research in the area in question. We have to take note of works done in Saṃskṛta as well as in regional Indian languages or in English. I am convinced that if we do that, all will find that there is still reason to be hopeful rather than feel despondent. One though not the only one, reason why things are not all right in the field of Indian philosophy is that the important works produced during last one hundred years or so are often not noticed let alone appreciated. I present bellow a number of such works chosen randomly and within the range of my limited knowledge. If we work collectively we will find many more and the exhaustive list, if widely publicized, will act as great encouragement to produce further good works and contribute to the advance of the tradition Indian philosophy. This is one possibility which is strongly realistic.

The few works I collect here are those which I have personally seen, read and found them worth mentioning. It is likely some of these are known to many of you; but I am convinced these are not known to many others who would have been hopeful about Indian philosophy if they knew these works. I remember Pundit Panchānana Shastrī published in 1961 a Saṃskṛta commentary, *Vedāntaparibhāṣāsa-ṃgraha* on *Vedānta Paribhāśā* of Dharmarajādvarīndra. In this work he made sustained criticism of Anantakrishna Sāstri's commentary on the same text published around 1887. This commentary is written in an elegant and clear Saṃskṛta. Besides, in it Sastriji had noted and discussed the views of many earlier scholars including some commentators of Vedāntaparibhāśā. It is fit to be a compulsory reading for students beginning to study Vedānta. It may also be regarded as the starting point of a new tradition of debate and dialogue beginning with and centering round the debate between Mm. Anantakrishna Shastri and Mm. Yogendranath Bagchi. Pundit Panchanana Shastri. This book is an example which illustrate admirably my point that on the one hand there are still or till recently dedicated scholars who produced remarkable works in Indian philosophy and on the other we have become so indolent and despondent that we fail to take notice of such works, let alone

appreciate them. If we bring such works to the notice of wider section of teachers, scholars and students as a matter of duty we may kindle hope in the heart of many teachers and scholars and students. They will feel encouraged to work seriously in the field of Indian philosophy. We simply speak of decadence but not also of whatever reason we have to be hopeful.

Pundit Panchanana Shastri belonged to the tradition of teachers like Lakshmanaa Shastri Dravid and his pupil, who was Shastriji's direct preceptor, Mm. Yogendra Nath Bagchi, Sāmkhya Vedānta Tarka Tīrtha (1887 – 1960). Yogendra Nath was an institution by himself and he may be credited with initiating a Bengal school of Vedānta. Bengal which, along with neighboring place Mithilā, is known as the birth place and capital of the culture of Navyanyāya, can boast of producing in the past Madhusūdan Sarasvati who started navyavedānta tradition. In the early twentieth century, the credit goes primarily to Yogendranāth Bagchi for initiating modern Bengal school of Vedānta. Yogendranāth had written a good many number of works in Bengali mainly on Vedānta. But his incomplete work *Bālabodhinī* which is an excellent elucidation of *Advitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana is in Saṃskṛta. However it was in Bengali script. I have heard that it has been later on published in Nāgari script. Yogendranāth's scholarship was encyclopedic. Another noted achievement of Yogendranāth had been to inspire his student Pundit Bhūtanātha Saptatīrtha to make intensive study and publish translation with short explanation of *Manusmṛti* with Kullukbhaṭṭa's commentary, *Mīmāṃsādarśan* in Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaiminī and Śabara and *Gūdārthadīpikā*, on Madhusūdan Saraswati's work on the *Bhagavdgītā*. These works have been in Bengali and all were of very high quality. Yogendranāth himself wrote many other books and monographs of very high quality. This is an example which encourages us to think that if we carefully look into the literature in vernacular then we may find that important works in Indian philosophy had been composed even during last one hundred years. We should also mention Nyāyadarśana, the five volume monumental work by Mm. Phanibhushana Tarkavagisha, a senior contemporary of Yogendranātha, in which he translated with his own elaborate critical notes (*tippaṇī*) the whole of *Nyāyasūtra* and Vātsyāyana's commentary on it.

The work *Vṛttiprabhākara* by Nischaldas in Hindi is a remarkable work of Vedānta. Swami Satchidanandendra's two books *Vedānta Prakriyā Pratyabhiñjā* (1964) and *Panchapādikāprasthānam* (1966) were published with the shocking declaration that he had shown Prakaśātmajyoti did not faithfully follow or expound the views of Bhagavatpāda ādi Saṃkarācārya. Pt. Madhusūdana Ojhā published from Jaipur in 1990 *Śārīraka-Vijñanam* (*Vedāntaśārirakasūtrānām saṃkṣiptabhāsyam*) with the claim that he had been entirely faithful to the tradition but he made available a number of innovative and explanatory points. This has been well brought out by Caturvedi, Mm. Girdhara Śharmā, in his work, *Vaidik Vijñana* (in Hindi), the 2nd edition of which was published in 2005 from Sri Lal Bahādur Shastri Rāṣtriya Saṃaskṛta Vidyāpītha (deemed University), New Delhi. In Vedānta I could also name Swami Viśuddhananda Giri's *Satyanandaprabodhika*, Saṃskṛta elucidation (Vyākhyā) of *Advitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Saraswatī; it has been published in 2002 and is a good work meant for students and examinees.

In the tradition of debate Swami Karāpatriji, wrote and published in two volumes *Vedārthapārijāta*. It is a sustained critique of Dayānanda Saraswatī's views. Dayānanda (1824-1883), the founder of Aryasamājā movement, not only rejected advaitavāda and advaita Vedānta[22] but also mphasized the Samhitā portion of the Veda to the exclusion of other parts. In this connection we could remember a text which took note of this preference of Dayānanda. It was a work of Prof. K. Saccidānada Mūrty who had recently passed away. His work under reference is in English and its English title is *Vedic Hermeneutic* and in his own translation the title is *Srūtārthaparyālocanā*. However, it cannot be cited as a contribution to the tradition of debate in Indian Philosophy. Another English work may be mentioned in this connection. It was a regular commentary in the classical Indian style but in English, of a portion of Gangeśopādhyaya's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which is regarded as the beginning of the fully developed Navyanyāya. The book was published in 1990s. Another remarkable book, one of its kind, was published in 1991; it contains the text of *Kautaliyamarthaśāstram* with two commentaries by Punditarāja Rajeśwaraśāstrī Dravid, namely *Vaidikasiddhāntasaṃrakṣiṇi* and *Jayamangalākroḍapatram*. One remarkable feature of these works is that in them Panditrāja is found

engaged in debate on number of points with modern scholars like Professor Hazra who was a research professor in Calcutta Saṃskṛta College. About the continuation of the tradition of debate in the pages of journals we may refer to the debate between a few Pundits who contested in writing the elucidation of the very first sentence of Vātsyayanās Bhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtra by Mm. Phaṇibhuṣaṇa Tarkavāgiśa on the one hand and on the other his celebrated pupil, Professor Gopinātha Bhattāchārya, himself a legendary scholar and teacher. In recent time Gopinātha Bhattachary's elucidation of certain passage of *Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ* and *Dīpikā* on it had been made target of criticism by Prof. N. S. Dravid in the pages of JICPR.

Apart from such minor works many major works were also written. Dinesh Chandra Bhattāchārya's *Prācina Bhāratīya Manovidya* and a professional psychologist's translation of Yogasūtra. A great example of philosophical debate and dialogue in recent time in Indian philosophy is the one which was initiated by the great Naiyāyika of Varanasi, who passed away only recently, Badrinath Shukla who published in Saṃskṛta a paper in which he formulated the Cārvāka theory of self, known as dehātmavāda, using the technical apparatus and language of Navyanyāya. The formulation was so formidable that it was a challenge to others to refute the Cārvāka position, for it now requires far greater skill in argumentation. Many Naiyāyika-s have responded to the challenge, unfortunately almost all of these were only after his sad demise. Anyone including the present author can produce easily hundred such examples. In the pages of the Journals like *JICPR*, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, *Philosophica*, *Dārsanikasamīkṣā*, *Anvisksīkī*, many papers have been found in which the authors have responded to rival views expressed by Indian or foreign contemporary scholars on some tenets of Indian philosophy. In the field of Vyākaraṇa the Ambākartrī of Raghunātha Sharmā is unparalleled. A small elucidation in Bengali of *Saṃkṣiptasāra* is another good work. This apart from another earlier work worth mentioning is *Vyākaranadarṣaner Itihāsa*, History of Vyakarnasastra.

Causes of decline

Having said all this it cannot be denied that the state of teaching and research in the field of Indian philosophy leaves much to be desired. The situation needs must be improved. And again for deciding on some

darśana (philosophy) group, the syllabus or the style and quality of teaching were not of a quality which could create among the students lasting interest in darśana. (ib) Usually persons with M. A. degree used to be selected as teacher in colleges and universities. Many university students of Saṃskṛta or philosophy were found to go to the Pundits of nearby catuḥṣpāthi-s to study the portions of texts of Indian philosophy, prescribed in the syllabus. (ic) The purpose was not so much to understand the subject as to pass examination. University degrees were used to be looked upon as gateway to service. (ii) In spite of the fact that European philosophy had to be studied from books in English and English was a foreign tongue student would study it for two reasons. Saṃskṛita by that time had already become an unfamiliar language to majority of students and teachers; besides, in the society the prestige of English language was very high compared to any other language. (iia) Another important factor was that in the indigenous system of education students from the intermediate stage were required to learn one branch of Indian philosophy at a time for quite a number of years. So they could afford to be thorough in their study and did not face very great difficulty in acquiring mastery over it. But in European system of education students at the intermediate or graduate stage were required to learn a number of subjects within a couple of years or so. Mastering a text of Indian philosophy within such constraints was difficult and as a result deep study was replaced by superficial study just adequate for passing the examination.

Only one compensatory feature of the time was that a number of motivated and committed teachers of philosophy started on their own initiative, and with no gain other than academic one in view, taking regular lessons from Pundits of Indian systems of philosophy like Nyāya, Vedānta, Sāmkhya, Mīmāṃsā etc. Serious as they were they soon found that the subjects and texts were very tough and challenging. A few of them continued their explorations of Indian philosophy and became convinced that Indian philosophy was far superior in every respect than European philosophy being taught in the colleges and universities. (iii) But at that time there was hardly any facility like publishing articles in good journals or holding regular seminars or workshops on Indian philosophical subjects. On the other hand there was not enough scope of teaching really advanced texts or even

realistic and effective agenda of action in this regard we need to know the objective conditions responsible for this state of affair. Though these are well known yet many a times these remain dormant below the level of our explicit awareness. It is for this reason I will try to recall some of the causes of the present state of decline so far as Indian philosophy is concerned.

We cannot determine the state of a particular branch of Indian knowledge system, Indian philosophy, without relating it to and taking note of the state of education in general. And in this respect the history of education of East, West and North India seem to be somewhat different in important ways from that of the South India. Because of personal limitation I will record a few relevant facts of the history of education in India minus south India. Even so, we need to conduct our search in following four phases: the state of education in general and that of Indian philosophy in particular in (i) the last quarter or so of the eighteenth century; (ii) from the beginning to first quarter of the second half of the nineteenth century or up to 1857 to be precise; (iii) from 1857 to 1947 and (iv) from the time of India's Independence to this day. The period between 1857 and 1947 be again divided into two segments: (a) from 1857 the year three Universities were established to 1906, when, following movements that started a few years earlier, National Council of Education, Bengal was established and the period (b) between 1906 and 1947. I have no scope for conducting search of conditions leading to the decline of education in India and that of Indian philosophy in this planned way here.

To be very brief the decline of indigenous system of education and Indian knowledge systems including philosophy started around 1857 when European education system was first officially introduced in India. (i) Neither did we try hard nor, in any case, did we succeed in incorporating Indian philosophy to the mainstream philosophy, its training and research, in India. Since then the indigenous system of education, the only authentic system of studying Indian philosophy in the original, started to be gradually marginalized. (ia) In the universities and colleges only or mainly European philosophy was taught in the departments of philosophy. In the Saṃskṛta departments main emphasis was given on literature, and religious texts like the Veda. Even where in the post graduate departments students had the option to choose

elementary texts adequately intensively or extensively in the departments of universities and colleges. So this compensatory feature could not resist the decline of teaching and learning of Indian philosophy. Through teaching minor texts (and that too by using inept translation) for a short period among many other subjects it was not possible to create interest and expertise among the general students. So very few students could be motivated to pursue the study of Indian philosophy on their own initiative in later life at the feet of pundits.

(iv) On the other side of the picture there was progressive devaluation of degrees obtainable for students of catuḥṣpāthis like Śāstri, Ācārya etc. in comparison to regular University degrees of B.A., M.A. and the like. With the increase in the number of colleges and universities offering European education, job prospect for persons having university degrees was greater. Similarly in society the prestige and glamour of university and colleges teachers compared to the adhyāpaka-s of catuḥṣpāthis became greater. (v) In course of time number of capable teachers trained in Western philosophy became many times more than those who trained themselves on personal initiative in Indian philosophy in the original. The latter group of teachers was not given official incentive or recognition, in material terms or otherwise for their qualification in Indian philosophy. (v) Some at least of those who did not have expertise in Indian philosophy developed in course of time a sort of sense of guilt but failed to utilize it positively by launching serious effort to learn Indian philosophy; instead many of them developed, perhaps unconsciously, a sort of defense mechanism which led them to make all sorts of effort to convince themselves as also others that Indian philosophy was inferior, that it was long dead, that commentaries and sub-commentaries were only reiteration of the teachings of old masters and that modern day scholars of classical Indian philosophy were simply learning by rote a few obscure Saṃskṛta utterances. Living philosophy was only European philosophy. (vi) Very few came forward to refute such objections with any sort of confidence and authority. So by default the superiority of European philosophy in comparison to Indian philosophy got established.

I would end the listing of causes of decline of teaching and research of Indian philosophy by recording only two more conditions. (vii) By the end of the nineteenth century majority of educated Indians

became imitators of Western norms and ideas and disrespectful of Indian ways of thinking and living. (viii) Many of these people accepted in a docile manner the Orientalists' propaganda and left handed compliment as true and as a matter of pride for Indians. They came to believe that India is a mystical, irrational and spiritual country where religion could grow but not critical and rational study like philosophy, whereas the West is rational and scientific country. The number of these people began to increase and they spread soft spiritualism. Now a large number of Indians are convinced that India is a spiritual culture and not scientific or rational culture. (viiia) As a result more rigourous intellectual disciplines like Nyāya and analytic Vedānta came to be progressively marginalized. Today we hear talks about mystical Vedānta or mystical version of Vedānta and Yoga and Buddhism. Due to the systematic neglect of the rest of Indian philosophy including analytical Vedānta under the impact of soft spiritualism is to my mind one of the principal reasons for the decline of Indian philosophy. Every educated Indian having least respect for our great tradition and minimum authentic understanding of the true nature of Indian culture should feel duty bound to check the spread of soft spiritualism.

Ways of improving the situation.

My very first suggestion is (i) we guard ourselves against falling prey to the negative propaganda of the arrogant and ignorant critics of Indian philosophy as well as against inculcating the attitude of resignation of the alarmists. Rather we should highlight with concrete examples whatever positive points are there and on this objective ground encourage everyone to do something to improve the situation which in any case leaves much to be desired. (ii) Through individual or group or institutional initiative attempts should be made to (a) scrap semester system in the department or institutions of Indian philosophy in which instruction through lecture mode is not at all suitable. For reasons elaborated above the peculiar nature of the Indian philosophical texts requires instruction through teaching mode. (However, a healthy combination of teaching mode and lecture mode is desirable as far as possible. This would end the practice of exclusively textual study and teaching in the bad sense in which it is hardly anything more than learning passages of some texts by rote on the one hand and making

translation and paraphrasing do the job of explaining. At the same time exclusively thematic study of philosophy or philosophical problems on the other hand ends in talking in vague generalities about certain problems. Besides, such practice does not allow us to pay the academic debt we owe to our predecessors. (iii) Projects should be launched (iiia) to prepare record of, published works in the field of Indian philosophy whether in the form of papers or books in the category of commentary or independent treatise, etc. for the purpose of giving wide circulation of those on a regular basis. These works may be in Saṃskṛta or some regional Indian language or English. (iiib) Consolidated list of all such works be widely circulated among the departments and institutions of philosophy with the explicit purpose of creating awareness particularly among students that field of Indian philosophy is still vibrant with activity. (iiic) Arrangement to be made for getting these works reviewed honestly and wherever possible positively. Any responsible negative review is welcome provided it contains detailed and concrete suggestions for improvement of the work reviewed. These reviews are to be published regularly. Open, rather than anonymous review system be introduced or followed. (iiid) Students and teachers of (Indian) philosophy be encouraged to fully utilize internet facilities beyond surfing existing websites only for regular exchanges with fellow students, colleagues and experts within or outside the country. (iiie) Arrangement, through existing websites or other means, should be made to receive questions, remarks etc and forwarding them to experts of the field for answers or responses. (iv) In many cases changes in the traditional style of teaching Indian philosophical texts may have to be introduced. Pundits as well as teachers in the departments of Saṃskṛta or philosophy may not insist on students memorizing the passages of the text as a precondition to discussion nor should they simply paraphrase and translate passages of the text as explanation of the same. These fail to exhibit highly analytic character of Indian philosophy and philosophical texts or impress the students. The taste of modern students, particularly of those who have studied European Philosophy and contemporary analytic Western Philosophy in particular, expect from teachers analytical treatment of problems. Teachers of Indian philosophical texts should pay attention to explaining the intention of

the authors of the texts beyond the apparent meaning of the sentences of the book. (ivf) For this, teachers and students should be encouraged to study books and papers of other philosophies and other subjects. (ivg) Students should be taught to think and write for themselves and combine authenticity with innovation. (ivh) Writings in regional language should be viewed with equal importance and good writings in regional languages should be made available in English or Saṃskṛta translation. (ivi) Means should be found out to expose bad writings prepared with commercial purpose by writers who are not competent for the job and who in connivance with profit minded publishing houses are causing great harm to the cause of Indian philosophy. (V) These days there is little hope of getting motivated students in good numbers. Effort should be made to successfully introducing top down method and (vi) removing the fear of Saṃskṛta from the mind of all concerned and infuse in the students and general public a sense of pride on account of India's past achievement in the field of philosophy (vii) New general histories of Indian philosophy be written with a purpose of creating sense of rightful pride in the mind of the readers for the depth, range and quality of Indian philosophy even in the eyes of some knowledgeable foreign scholars.

(viii) Scholars of Indian philosophy need to engage in debate with scholars of Western philosophy (who may or may not know Indian philosophy) on current issues of philosophical controversy. This will be possible for one who has authentic and deep knowledge of both the philosophies and can communicate with both these groups of scholars with ease. In such debates all related to study and teaching of philosophy should be invited. (ix) Similarly Indian scholars of Western philosophy should engage in debate on abiding philosophical issues with scholars of Indian philosophy (who may or may not know Western philosophy). Such inter cultural debate will be possible directly between scholars who have expertise in both these philosophies. So long there are not too many such people those few who satisfy this description may be used to build the bridge and ensure intercultural debate in the field of Indian philosophy. (x) Till such time good scholars of Indian philosophy should team up with colleagues who are experts in Western philosophy and vice versa and produce jointly writings of the required genre.

Notes and References

1 This paper is based on the Keynote Address delivered in the National Seminar on Dialogue in Indian Philosophical Tradition – Stagnation, Continuity, and Possibilities [Organized by Sree Sankaracharya University of Saṃskṛta, Kalady; August 26 - 27, 2011]

2 Albert Wezler is a Professor of the Institute for the Culture and History of India and Tibet, University of Hamburg, Germany.

3 Wezler, Albert., "Max Muller on Indian Philosophy" published in the Proceedings of an International Seminar, *Max Muller and his contemporaries*, The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Kolkata,2001, pp. 99-104

4 Op. cit. p.96

5 Ibid, p.93. italics added.

6 One recent example is the title of the work edited by Daya Krishna and others and published by ICPR in 1991. The full title is *Saṃvāda: A Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions.*

7 Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti* names the section consisting of the first two sūtra-s Tattvajñānavivṛddhiprakaraṇam. According to Vacaspati Misra dialogue is necessary for prajñāparipāka.

8 Viṣvanātha gives this section or prakaraṇa the name tattvajñanasaṃrakṣaṇaprakaraṇam.

9 Kuhn, Thomas., "The Sciences As Puzzle-solving Traditions" published in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Open Court 1974 (excerpt from this in Brown 1981)

10 Further, debates were not always confined to philosophical subjects only. Greece had a strong tradition of public debate of matters of state and governance of state. In court of law it is still being practiced as it was in ancient Greece.

11 The literature on Rhetoric in early Greece does not seem to be equally systematic or developed.

12 While introducing the Sutra-s 1.2.1-3 Vātsyāyana writes *Tisraḥ kathā bhavanti – vādo jalpo vitaṇḍā ceti.*

13 Many Indians like Deviprasad Chattopadhyay and Amartya Sen seem to be at least occasionally victims of such an alien conception of rationality.

14 The great Naiyāika Mm. Rakhāldas Nyāyaratna once wrote in clear terms that he had great admiration for Adavitavedānta system of thought of the schools of Ādi Śamkrācārya. But he was duty bound to he predecessors, the Naiyāyika to criticize this position and establish the comparative superiority of the Nyāya position in respect of its rationally defensible character. This rationality is so far of a distinctive kind and was described by Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya as authoritarian rationality.

15 Tantre dośagaṇenadurgamatare siddhāntadīkśāguru/Gaṇgeśah tanute mitena vacasā SrīTattvacintāmaṇim//.

16 See Welzer, A., "Max Muller on IndianPhilosophy" in *Max Muller and His Contemporaries*

17 See Gopinatha

18 See Rajendra Nath Ghośa's Introduction to Yogendra Nath Bagchi edited Madhusūdan Ṣaraswatī's Advatasiddhi with his own Saṃskṛta commentary *Bālabodhini* (in vangākśara).

19 Gopinath Kaviraja

20 See the English Introduction of H.P. Malledevaru (p.1) of his edition of *Tarkatandavam*, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, 1985

21 See note no. 11 above

22 See Rajendranath Ghose's Intoduction

विशिष्टाद्वैतवेदान्ते ख्यातिविमर्शः

का.ई.धरणीधरन्

भ्रमात्मकज्ञाने ख्यातिरिति व्यपदेशः शास्त्रग्रन्थेषु वर्तते। तत्र विषये वादिनो बहुधा विप्रतिपद्यन्ते। लोके यस्य यस्य यद्यत् ज्ञानं भवति तत्सर्वं प्रमेति वक्तुं न शक्यते। तथा सति प्रतिवादिनो ज्ञानमपि प्रमा स्यात्। तथात्वे प्रतिवादिनोऽपि विजयेरन्। तथा सर्वं ज्ञानमप्रमा इत्यपि वक्तुं न पार्यते। तथा सति वादिनो यत् ज्ञानं तदप्यप्रमा स्यात्। तथा च वादी पराजितो भवेत्। तथा चैवमभ्यधायि तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापे–

> सर्वं ज्ञानं न मानं परमतविजयात्, नाप्रमाणं स्वबाधात्,
> मानामानव्यवस्था तदियमनुमता लौकिकैर्यौक्तिकैश्च।।[1] इति

तस्मात् किञ्चिज्ज्ञानं प्रमा किञ्चिज्ज्ञानमप्रमेति विभागः अवश्यं सर्वैरभ्युपगन्तव्यः। तत्र अप्रमात्मके ज्ञाने अन्यथाभानात्मिकान्यथाख्यातिं नैयायिकाः, जैनाः भाट्टाश्च उररीकुर्वन्ति। अन्यथाख्यातेः या सामग्री भेदाज्ञानरुपा अख्यातिः तयैव व्यवहारोपपत्तेः अख्यातिपक्ष एव युक्त इति प्राभाकरा आशेरते। क्षणिकविज्ञानरूप आत्मैव बाह्यवस्त्वाकारेण प्रतीयत इत्यात्मख्यातिमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति माध्यमिकेतरा बौद्धाः। भ्रमस्थले असदेव प्रतीयत इति माध्यमिका असत्ख्यातिं स्वीकुर्वन्ति। भ्रमे सदसदनिर्वचनीयं वस्तूत्पद्य प्रतीयत इत्येवमनिर्वचनीयख्यातिमुररीकुर्वन्ति अद्वैतिनः। एतत्ख्यातिपञ्चकं मण्डनमिश्रपर्यन्तं प्रसिद्धमासीत्। अन्या अपि ख्यातयः प्रसिद्धेषु ग्रन्थेषूपलभ्यन्ते। पूर्वोक्तं ख्यातिपञ्चकमेवं निरदेशि मण्डनमिश्रेण–

> आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा।
> तथानिर्वचनख्यातिरित्येतत् ख्यातिपञ्चकम्।।[2] इति

भगवद्रामानुजाभिहिता यथार्थख्यातिः–

अथेदानीं ज्ञानयाथार्थ्यवादिनां भगवद्रामानुजीयानां मतं किञ्चित् निरूपयामः। तथा हि यथा प्राभाकराः सर्वं ज्ञानं यथार्थमिति व्यवहरन्ति तथैव एतेऽपि अयथार्थं किञ्चिदपि अनङ्गीकुर्वाणाः सर्वेषामपि ज्ञानानां याथार्थ्यमूरीकुर्वन्ति। तदुक्तं–

'यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदविदां मतम्'।[3] इति। अत्र 'वेदविदां मतम्' इति पदं नेदं मतमनाप्तबुद्धिकपोलकल्पितम्, अपि तु साम्प्रदायिकमिति सूचयति। सर्वज्ञानयाथार्थ्ये पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रियां मीमांसादिग्रन्थांश्च ते प्रमाणयन्ति।

इदं रजतमित्यादौ भ्रमनिर्वाहः कथम्? इति निरुपणम्

सर्वज्ञानयाथार्थ्ये कथं तर्हि इदं रजतमित्यादौ भ्रमनिर्वाहः इति चेत्- ब्रूमः, शुक्तावपि रजतावयवानां विद्यमानत्वात् विद्यमानानामेव रजतावयवानाम् इदं रजतमिति ग्रहणम्। अतो यथार्थमेव तत् ज्ञानम्। न च शुक्त्यादौ रजतावयवसत्त्वे सदा रजतगहणं भवेत् प्रवृत्तिश्च सदा स्यात्, बाधश्च नोपपद्येत इति वाच्यं, शुक्तिरजतस्थले शुक्त्यंशाग्रहणे दोष एव हेतुः। शुक्तिर्हि भूयोभिः शुक्तेरवयवैः तदपेक्षया न्यूनैः रजतावयवैश्चारब्धा। तत्र रजतावयवानामल्पत्वात् शुक्तिरिति लोके व्यवहारः। दोषवशात् शुक्त्यवयवभूयस्त्वस्याज्ञाने सति इदं रजतमिति जानाति। रजतार्थी तदानेतुं तदा प्रवर्तते। दोषापनये शुक्तिरिति ज्ञानोदये रजतज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते। शुक्तिधर्मप्रचुरग्रहणाभिभूतत्वाभावात् अदृष्टवशाच्च रजतग्रहणम्। शुक्तिभूयस्त्वेन रजताल्पत्वेन च शुक्तिज्ञानस्य बाधकत्वं रजतज्ञानस्य बाध्यत्वमिति निर्वाहः कृतः। किञ्च ज्ञानस्य बाध्यत्वं न स्वरूपतः, न च विषयतः, किन्तु बाध्यप्रवृत्तिकत्वम्, उत्तरज्ञानस्य बाधकत्वं पूर्वज्ञानजन्यप्रवृत्तिनिवारकत्वम्। अन्यथाख्यातिवादेऽपि ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपेण बाध्यत्वमनभिमतं, किन्तु विषयबाध्यत्वमेवाभिमतम्। वयं तु ज्ञानफलभूतप्रवृत्तेर्बाध्यत्वमिति वदामः। अतः शुक्तिरजतस्थले गृह्यमाणम् इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानं नायथार्थम्।

एतदुक्तं भवति- शुक्तिज्ञानस्य रजतज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वं नाम नावच्छेदकधर्मदर्शनविधया, किन्तु मन्दतरशब्दग्रहं प्रति तारतरशब्दग्रहस्य यथा अभिभावकज्ञानविधया प्रतिबन्धकत्वम् एवमल्पतरशुक्तिसंसृष्टरजतांशग्रहं प्रति शुक्तिज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वमनुभवबलात् स्वीक्रियते। अत एव निर्धर्मितावच्छेदककज्ञानस्यापि प्रतिबध्यतानिर्वाहः स्वीक्रिते। तारशब्दग्रहदशायां निर्धर्मितावच्छेदककस्यापि मन्दशब्दग्रहस्यानुत्पत्तेस्तस्यापि प्रतिबध्यत्वावश्यकत्वात्। तथाचैवमभ्यधुः भगवद्रामानुजमुनयः–

शुक्त्यादौ रजतादेश्च भावः श्रुत्यैव बोधितः।
रूप्यशुक्त्यादिनिर्देशभेदो भूयस्त्वहेतुकः।।

रूप्यादिसदृशश्चायं शुक्त्यादिरूपलभ्यते।
अतस्तस्यात्र सद्भावः प्रतीतेरपि निश्चितः।।

कदाचित् चक्षुरादेस्तु दोषाच्छुक्त्यंशवर्जितः।
रजतांशो गृहीतोऽतो रजतार्थी प्रवर्तते।।

दोषहानौ तु शुक्त्यंशे गृहीते तन्निवर्तते।
अतो यथार्थं रूप्यादिविज्ञानं शुक्तिकादिषु।।

बाध्यबाधकभावोऽपि भूयस्त्वेनोपपद्यते।
शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्यसाकल्यग्रहरूपतः।।

नातो मिथ्यार्थसत्यार्थविषयत्वनिबन्धनः।
एवं सर्वस्य सर्वत्वे व्यवहारव्यवस्थितिः।।[4] इति

भ्रमनिर्वाहे त्रिवृत्करणपञ्चीकरणप्रतिनिधिन्यायभेदाग्रहादीनामुपयोगवर्णनम्–

त्रिवृत्करणस्योपयोगः- सर्वत्र भ्रमनिर्वाहः त्रिवृत्करणपञ्चीकरणप्रतिनिधिन्यायभेदाग्रहैश्च कृत इति प्रागवादिष्म। तत्र त्रिवृत्करणेन शुक्तावन्तर्गतस्य तेजोंशस्य शुक्लभास्वरेण परिणामवतो रजतसौसादृश्यात् रजतावयवत्वमुपपन्नम्। तादृशाकारयुक्ततद्भूतविशेषवन्त एव सम्यग्रजतादयो निरीक्ष्यन्ते। अतः शुक्त्यादौ रजताद्यवयवसद्भाव उपपद्यते। 'नामरूपे व्याकरोत् तासां त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकमकरोत्'[5] इति श्रुतिरेव त्रिवृत्करणे प्रमाणम्। अत्रत्यो विचारस्तु **'त्र्यात्मकत्वन्तु भूयस्त्वात्'**[6] इत्यस्मिन् सूत्रे श्रीभाष्ये स्फटीकृत इति नेह प्रतन्यते। एतेन पञ्चीकरणमपि व्याख्यातम्।

अत्रेदम् अवधेयम्- त्रिवृत्करणप्रतिनिधिन्यायाभ्यां शुक्तौ रजतावयवानां सिद्धिरित्युच्यते। तथा हि शुद्धैः महाभूतैः पृथिव्यप्तेजोभिः अण्डारम्भो न सम्भवतीति पृथिव्यादिके एकैकस्मिन् भूते जलादिभूतद्वयसंयोजनं सर्गादौ परमात्मा चकार। तथा च अण्डोत्पत्त्यभावप्रयोजकीभूताभावप्रतियोगि- भूतानुयोगिकभूतान्तरप्रतियोगिकविलक्षणसंयोगः त्रिवृत्करणमिति सिद्ध्यति। तदाह श्रुतिः "तासां त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतम् एकैकं करवाणि" इति। एवं "यदग्ने रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तद्रूपं यच्छुक्लं तदपां यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्य" इति च्छान्दोग्यश्रुत्या अग्नेः साक्षादेव पृथिव्यप्तेजोरूपत्वं प्रदर्शितम्। तथा च शुक्तिरूपपृथिव्यां रजतांशरूपतेजस्संयोगसिद्धिः। न च उक्तश्रुत्या पृथिव्यां तेजःप्रतियोगिकविलक्षणसंयोगसिद्धावपि न शुक्तिरूपपृथिव्यां रजतांशरूपतेजस्संयोगसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं, शुक्तौ तेजोऽन्तरसंयोगकल्पने शुक्तौ रजतावयवविरहेण रजतासत्त्वात् देशान्तरस्थितेन रजतेन चक्षुषः सन्निकर्षाभावात् चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षं नोपपद्यते। अतः रजते चक्षुषः ज्ञानलक्षणाप्रत्यासत्तिः कल्पनीया। एवं सुरभिः चन्दनखण्डः इति चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षे उपनयमर्यादया भासमाने सौरभे लौकिकविषयताया असत्त्वात् सौरभं साक्षात्करोमीत्यनुव्यवसायो न भवति। एवं पुरोवर्तिशुक्तौ रजतावयवाभावे रजते लौकिकसन्निकर्षविरहात्, ज्ञानलक्षणास्वीकारेऽपि देशान्तरीयरजते लौकिकसनिकर्षविराहाच्च रजतं पश्यामीत्यनुभवो न स्यादिति तदुपपादनाय दोषविशेषस्यापि लौकिकविषयताप्रयोजकत्वं कल्पनीयमिति च गौरवम्। शुक्तौ रजतावयवरूपतेजोंशसद्भावे चक्षुषो लौकिकसन्निकर्षसत्त्वेन ज्ञानलक्षणायाः प्रत्यासत्तित्वस्य, दोषविशेषे लौकिकविषयताप्रयोजकत्वस्य च अकल्पनेन लाघवमिति लाघवज्ञानसहकृतेन त्रिवृत्करणप्रमाणवाक्येन रजतांशरूपतेजस्संयोगः शुक्तौ सिद्ध्यति।

न च शुक्त्यादौ प्रतीयमानानामवयवानां रजतावयवत्वं न सम्भवति, रजतादिभ्य आनीय निवेशितत्वाभावादिति वाच्यं, रजतावयवत्वं नाम रजतावयवतावच्छेदक-

धर्मावच्छिन्नत्वमेव। तच्च शुक्त्यन्तर्गतावयवानामप्यक्षतम्। न हि आपणस्थरजतावयवा अपि कुतश्चित् रजतान्तरादेरानीय निवेशिताः। तथा च यादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नतेजोंशात् रजताम्भस्तादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नाः केचित् सूक्ष्मावयवाः शुक्तौ सन्ति। यादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नात् तेजोंशात् रजतारम्भस्तादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नानामप्यंशानां महाभूतात्मके तेजसि सत्त्वेन, शुक्त्यारम्भकतावच्छेदकधर्मावच्छिन्नानां पार्थिवभागानामपि महापृथिव्यां सत्त्वेन तयोर्महाभूतत्रिवृत्करणदशायामेव मेलनसम्भवात् शुक्त्यादौ रजतसद्भावोपपत्तेः। नचैवं शुक्तौ रजतावयवस्य सिद्धावपि रजतस्यासिद्ध्या सन्निकर्षाभावात् कथं रजतस्य प्रत्यक्षमुपपद्यत इति वाच्यम्, अस्मन्मते अवयवसङ्घातस्यैवावयवित्वात् रजतावयवस्यैव रजतत्वाश्रयत्वात् रजतत्वस्य अवयवावयविसाधारणत्वाच्च। न च शुक्तिगतैः रजतावयवैः तत्सङ्घातरूपरजतेन वा शुक्त्यन्तर्गतेन कटकादिकं जायतामिति वाच्यं, क्षीरान्तर्गतजलस्य जलपानप्रयोज्यपिपासाविशेषशमनादिकारित्वाभावस्येव शुक्त्यवयवेषु भूयस्सु अन्तर्गतरजतावयवस्य तत्सङ्घातस्य च कटकाद्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वाभावसम्भवात्। तस्मात् त्रिवृत्करणन्यायेन शुक्तौ सदेव रजतं भासते इति शुक्तिशकले इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानं यथार्थमेव। तदुक्तं श्रीभाष्ये–

यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदविदां मतम्।
श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यः सर्वस्य सर्वात्मत्वप्रतीतितः।।
बहुस्यामिति संकल्पपूर्वसृष्ट्याद्युपक्रमे।
तासां त्रिवृतमेकैकमिति श्रुत्यैव चोदितम्।।
त्रिवृत्करणमेवं हि प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्यते।
यदग्ने रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तदपामपि।
शुक्लं कृष्णं पृथिव्याश्चेत्यग्नावेव त्रिरूपता।
श्रुत्यैव दर्शिता तस्मात् सर्वे सर्वत्र सङ्गताः।। इति।।[७]

एवं भूते भूतान्तरस्य सद्भावो निरूपितः। क्वचित् सदृशे सदृशान्तरसद्भावः कीर्त्यते। 'यदि सोमं न विन्देत् पूतीकानभिषुणुयात्' इति श्रुतिः। सोमालाभे पूतीकलताभिषवेन रससम्पत्तिः कार्येति तदर्थः। तत्र स किमपूर्वविधिः उत नियमविधिरिति विमृश्य, सोमेन यजेतेति वाक्येन सोमावयवानां यागसाधनत्वावगमात्, भूयस्सोमावयवकसोमव्यक्त्यलाभे द्रव्यान्तरवर्त्यल्पसोमावयवानामपि साधनत्वस्य सिद्धत्वात् पूतीकापूतीकयत्किञ्चित्सदृशग्रहणप्रसक्तौ पूतीकगतसोमावयवा एवानेन नियम्यन्त इत्युक्तम्।

अत्र शाबरभाष्यसम्मतिः

अत्र भाष्यम्- 'क्वचिद् विधानाच्च'[८] इत्यत्र 'यदि सोमं न विन्देत् पूतीकानभिषुणुयात्' इति श्रुतिरुदाहृता। 'नियमार्थः क्वचिद्विधिः'[९] इति सूत्रभाष्ये सोमाभावे बहुषु सदृशेषु प्राप्तेषु नियमः क्रियते पूतिका एव अभिषोतव्या इत्यभाषि। तस्मात्

प्रतिनिधिमुपादाय प्रयोगः कार्य इति सिद्ध्यति। **'तन्नित्यं तच्चिकीर्षा हि'**[10] इति तदनन्तरसूत्रव्याख्याने 'वचनमेतन्नियमाय नित्यमिति गम्यते'[11] इति निर्देशेन वचनमिदं नियमार्थमिति च गम्यते। इति।

एवमेव व्रीह्यभावे नीवारग्रहणमनुमतम्। अत एव **'सामान्यं तच्चिकीर्षा हि'**[12] इति सूत्रे 'यस्मिंश्च सदृशे गृह्यमाणे तेषां विशेषाणां केचित् सङ्गृहीता भवन्ति स तत्र लाभो लभ्यत इति तत्सदृशं द्रव्यमुपादातव्यं भवति, तस्माद् व्रीहीणामपचारे नीवाराः प्रतिनिधेयाः' इति शबरमुनिना प्रोक्तम्।

प्रतिनिधिग्रहणवेलायां यत्र सदृशावयवभूयस्त्वं तदेव प्रयोजकं नान्यत्। अत एवोक्तं पार्थसारथिमिश्रैः सुसदृशलाभे मन्दसदृशं नोपादेयं, किन्तु सुसदृशमेव, तत्र बह्ववयवानुग्रहात्' इति। तथा च 'व्रीहिभिर्यजेत' इत्यत्र व्रीह्यलाभे नीवारग्रहणमनुमतमिति फलति। व्रीहित्वमवयवसमुदायानतिरिक्तावयविभूतव्रीहिशब्दावाच्यान्तर्गतावयवेष्विव नीवारावयवेष्वपि कतिपयेष्वस्तीति नीवारग्रहणं युक्तम्। प्रसङ्गेऽस्मिन् अत्रत्यो भाट्टदीपिकाग्रन्थो द्रष्टव्यः।

एतेन इदं रजतमित्यत्रापि शुक्तौ रजतावयवसद्भावेन भ्रमनिर्वाहस्सुकर इति व्याख्यातम्। यत्र यत्सादृश्यबुद्धिर्भवति, तत्र तदवयवत्वमिति प्रतिनिधिन्यायफलितार्थः। शुक्तौ रजतसादृश्यस्योपलम्भात् रजतावयवत्वम्। तथा स्थाणौ पुरुषसादृश्यस्योपलम्भात् पुरुषावयवत्वं सिद्ध्यति।

ननु यत्र यत्सादृश्यं तत्र तदवयवत्वमिति न व्याप्तिः, **"अर्भकौकस्त्वात् तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न, निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च"**[13] इति सूत्रोक्तव्योमसादृश्यवति ब्रह्मणि व्योमावयवत्वाभावात् "शुनि चैव श्वपाके च पण्डितास्समदर्शिनः"[14] इति भगवद्गीतावचनोक्तपरस्परसादृश्यवत्सु च जीवेषु परस्परावयवत्वविरहादिति चेत्, न, यत्र यत्सादृश्यप्रकारकबहिरिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं तत्र तदवयववत्वमिति व्याप्तेः स्वीकारान्नोक्तदोषः। यथा च स्थाण्वादिः पुरुषाद्यवयववान् पुरुषसादृश्यप्रकारकबहिरिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात्, यः यत्सादृश्यप्रकारकबहिरिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयः स तदवयववान् यथा पूतीकादिः इत्यनुमानमत्र ग्राह्यम्। जीवब्रह्मादिकञ्च नैतद्व्याप्त्याक्रान्तं बाह्यप्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वादिति नोक्तदोषः।

एवं पीतशङ्खद्विचन्द्रदिङ्मोहादिज्ञानेषु भ्रमनिर्वाहः विस्तरेण श्रीभाष्यश्रुतप्रकाशिकातत्त्वमुक्ताकलापादौ विवेचित इति नात्र तन्यते।

अख्यातियथार्थख्यात्योर्भेदः-

इदं तु तत्त्वम्- यद्यपि प्राभाकरा अपि सर्वं ज्ञानं यथार्थमित्येव आतिष्ठन्ते तथापि ते इदमिति ज्ञानमनुभवरूपं यथार्थं, रजतमिति स्मरणरूपं ज्ञानमपि यथार्थमित्येवं

भ्रमस्थले ज्ञानयाथार्थ्यमुपपादयन्ति। रामानुजीयास्तु इदं रजतमित्याकारकं विशिष्टज्ञानमपि नैयायिकवदङ्गीकुर्वन्ति। तद् विशिष्टज्ञानमयथार्थमिति नैयायिकाः, यथार्थमिति तु रामानुजीयाः।

किञ्च इदं रजतम् इत्यत्र भ्रमस्थले ज्ञानद्वयं प्रत्यक्षस्मरणरूपमिष्यते प्राभाकारैः। रामानुजमते तु तज्ज्ञानद्वयमपि प्रत्यक्षरूपम् अर्थात् रजतस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमेव स्वीक्रियते इति विशेषः। त्रिवृत्करणप्रतिनिधिन्यायाभ्यां शुक्तावपि रजतावयवस्य सत्त्वेन इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षसम्भवात् रजतांशे प्रत्यक्षत्वसम्भवः। रजतप्रत्यक्षे रजतचक्षुस्संयोगस्य कारणत्वात् तादृशसंयोगोपपादनायात्र त्रिवृत्करणस्यादरः। अत एव रजतं पश्यामीत्येवानुभवः न च रजतं स्मरामीति। तथा च अपरोक्षस्थले क्वचित् त्रिवृत्करणस्य उपयोगः क्वचित् प्रतिनिधिन्यायस्य समादरः भ्रमज्ञानस्य यथार्थत्वसम्पादने समीहितः विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्ते। परोक्षस्थले देहात्मभ्रमादिस्थले च भेदाग्रहः समादृतः। स्वाप्निकपदार्थानां यथार्थत्वं जागरवत् सम्पादितं सन्ध्याधिकरणश्रीभाष्ये। अख्यातिसम्वलितयथार्थख्यातिरेव विशिष्टाद्वैतिनां पक्षः इति अधिगतन्यायपरिशुद्धि-तत्त्वमुक्ताकलाप-सर्वार्थसिद्ध्यादिग्रन्थानाम् अतिरोहितम्। तत् सर्वं विस्तरभयात् नात्र प्रतन्यते।

सन्दर्भसूची–

१. तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापः ४/९.
२. विभ्रमविवेकः
३. श्रीभाष्यम्, पृ. ८०९.
४. श्रीभाष्यम्, पृ. ८१३.
५. छान्छोग्योपनिषद्, ६-३-३.
६. शारीरकसूत्रम्, ३-१-२.
७. श्रीभाष्यम्, पृ. ८१३.
८. मीमांसादर्शनम्, ६-३-४-१४.
९. मीमांसादर्शनम्, ६-३-४-१६.
१०. मीमांसादर्शनम्, ६-३-४-१७.
११. मीमांसादर्शनम्, ६-३-४-१७.
१२. मीमांसादर्शनम्, ६-३-४-२७
१३. शारीरकसूत्रम्, १-२-२७.
१४. भ.गी., ५/१८.

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Text, Determination of Meaning and Rules of Interpretation

D.N.Tiwari

(In continuation with the Ist. part published in the first Vol. of Pratipitsā from pages55-63)

Mīmānsā Method of Interpretation-

Mīmānsā is popularly known as a system of interpretation of the text. The rules given in Jaiminisūtra are interpreted by Śabara that was developed later by the Kumārilas and Prabhākaras. Though these rules can be observed in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya in a way that sometimes it appears that they are taken by Bhartṛhari from Jaimini but it cannot be denied that tradition of Grammarians is as old as Jaimini's and the two traditions are so intensively devoted to the interpretation of Veda that their difference becomes subordinate. Mīmānsāka's primary concern is interpretation of the Vedas or śrutis. They are specific and precise on the rules of interpretation and, therefore, it seems to me to accept that the exposition of the Mīmānsā method of interpretation will be highly effective in shading new lights on the issue of interpretation.

Mīmānsā method is very scientific. First, it follows the rules on the basis of which śruti, the text is identified distinctly from any amalgamation and different from smṛtis so that it can merit doubtlessly as self - proved and can serve as proof in the matter of Dharma(duty) which is knowledge also. Other Systems in Indian philosophy who either refute or accept (except vaiyakaraṇās) śruti as pramāṇa, do not exercise the skill of identifying the text because they take dharma in a different sense or who do not sense Dharma as Duty and the same as pramāṇa. Generally they donot give primacy to it because they have a different notion that it concerns only with language we speak or write. Once the text is identified it can be applied as proof. Then they adopt rules for follow up or order of application of the text for different primary and auxiliary activities. Viewing all these methodical ways involved in the application of the text, they discuss general and specific rules of

interpretation by following which the true spirit or meaning of the text can be preserved without any alteration. Let us see their approach to text step by step.

1. As per the definition 'Viṣayaviśayaścaiva pūrvapakṣastathottaram, nirṇayaśceti pañcāṅgaśāstre'dhikaraṇam matam' ādhikaraṇa[14] is a complete argument consisting of following scientific methodological activities–

i. understanding of the proper text or subject in hand,

ii. Awareness of the possible doubts, if any, regarding its meaning,

iii. Opponents views regarding the text under consideration,

iv. The theorist's view or reply regarding the text under consideration,

v. Decision of the interpreter after evaluating both the sides of thesis and antithesis, and

vi. Establishing the conclusion formed in the last.

2. Elementary principles or axioms of interpretation comprising of following rules[15]

- Sārthakya – Every unit of language either the word or the sentence must be meaningful and having a specific purpose.
- Lāghava- One must not assume more rules than sufficient.
- Arthaikatā- A sentence or a word must have a meaning in a unity. a double meaning must not be attached.
- Guṇapradhānatā- The secondary meaning of a word or a sentence must be adjusted to the primary meaning or be totally overlooked.
- Sāmanjasya- There must not be contradiction between the meaning of the words and of the sentences; it must be reconciled.
- Vikalpa – In case of contradiction any of the sides be adopted at option.

3. After an examination of meaning of words, structure of sentences, the relatedness of the topic, etc., the interpreter has to adopt the following general principles out of them that which precedes is authoritative than that which follows (śrutilingavākya prakaraṇasthānasamākyānām samavāye pārdaurbalyamarthaviprakarṣāt[16]-

a. Text (śruti)- it is direct assertion, a complete sentence in which the

verb and the case governed by it serve as independently expressive of a self veridical sentential cognition.

b. Indication (liñga)- if the meaning of a word or a sentence is not apparently clear, it is decided on the basis of indications elsewhere in the śruti that works as suggestive force by which the meaning of the expression -word or the sentence -is made apparent.

c. Syntactical Connection (vākya)- if the meaning of a sentential structure is not satiating the expectancy of a complete sense, the structure is taken as a subordinate to a complete sentence in a syntactical arrangement.

d. Context (prakaraṇa)- the given sentence or the subordinate sentence does not indicate its purpose by itself, it may when read with a context of some other text, becomes clear to it purpose.

e. Place in an order(sthāna)- it is sequence or order (karma) of the passages , words or subordinate sentences in a completeness of an expression.

f. appellation (samākhyāna)- it is connection between different passages of the expression. If a complete meaning is not comprehended by a sentence, the completing part be inserted for a unitary meaning.

These six serve as the determinants of the connection of subsidiaries. These principles of interpretation serve as sources of evidential cognition by expressions. śruti principle is based on perception and śabda-pramāṇa, liñga, vākya and prakaraṇa are based on inference, comparison and presumption.

4. **Specific principles** applied for the discrimination and determination of the authority or the text follow thus[17]-

- **Smṛtipramāṇādhikaraṇa-** smṛti under interpretation must be authentic or authoritative. There are certain rules to examine the authenticity of smṛti text.
- **śrutiprābalyādhikaraṇa-**if there is conflict between a śruti text and a smṛti text primacy must be given to the former.
- **Duṣṭamūlaka-smṛti apramāṇyādhikaraṇa-** those smṛti text having intangible purposes are authentic and those having only intangible or worldly motives are not authoritative.

- **Padārtha prāblyādhikaraṇa**- the denotative meaning of smṛti text is of primary concern and hence authentic than those derived by implication or imagination. Śabara takes the word for 'action that is the central meaning of an expression.
- The usage conformable to the śāstras is authoritative if there are conflicting usages.
- **Malekṣa-pariṣiddha padrāthādhikaraṇa**- if a smṛti text is expressed in corrupted form of usage, one must keep in mind that the authoritative text is expressed by the corrupted form of the usage popular in foreigners.
- **Sāmānyaśrutikalpanādhikaraṇa**- if the form of a smṛti text is found at variation, the interpreter must think of their general form to be found as śruti.

5.An account of general principles of application of the text follows thus-

a. Mīmānsāsūtra 1/2/19-25 contains the rules on the basis of which the interpreter can decide as to which text is obligatory and which others are quasi- obligatory and non- obligatory.

b. **adhikāra vidhis** – Mīmānsāsūtra 6/1/6-16, opposed to the rules imposing duties, discuss the rules indicating right for deciding as to whom the vidhi texts are applicable.

c. **Kramavidhi- Mīmānsāsūtra** 5/1/1-8 gives the order in which the actions are to be performed.

d. **Atideśa** – in the sūtras mentioned in point 'c' some general and special rules of reference are discussed. Regarding a matter what rules are made to bear on another matter in case of rules is decided.

e. **Ūha**- ūha stands for conjectural reasoning. Mīmānsāsūtra 9/2/40 . on the basis of such a reasoning we decide to relate the material environment of a spiritual duty. It is not applicable to vidhi proper that enjoys the spiritual duties themselves but to niyam-vidhis and to arthavāda only[18].

f. **Bādha**- chapter 10 of the Mīmānsāsūtra talks about the rules of reconciliation of conflicting texts. It contains the following rules involved in the application of a vidhi[19].

Tantratā- contains the rules for avoiding repetition of duties in cases a single act solves the purpose.

Avāpa- talks about the rules regarding repetition of a duty many times to make it understandable to other people. It is just reverse of the tantratā.

Prasanga- it is the rule that the performance of the major duty dispenses with the performance of minor duties involved in it. It is the extended application of the tantratā.

4. Rules regarding character and interpretation of smṛti texts and usage- in earlier pages I have already mentioned the difference between a śruti and the smṛti. Presently, I am putting the rules of interpretation of smṛti texts[20].

i. śruti prevails if there is a conflict with smṛti because it has the sanction of apūrva in the matter of merit.

ii. In case of selfish motive the validity of smṛti is questioned.

iii. Smṛti cannot be taken unauthentic if conflicting to explanatory or praise passages of śruti because they are not vidhis.

iv. In conflict between the smṛtis and purāṇas the latter fails.

v. Other principles of interpretation and practice of the text already pointed out earlier are equally applied for the interpretation of the smṛti texts.

Mīmānsakas give value to local customs in worldly matters but not in religious matters because they are of the view that all people should be guided by uniformed general rules and that is why they recognize the usages approved by the human community.

Bhartṛhari on Interpretation:

Different *smṛtiyān*, having tangible and intangible objectives, contain codes of life written and popularly practiced are formed by memory of the wise based on *Vedas*[21]. For instance- *Vaiṇavim dhārayedyaṣṭim*[22] (the stick of bamboo should be hold) – its visible objective is that the old man who holds the bamboo stick does not slip. These things are edible, those things are not edible, this speech be made that speech should not be made, these *smṛtiyān* prescribing thus have intangible objective.

There may be conflict between two *smṛtiyān*. In those cases the prescription is decided on the basis of difference of the objective the two conflicting *smṛtiyān* possess. For example, *Pancapancanakhā bhakṣayā* (Animals having five claws should be eaten) and just opposite to it *abhakṣyā grāma kukkuṭtaḥ* (Do not eat even the village cock that is non-edible)[23]. Swan should be eaten; swan should not be eaten'. The *smṛtiyān*, under consideration, have different objectives- tangible (*dṛṣṭa*) and intangible (*adṛṣṭa*) and the *smṛtiyān*s are opposed to one another. Here the decision of the wise (*śiṣṭas*) is silent; *śruti* is silent. In that case the *smṛtiyān* having tangible objective is decided invalid. Eating of the animals having five claws is a tangible objective opposed to the *smṛtiyān* prohibiting the eating of animal and thus having intangible objective and therefore invalid.

According to commentary '*Vṛṣabha*', there is an obvious reason for prescribing eating of the animal and that is sometimes, perhaps, a misunderstanding of the text and another time greediness for eating flesh. It is for that reason that some writers of *smṛtiyān* inserted by forge the eating of animals as a prescription and such projections corrupted the *smṛtiyān*.

Showing his resentment over spurious insertion of some of the *smṛtiyān* causing a misunderstanding of the text and somehow or the other continuing as a tradition of their own, *Bhartṛhari* says that such *smṛtiyān* resulted out of the wicked intention and allegiance to the greediness of the author of the smṛtiyān They are sometimes contradictory on the prescription of an act for example, some author of the *smṛtiyān* prohibit killing of a Brāhmaṇa as it causes demerit while some other prescribe killing of a *abrāhmaṇa* in *Puruṣamegha* sacrifice, is essential as it promotes to heavenly abode. The reason as *Bhartṛhari* observes is the allegiance of the malignant author of that smṛtiyān to his incendiary longings, greed, etc., that is tangible objective[24].

Explaining the difference between the *śruti* and *smṛtiyān*, *Bhartṛhari* accepts that there is eternity in the sense of continuity of the meaning of the both. Both of them give central importance to action. However, he notices differences between them. An account of the differences observed by him are given as follows-

i. There is no part in the *śruti;* it is indivisible whole while *smṛtiyān* are elucidation of the former based on whole part division.

ii. *Śrutiyān* are authorless, the seers got the vision of the *śrutiyan* and taught them directly to their pupils while *smṛtiyān* are authored later on the basis of the memory of *śruti* with the favour and contact of the meaning of the words and indications lying there in *śrutiyān*..

iii. *Śrutiyān* are the seer's knowledge and the seers are free from all sorts of allegiances (physiological, psychological and cultural) while this is not exactly the same in case of different *smṛtiyān* as their authors are not always free from allegiances and they make some insertion with the explanatory illustrations (*arthavāda*)

So far authenticity and validity of the knowledge by *śruti* and *smṛti* are concerned, *Bhartṛhari* has clarified the issue on the basis of an example of the cognition by *Apabhraśas* (incorrect use or corrupt words) in cases of which the correct form of word of which that was an incorrect form is expressed in the mind of the hearer and then the meaning is revealed by the correct form of the word non-differently. Incorrect words may have also a tradition in a linguistic community and they may express the meaning but in every case, the use of the correct form of the word is recommended by the seers (*śiṣtas*) of the tradition for merit. It is that on which our communication is based and thus for checking any corruption of communication by wild uses.

Vaiyākaraṇas accept that *śruti* is always authentic in the matter of knowledge and wisdom of truth. *Smṛtiyān* are valid and evidential if uncontradicted by the *śruti.* Out of the two *smṛtiyān* contradicting one another the prescription having intangible objective is valid while that having tangible objective is invalid [25].

Three ways for an interpretation of a text

For language philosophers for whom the text is a concept, a complete unit of awareness and as there is no possibility of parts in a unit of awareness; that is indivisible; it is by the analytic device through which the indivisible is interpreted for making it understandable to those who cannot understand the indivisible otherwise[26]. Grammar is the science of interpretation helpful for making the text understandable to those who can understand only through interpretation. There are remotely three ways for an interpretation of a text.

i. As a grammarian Philosopher, we provide with the philosophy of interpretation of the Vedic injunction and commandments by taking

action as their central meaning. This method is applied in regard with the interpretation of different grammatical concepts also.

ii. All words are concepts. When we take a concept for interpretation, we put forth different interpretations of the concept popular at time. We put those theories in a way to observe as to how far those interpretations are skillful in approaching the concept as popular in usual communication and that what problems regarding the concept are left unnoticed or to unveil the problems those theories are unable to meet with and, finally, he gives his own verdict. His aim is to analyze the cognition or concepts as they figure in the mind by language.

iii. Analysis of language and meaning by derivations. Before coming to the discussion proper on interpretation, I take the privilege to say that meaning of all words is universal. Individuals, in our scheme of interpretation based on the analysis of cognition as expressed or figured in the mind by language, are known by imposition of the universal on them with some similarity. In knowing individuals, the cognition expressed by words, that is, universal expressed by language in the mind, a cognitive being, serves as the substratum of individuals. Acceptance of universal as the meaning of all word is significantly relevant for the genuine interpretation of Vedic acts in which sometimes the problem of individual, number, gender, the substitution of the material, the need of representative and ultimately non-violation of the Vedic act become very difficult to solve. However, we accept individual as the meaning of sentences and that Vedic commandments and injunction whether assertive or prohibitive express specified meaning or individual that can be interpreted as universal only because of identical cognition expressed by them in all their occurrences and instances.

In our scheme of interpretation, we are not to bother much about searching the social and cultural setting of the period the text came into existence; that is a futile endeavor because of the anonymity, historicity and eternity of the text. The text is an indivisible unit of awareness in nature which when articulated through sets of sentence-token that are divided, artificially, into subordinate sentences, compounds, words, roots and suffixes, expresses action.. What we intend to elucidate is a universal criterion on the basis of which all the sentences may well be interpreted

without any discrepancy and inconsistency; a criterion that is unalterable in spite of differences of explanatory sentences based on cultural allegiances of the different interpreters; a criterion which at the same time accommodate the cultural milieu in which the text is expressed, that is, which does not leave the question of the climate the text is expressed. Accordingly, the text expresses action. It is injunction for an act to do or not do or to do otherwise. Action is the central meaning of the text and interpreters to avoid misunderstanding regarding the reading of the text should keep that in the mind. The interpreters of the text sometimes insert their allegiances while interpreting. Different explanatory sentences inserted by interpreters in the process of making the text worth understandable to the persons belonging to a specific time, situation and territory vary but with those differences the action, the text commands does not change. If there is deviation from the text in an interpretation that should not be eligibly entitled an interpretation but an independent work.

Interpreters adopt different methods for interpreting a text. First they interpret the text by having the determinate knowledge of the action enjoined by the text. For them, action is the central signified of the text and that must remain unaltered in the interpretation. If there is any alteration of the action expressed by the text that is not an interpretation but an independent enterprise or a bad interpretation. Their purpose of interpretation is to make the action expressed by the text understandable in more precise and updated expression. They apply syntactic and semantic skill and philosophical wisdom while interpreting the text through the division scheme. In doing so they are always aware of preserving the action enjoined by the text intact and sport their freedom of scholarship in providing with a good interpretation.

In order to clarify grammarian's specially *Bhartṛhari's* stand on interpretation of the text, I shall move with some example of the Vedic prescriptive and prohibitive sentences that he has specifically interpreted in *Vākyapadīya*.

(A). Prescriptive Sentences (VIDHI VĀKYAS):-

Let me take the Vedic sentence '*Khadire baddhanāti*[27]' (he ties the sacrifice animal with the post made of catechu wood) first. *Bhartṛhari* provides with at least three interpretations of the sentence with the view

that action is the central meaning of a sentence an account of which in the light of *Prakāśa* commentary of *Helārāja* may be given as follows-

i. The meaning of the word '*Khadira*' is universal. Here, it denotes the capacity of the post. Any post fit for acting as the capable post may substitute the *Khadīra* post for avoiding the violation of the action (sacrifice) in the absence of catechu post.

ii. The context of the expression is sacrifice of animal for which the animal has to be tied to the post well tightly. *Khadīra* wood has that fitness but in the absence of it any post fit for the action can be substituted.

iii. The verb is the central words in the sentence as the meaning of words other than the meaning of verb qualify the later. In the sentence under consideration, 'ties' (*baddhanāti*) denotes an action and that has not to be violated in any situation. For keeping the action intact, a post made of any wood capable of tying the animal to keep its movement stop, be substituted.

Substitution of the post is not significant. The action that is injunction is of central importance. In all the three interpretations, we observe that *Bhartṛhari* concerns primarily for preservation of action that does not alter in any circumstance. In similar manner he thinks that the injunction like *Vrīhīḥ yajeta, Svargakāmo yajeta, Nityasandhyāmupāsit,* and the sentences like *Kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpiḥ*, etc, may be interpreted.

(B). Prohibitive Sentences (*Pratiṣedha vākyas*):-

In regard to the interpretation of sentences speaking prohibition let us see his treatment of the sentence *Brāhmaṇam na hanyāt*[28] (Do not kill a *Brāhmaṇa*).

i. The word '*Brāhmaṇam* is applied in singular number, masculine gender, present tense and so one may say that the sentence does not prohibit the killing of other *Brāhmaṇas* excluding one male of the present time. But that is quite opposed to the spirit of the sentence. According to *Bhartṛhari*, the word '*Brāhmaṇa* denotes universal that is the class of those belonging to austerity, penance and learning belonging to all the times of past, present and future. There is no specification of a particular gender and thus the Brāhmaṇa class is prohibited from killing by the sentence.

ii. It is not possible to decide the particular Brāhmaṇa the killing of whom is prohibited and thus there is a case of indetermination of exclusion that leads to prohibition of killing of the Brāhmaṇa class.

iii. Prohibition of killing (*na hanyate*) is the central meaning of the sentence under consideration and in Vedic mythology all beings are accepted as the offspring of *Brahmā* and, thus, it is a statement about prohibition from killing.

Similarly, other sentences of prohibition may be interpreted with the view that the action that is prohibited is the central meaning of such sentences.

In very brief, an interpreter of a text should keep the indivisible awareness in mind while interpreting the text and that is expressed by a complete unit of language that is sentence, a complete unit expressive of a unit sense satiating the expectancy for the cognition of the sense. He cannot move freely by taking words, phrases and subordinate sentences independently of the complete unit. In an interpretation the action expressed by the text must not alter. The learning of different interpretations of a text provides with clarity and wisdom of the text. It excels one's understanding with the wisdom and the task of interpretation becomes purposively fruitful and correct if the action expressed by the text is grasped in such a way that it cannot be overlooked or deviated in the interpretations. Taking this way only, several interpretations of the text despite differences of the explanatory sentences occurred in them could be understood distinctly as correct. In our scheme of understanding interpretation, the determination of socio-historical situation of the text is not essentially a bothering issue for an interpretation.

VII

Some interpreters do not care much for the action enjoined by the text and they interpret the text by dividing it into parts that is into sub-sentences, words, roots, suffices and again categorizing their different sorts and determining their independent meaning and then getting the meaning of the text my synthesizing them in a unity. They think that the beginners can understand a text only through the analytic - synthetic device. They think that without the determination of the meaning of the different units of expression the text cannot be interpreted. They decide the meaning of the sentences through the determination of meaning of

different sorts of the words of the text. They frame different rules for the determination of word-meaning in different contexts. For the first time in the history of philosophy, Bhartṛhari has given different criteria for the determination of the meaning of the words of a sentence a brief account of which is given here below-

If word-meanings connected for sentential-meaning are taken as independent units and as there is no fixed rule for association, any word-meaning can be connected with any other word-meaning, and, then, it will cause difficulty in cognizing the true meaning of the sentence. *Puṇyarāja* [29] clarifies it with the example given as follows: *'Bhagini! yā tvam śirasānanvāham vahasisātvam prāctīnam kumbhamabhidhāvantamadrākṣīḥ'*. There are several words associated together in the sentence but if they are connected in a reverse order, the arrangement may be meaningful in some cases and meaningless or even contradictory in other cases of association and, then, the nature of association will be uncertain, and this uncertainty of the nature of association may cause difficulty in understanding the meaning of the sentence.

From the point of view of words as independent expresser, the sentence[30] *'Indorlakṣmasmaravijayinaḥ Kanṭhamūlam murārirdignāgānām madamalamasibhañji gaṇḍasthalāni, Adyāpyuravīvalayatilak! śyāmalimnānuliptānyudbhāsante vada dhavalitam kim yaśobhistvadīyaiḥ'* means – "O king! What is there whitened by your glory if the spot of the moon, the darkness of Lord! Śiva's throat, the cheek of elephant and the colour black (*śyāma*) all are still black". But if the sentence as independent unit is taken into account, then, the sentence means kings' glory has whitened everything and that which are black are so by their very nature. The example clearly shows that the understanding of meaning through words as independent expresser may be 'abuse' but it may be 'praise' if sentence as a whole is taken as the expresser. If words and their meanings are taken as real, the meaning expressed by them must be the same, what is expressed by the whole sentence, but this is not the case with Bhartṛhari's view of sentence holism. The meaning of sentence as indivisible whole is observed to be different from its meaning explained through the collection of word meanings. Ambākartrī shows these differences by the example[31] of the sentence given as follows *"Upakṛtam bahu tatra kimucyatesujanatā bhavatā prathitā parama"*. If the sentence as whole is taken as expresser,

the sentence means the 'wickedness' but if its meaning is understood as sheer collection of word-meaning, the sentence means the 'greatness'. Raghunath Sharma in his commentary 'Ambākartrī' has quoted a very popular verse[32]. The verse reads '*Bhrāma dhārmika visvastaḥ sa svā' dya māritastena godānadī kacchakunjavasinā dṛpta sinhena*", (O gentleman! go and move freely, there is no fear from the dog dwelling in the bank of the river Godāvarī. because a furious lion has killed the dog). Now, if the word-meanings are taken in view, the verse means' O Pious man! Go and move freely without the fear of dog which is now not alive' but if the whole sentence is taken as expresser it expresses just a reversed meaning (O wretched! there is a risk of losing your life by a furious lion, if you go to the bank of the river Godāvarī).

The interpreters must not infuse their allegiances with the text because interpretation stands philosophically interesting and relevant in view of it free from tangible allegiances.

(.... to be continued)

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21. *Mīmānsāsūtra,1/3/9.*
22. *VP.1/7*
23. *Manusm?ti 4/36.*
24. *Adṛṣṭaprayojanabhakṣyābhakṣyagamya-āgamana-avācyāvācyaviṣayāstulye viṣaye- tāsāmaprāmāṇayam- VP.1/7 and Harivṛtti on it.*
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Determining the Cardinal Directions : The Śulbasūtra approach

Vanishri Bhat & K. Ramasubramaniam

1. Indroduction

Through the word direction has several connotations, such as the course taken/to be taken by a moving object, information about where to go, instruction as to how to do and so on, in the present article we use it in the sense of cardinal directions namely the east, west, north and south. The movement we think about direction, the thought that immediately surfaces up in our minds is the phenomenon of rising of the Sun. Direction is something that is very closely linked with our day-to-day activities (directly or indirectly), that we cannot afford to dispense away with it. It has played a key role in planning the city in which we live, in preparing a layout of the street in which we reside, in preparing the plans of the buildings in which we dwell, the lay out of the holy places in which we offer worship, and so on. More importantly, the knowledge of direction plays a very crucial role in enabling the sailors and pilots to navigate through water and space and make carriers reach their desired destination.

The notion of direction and the phenomenon of rising of the Sun are so closely knitted together, that any amount of abstraction of this notion that direction is an entity that is 'all-prevasive', 'imperceptible', 'eternal', etc., brought in by *Niyāyikas* in their theoretical formulation cannot severe this stitch. Irrespective of the descriptions provided by the philosophers and logicians, for all practical purposes, we look up to the sky to find out in which part of the sky does the sun rise, determine the direction, and then carry on our activities.

In fact all our dialogues related to specifying the location of an object, whether it is terrestrial or celestial, is based upon direction, which in trun is dependent on the phenomenon of rising/setting of the Sun. It may also be mentioned that this phenomenon is observed not only by the mankind, but by other creatures as well. Given its

importance, our primary objective in this paper is to discuss the method described in *Śulbasūtras*- a very simple, yet fool-proof method that has been adopted by Indian astronomers since ages-to find out the directions based on shadow measurements. By shadow measurements we mean the measurements related to the shadow of the *śaṅku* cast by the sun. But before proceeding to discuss that, we will provide a brief note on the *Śulbasūtra* texts themselves.

2. *Śulbasūtras*

Śulabasūtras are the earliest texts that are extent today that provide us a glimpes of geometry in Ancient India. The origins of geometry in India can be traced back to different kinds of construction of altars for Vedic sacrifices. As the sacrifices were to be performed in altars of prescribed shape and size, the Vedic priests needed manuals that would assist them in their construction. It is in this context, the class of texts called *Śulbasūtras*- some of which are supposed to have been composed prior to 800 BCE- seems to have come into existence.

The branches of knowledge that are considered to be auxiliaries of *Vedas* namely *vedangās* includes *Kalpasūtras* which in turn, can be broadly classified into four different types namely *Gṛhya, Dharma, Śrauta* and *Śulba-sūtras*. Of them, the *Gṛhya* and the *Śrautasūtras* primarily lay down the rules connected with the performance of rituals or ceremonials that would be beneficiary at the individual and societal levels respectively. *Śulbasūtras* can be considered as handmaiden to these *sūtras*, in the sense that they present the necessary mathematical tools and practical guidelines that would be useful in the construction of altars for the performance of sacrifices that are ordained in the Vedas and further codified in the *Gṛhya* and *Śrautasūtras*.

Though the tradition of construction of altars should at least be traced back to the period of *saṃhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas* (not later than 2500 BCE according to B.G. Tilak and Jacobi), the indologists have been of the view that the period of composition of *Śulbasūtras* could be somewhere between 800-500 BCE. Without getting into that issue of antiquity, we simply move on to describe how the Vedic priests used to determine the cardinal directions as a prerequisit to the construction of different types of alters (*vedīs* and *kuṇḍas*), whose dimensions and other constructional details are outlined in the Śulbasūtra texts.

3. Direction and Carfdinal direction

Purely from a methematical view point, direction is something that is donated by a unit vector. However, in common parlance the word is generally employed to refer to some sort of information that helps in identifying the location of some object with reference to the other. For instance, if someone asks, where is the bicyle, we immediately tend to raise the index finger and point towards bicycle. Thus, the act of providing information regarding location of bicycle, with respect to the location in which we are standing, amounts to giving 'direction'. Sign boards with arrow marks, etc. also serve the some purpose.

This however is not what we mean by the word direction as employed in the title of the paper. There it refers to the east, west, north and south which are rreferred to as *dik* in Sanskrit. In this connection it would be interesting to recount the definition provided by *Naiyāyikas* for direction (*dik*).

> प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक्। सा च एका विभ्वी नित्या च।
>
> Direction is the cause (i.e., forms the basis) for dialogue (vyavahāra) involving the use of the terms such as east, [west] and so on. It is one, all-pervasive and eternal.

Two things that are noteworthy in the above definition are :

1. The definition is based on the firm conviction that there must be an objective reality in the form of a substance (*dravya*) that forms the basis for the dialogue (*vyavahāra*) such as east, west, etc. Needless to say, *vyavahāra* is based on the subjective experience of events which in present case is the phenomenon of rising/setting of the Sun.[1] Thus, according to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system, in the case of *vyavahāra* such as east, west, etc., it is dik that froms the basis.
2. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system has also proposed *dik* to be one, all pervasive and eternal,[2] by invoking to principle of parsimony (*lāghava*).

Since a detailed analysis of these aspects are out of the scope of the present paper, with these observations, we simply move on to describe the experimental method outlined in the *Śulbasūtra* texts to

determine the directions. As this method involves employing a certain contrivance called *śaṅku*, we present a brief note on it in the following section.

4. *Śaṅku* and the experimental set up

The term *Śaṅku* (gnomon) does not generally appear in classical Sanskrit literature. It is a technical term referring to a nail, a post, a shaft, etc., whose usage could be found in literature related to astronomy and mathematics. Though *śaṅku* has different shades of meaning, when employed in the context of shadow measurements, it invariably refers to a stick of uniform thickness with a sharp tip at one of its edges. It is generally taken to be 12 *aṅgulas* (a unit of measurement) in length. A graphic description of *śaṅku* given by *Śrīpati* may be worth recalling here :

> भ्रमविरचितवृत्तः तुल्यमूलाग्रभागः
> द्विरददशनजन्मा सारदारूद्भवो वा।
> सममृजुरवलम्बात् अव्रणः षट्कवृतः
> समतल इह शस्तः शङ्कुरर्काङ्गुलोच्चः।।-इति।।
>
> A stick which is 12 *aṅgulas* in length, prepared from elephant's tusk *(dviradadaśana*[3]*)* or else some good-quality wood (*sāra-dāru*), made perfectly circular by rotating (tools) so that it is uniform (in thickness) without any injury/dent (*avraṇa*), with six circular markings and placed erect like a plumb-line on a flat surface is called a *śaṅku.*

What is most noteworthy in the above description is the use of the word *avraṇa*. This literally means without injuries. However, in the present context of being employed as a qualifier to *śaṅku*, it is used to indicate that there should not be any imperfections- which are likely to happen when turning a piece of wood into cylindrical shape-in the *śaṅku* that is being prepared for conducting experiments.

The experimental setup required to make shadow measurements to determine cardinal directions is pretty simple. All that is required is a *śaṅku* and a flat surface. It must be ensured that the surface selected is absolutely flat, because any undulation in the surface is likely to

introduce error in the determination of the direction. Hence astronomers have made it a point to doubly caution us in getting that set-up right, doesn't matter whether we choose the surface of a stone or Earth. All that we need to make sure is that the prepared surface si quite flat (*samīkṛta*). To achieve this, it is been suggested that one could use a plumb-line if needed. The prescription that is generally given is :

लम्बनादिना परीक्ष्य समीकृते तले मण्डलमालिखेत्।

> May you draw the circle on that surface whose flatness has been tested by using plumb-line, etc.[4]

Having prepared the surface, it is suggested that we draw a circle on it whose radius is twice that of the height of the *śaṅku*. In principle, there is no constraint on the measure of the radius of the circle. It can be must larger than this or smaller too. The choice is completely left with the performer of the experiment. However, choosing a larger radius, would help in minimizing the error caused due to measurements. But there is a catch here. The larger the circle, the more difficult it is to ensure the flatness of the surface. Hence, given a certain location, based the tools available over there in preparing a flat surface, an optimal measure is to be chosen as radius and the circle. In any case, one should ensure that the entire midday shadow (of the *śaṅku*) cast by the Sun will fall within the circumference of the circle. Otherwise, the shadow wouldn't even enter and leave the circle, which is utmost essential for making the east and west points (details in the following section).

5. Finding the east-west points

As indicated earlier, before the commencement of any kind of construction, whether it is a house, or a place of worship, or a *yāgaśālā*, the first and the foremost thing that needs to be done is to find out the cardinal directions. Particularly, in the context of creating *yāgaśālā*, wherein different types of the alters (*vedīs*) and fireplaces (*agnikuṇḍas*) would be constructed, the *sūtras* clearly present an injunction that we need to determine the exact east-west direction called *prācī*.

In Baudhāyana and Āpastamba Śulbasūtras we do not find the procedure for obtaining prāci or east-west line delineated in the text. The authours apparently seem to have taken this for granted. However, this procedure has been neatly explained in *Kātyāyana* and *Mānava*

Śulba-sūtras. In what follows, we quote the sūtra given by *Kātyāyana* and also explain it with the help of a diagram.

> समे शङ्कुं निखाय शङ्कुसम्मितया रज्ज्वा मण्डलं परिलिख्य यत्र लेखयोः शङ्क्वग्रच्छाया निपतति तत्र शङ्कू निहन्ति सा प्राची।[5]
>
> Fixing a gnomon (śaṅku) on level ground and drawing a circle with a cord measured by the gnomon, he fixes pins at points on the line (circumference) where the shadow of the tip of the śaṅku falls (intersects). This is *prācī*.

We know that in the early hours of the day, the length of the shadow of any object will be quite long. However, as the Sun rises and keeps receding away from the horizon- heading towards the zenith (*khamadhya)*- the length of the shadow keeps decreasing. At some point of time during the forenoon, the tip of the shadow will just grace the circumference circle before entering into it. This point of intersection of the tip of the shadow and the circumference must be marked, and it is the west point. Similarly during the afternoon, as the length of the shadow keeps increasing, at a certain point of time, the tip of it would grace the circumference of the circle once more before moving out of the circle. This point of intersection must be marked as the east point. The line joining these two points gives the east-west direction at that location.[6]



Figure 1: Determining the east and the west points using *śaṅku*.

6. Determining the cardinal directions

In figure 2, O represents the centre of the circle where the śaṅku is placed. The points where the tip of its shadow grazes the circumference of the circle in the forenoon and the afternoon are marked

as W' anf E' respectively. With these two points as centres and radius greater than half of E'W', arcs are to be drawn. The resulting figure appears like a fish and hence is referred to as a matsya (fish). A straight line is drawn through the points of intersection A and B of these two arcs. This line meets the circle at N and S and this represents the north-south direction.

With N and S as centres along north and south directions equidistant from O and radius greater than half the distance between them, two more arcs are again drawn. They intersect at points C and D, forming a matsya. With these two points a straight line is drawn that intersects the circle at E and W. This line represents the exact east-west direction. By constructio similar matsyas with N and E as centres, the north-east and south-west directions are determined. Thus, by making shadow measurements and drawing matsyas, the four cardinal directions are determined.



Figure 2: Contrivance used as a plumb-line to determine the perpendicular to the horizon at the observer's location.

7. Determining the ordinal and other directions

The directions that are in between the cardinal directions are referred to as intercardinal, ot ordinal. The intermediate directions are, south-east (SE), south-west (SW), north-west (NW) and north-east (NE). They can be obtained simple by constructing a matsya with cardinal points as centres. For instance, with S and W as centres, the south-east

and north-west directions get determined.



Figure 3: Contrivance used as a plumb-line.

Having determined the four cardinal and the four ordinal directions, the next step is to find direction that is upright (direction vertically above the observer) and the one below, generally referred to as the zenith and nadir. They are determined only withthe help of a plumb-line (*lambaka*). A *lambaka* consists of a thread tied a heavy object-made of wood or metal-having a fine tip, and a square block with a small hole at it centre for the thread to slide in as indicated in Figure 3. When the device is suspended freely, the direction pointed by the thread gives the direction perpendicular to the horizon at the observer's location, that points to the zenith and the nadir.

8. Concluding remarks

Given the importance of finding the cardinal directions for a variety of purposes-navigational, civil, social, religious, and so on-from very ancient times, people of all civillizations have been devising several techniques for determine the same. These techniques include observing the position of the celestial bodies, using magnetic compasses, conduction experiment with *śaṅku* and so on.

Since determing the directions based on onserving celestial bodies requires a fairly sophisticated training, and also depends on the sky being clear, the most convenient and commonly employed technique, even today, happens to be use of magnetic compasses.

Compasses are instruments in which a magnetic needle is mounted on a low-friction pivoted point so that they can freely retate. This needle, because of its interactions with earth's magnetic field, always points to the direction of magnetic north. It must also be pointed out here that this north is slightly off from the geographic north-pointed by the earth's axis-which is what we are interested in while finding the cardinal directions. Since the difference is not much (obly about 1.5 degrees), if one is not interested in very precise measurements, then the magnetic north itself can be taken as geographic north.

However, this difference of 1.5 degrees, cannot be ignored if one of is involved in construction activities that would require precise orienteering. For instance, there are many temples in India which have been constructed several hundreds of years ago, so that light entering through small holes in the compound wall that is several metres away from the deity in the sanctum sanctorum, will exactly fall on the the deity on a particular day, The high degree of precision in finding the cardinal directions which such constructions require are possible only by making precise measurements using the *śaṅku* method described in the article, only not by employing a simple magnetic compasses. Today of course, we have invented more sophisticated compasses that have a built in mechanism to take into account certain corrections. However, given the fact that the magnetic needle can easily get deflected by any external field, and also the fact that we live in a technotronic age with so many electronic gadgets around, by far the method using *śaṅku*, as employed by *Śulvakāras* more than two millenia ago, seems to be one of the best, simple, and fool-proof method.

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न्यायवैशेषिकाभिमतसम्बन्धावधारणा

राजारामशुक्लः

सम्बन्धसद्भावे नास्ति विप्रतिपत्तिः, तस्यापामरसाधारणानुभवसिद्धत्वात्, अयमनेन संयुक्तः, अयमत्र समवेत इति सम्बन्धविशेषविषयकप्रतीतिवत् "इमौ मिथः सम्बद्धौ" इत्यादि-सम्बन्धसामान्यविषयकप्रतीतेः सर्वसम्मतत्वात्। घटभूतलयोः संयोगः, घटतद्रूपयोः समवायश्च[1] प्रत्यक्षसिद्धः। नहि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धेऽर्थे विप्रतिपद्यते कश्चित्। समवायानभ्युपगमवादिनोऽपि घट-तद्गुणक्रियादीनां सम्बन्धन्तु न निराकुर्वन्ति, समवायस्थानापन्नसम्बन्धान्तरस्वीकारमात्रेण कृतकृत्यतां मन्यन्ते च। तत्रापि नित्यसम्बन्धस्य निराकरणमात्रे पर्यवस्यति तेषां समवायविद्वेषः।

संयोगस्तु सर्वथाऽशक्यनिराकरणः। स हि द्विविधः, इन्द्रियग्राह्योऽतीन्द्रियश्च। आद्यो यथा भूतलघटसंयोगः, सम्बंन्धिनोः घटभूतलयोरिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्, सम्बन्धप्रत्यक्षस्य यावत्सम्बन्धिप्रत्यक्षप्रयोज्यत्वात्। अत एव घटस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि घटाकाशसंयोगो न प्रत्यक्षः, अन्यतरस्य सम्बन्धिनः आकाशस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वात्। द्वितीयो यथा परमाणुद्वयसंयोगः। स चारम्भकसंयोगः। तथाहि– एकस्मिन् परमाणौ अनेकेषु वा परमाणुषु अवयवविनाऽवष्टब्धेषु क्रिया, ततो विभागः, ततस्तत्संयोगनाशः, ततोऽन्त्यावयविनमारभ्य क्रमेण द्व्यणुकपर्यन्तं द्रव्यनाशः, ततो विशकलिताः परमाणवोऽवशिष्यन्ते। तेषु ईश्वरेच्छावशात् पुनः कर्म, ततो विभागः, ततः पूर्वदेशसंयोगनाशः, ततः परमाण्वन्तरेण संयोगः, स एव संयोग आरम्भकसंयोग इति कथ्यते। तेन संयोगेन द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण महावयविपर्यन्तमुत्पत्तिरिति न्यायवैशेषिकप्रक्रिया। अयं हि संयोगोऽनुमेयः, सम्बन्धिद्वयस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वात्। अनुमानप्रयोगश्च-त्र्यणुकावयवद्रव्यं स्वावयवसंयोगजन्यं, जन्यद्रव्यत्वात् कपालद्वयसंयोगारब्धघटवदिति। पूर्वोक्तानां घटभूतलादिसंयोगानामङ्गीकारे न स्यात्कस्यापि विप्रतिपत्तिः। किन्तु निरुक्तद्रव्यारम्भकावयवद्वयसंयोगे विप्रतिपद्यन्ते बौद्धाः। तथाहि- अवयवद्वयसंयोगाज्जायमानोऽवयवी अवयवेभ्यो भिन्न इति न्यायमतम्। किन्तु बौद्धास्तन्नाङ्गीकुर्वन्ति। तदनुसारम् अवयवेभ्योऽवयवी नातिरिच्यते। दृश्यमानो जलाहरणादिक्रियासमर्थो घटः परमाणुपुञ्ज एव। परमाणूनां परस्परं सम्बन्धो न सम्भवति। या च स्थूलादिप्रतीतिः सा भ्रान्तिः। उपपादितमेतद् विस्तरेण सयुक्ति चाचार्येण धर्मकीर्तिना सम्बन्धपरीक्षायाम्।[2] तथा चावयविनः परमाणुपुञ्जातिरिक्तत्वनिराकरणाय बौद्धैरारम्भकसंयोगो निराकरणीयः। तच्च निराकरणं सम्बन्धसामान्यनिराकरणमुखेन सम्पादितम्। यतोहि घटभूतलयोः सम्बन्धे

स्थापितेऽपि न तेषां काचिद्धानिः। हानिस्तु परमाणुद्वयसंयोगाङ्गीकारे, तस्माच्च द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारे एव। ननु द्रव्यान्तरानुत्पादे दृश्यमानजलाहरणादि-क्रियासमर्थघटादेः स्थूलत्वादिप्रतीतिः कथमुपपन्ना स्यादिति चेत्? न, तादृशप्रतीतेर्भ्रमत्व-स्याङ्गीकारात्। अवयवद्वयसंयोगस्यातात्त्विकत्वे तज्जन्यावयविनोऽप्यतात्त्विकत्वं, स्वाप्नसुवर्णजन्यकुण्डलवत्। विषयस्य चातात्त्विकत्वे ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वम्। अत एवाचार्येण धर्मकीर्तिना **"सम्बन्धो नास्ति तत्त्वतः"**[३] इत्युक्तम्। एतच्च कियत्सङ्गच्छत इति तु विचारणीयम्। किन्तु धर्मकीर्तिग्रन्थस्य तद्व्याख्याग्रन्थस्य[४] चावलोकनेन स्पष्टमिदं प्रतीयते यत् तेषां सम्बन्धसामान्यनिराकरणप्रक्रमः अवयवद्वयसंयोगनिरा-करणमात्रपर्यवसायी, तावन्मात्रस्येष्टत्वात्। सम्बन्धसामान्ये निषिद्धे तयैव युक्त्या सम्बन्धविशेषाणामपि सुतरां निषिद्धत्वात् न तदर्थं पृथक् प्रयासापेक्षा भवति।[५] अवयवसंयोगोऽपि कुतो निराकरणीय इति चेत्, तस्मिन्निराकृते एवावयवद्वयसंयोग-जन्यातिरिक्तावयविनिराकरणं भवेत्, तथा सति च स्वसिद्धान्तरक्षा स्यात्। तस्मात् समवाय इव संयोगेऽपि विद्वेषः प्रयोजनविशेषनिबन्धनो न पुनर्यौक्तिको नाप्यनुभवारूढः।

एवं ज्ञानविषययोः सम्बन्धोऽपि विचारविषयोऽस्ति। ज्ञानं स्वविषये विषयतासम्बन्धेन, विषयश्च स्वज्ञाने विषयितासम्बन्धेन तिष्ठत इति ज्ञानस्य विषयो घटः, घटविषयकं ज्ञानमित्याद्यनुभवबलादास्थीयते नैयायिकैः। विषयित्वं विषयत्वञ्च पृथक् सम्बन्धौ किं वा विषयविषयिभावाख्यः एक एव सम्बन्ध इत्यत्र स्याद् विवादः, किन्तु ज्ञानज्ञेययोरस्ति कश्चन सम्बन्ध इत्यत्र न कश्चिद् विप्रतिपत्तुमर्हति, लोकानुभवसिद्धे विप्रतिपत्तेरसम्भवात्। दृशि दृश्याध्यासं स्वीकुर्वन्तोऽद्वैतिनोऽपि यद्यपि ज्ञानज्ञेययोस्तात्त्विकं सम्बन्धं निराकुर्वन्ति, तन्मते दृगतिरिक्तस्य तात्त्विकस्याभावात्, तथाप्याध्यासिकसम्बन्धं तु ते स्वीकुर्वन्त्येव।[६] विषयत्वादेर्दुर्निरुप्यत्वकथनन्तु[७] तेषां वाग्वैभवमात्रं, तत्सिद्धेर्नैयायिकैर्बहुधा कृतत्वात्। वस्तुतस्तु यत्र तैर्दृश्याध्यासः स्वीक्रियते न तन्नैयायिकानां ज्ञानं, किन्तु ज्ञानाधिकरणम्। तन्मते तस्य निर्विषयत्वम्। नैयायिकनये ज्ञानं तु नियमतः सविषयकमिति स्वीक्रियते। एतन्मतसिद्धज्ञानन्तु अद्वैतिभिः वृत्तिपदेन व्यपदिश्यते, किन्तु न तत्र दृश्याध्यासः, तन्मते तस्या अपि मिथ्यात्वात्, अधिष्ठानस्य च सत्यत्वनियमात्। तस्मात् प्रक्रियाभेदमात्रनिबन्धनोऽयं विवादः।

यद्यपि घटो घटः इति शाब्दानुभवो न सम्भवति, विरूपोपस्थितेरभावात्, तथापि तादृशस्य प्रत्यक्षादेः सम्भवात्, नीलो घट इति शाब्दप्रतीतेरपि सम्भवाच्च तद्विषयतया तादात्म्यस्यापि सम्बन्धत्वसिद्धिः। किञ्च घटो न पटः इति प्रतीतिः तादात्म्यसम्बन्धा-वच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावविषयिणी तादात्म्यस्य सम्बन्धत्वं विना नोपपन्ना स्यात्। गुणगुणिनोः समवायस्थानीयतादात्म्याख्यसम्बन्धस्य कैश्चित्स्वीकारेण संज्ञामात्रे विवादेऽपि अभेदसम्बन्धस्य सर्वानुभवसिद्धस्यापलापो न शक्यते कर्तुम्।

एवमेव समानदेशत्व-समानकालत्वादयोऽपि सम्बन्धास्तत्तदनुभवसाक्षिकाः अशक्यनिराकरणाः। अनुभवानारूढानामप्रामाणिकानां परम्पराणां सम्बन्धत्वं तु नैयायिकैरपि नाङ्गीक्रियते।

इत्थं पर्यालोचनेन निश्चप्रचमिदं वक्तुं शक्यते यत् सम्बन्धसद्भावे न कस्यापि वास्तवी विप्रतिपत्तिः। तत्र तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनं तु तत्तद्दार्शनिकविवशतामात्रम्।

तर्हि किमन्यदवशिष्टं विचारायेति चेत्? सम्बन्धस्य स्वरूपमात्रम्। सम्बन्धिभ्यां भिन्नत्वे सति द्विष्ठत्वे सति विशिष्टप्रतीतिजनकत्वमिति अत्यन्तं प्रसिद्धं सम्बन्धस्वरूपम्।[८] विशिष्टप्रतीतिजनकत्वस्य सम्बन्धिद्वयसाधारणत्वे नातिव्याप्तिवारणाय सम्बन्धिद्वयभिन्नत्वम्। अभेदादेः सम्बन्धत्वव्युदासाय द्विष्ठत्वम् (तन्मतेऽभेदस्य सम्बन्धत्वं नाङ्गीक्रियते। विषयत्वं विषयित्वं वा न पृथक् सम्बन्धः, तयोरद्विष्ठत्वात्, किन्तु विषयविषयिभाव एक एव सम्बन्धः)। उदासीन- द्विष्ठपदार्थवारकतयाऽन्त्यदलनिवेशः।

तत्रापि सम्बन्धिद्वयभिन्नत्वं न तत्त्वेन प्रविष्टं, किन्तु विशेष्यताभिन्नत्वे सति प्रकारताभिन्नत्वपरम्, अन्यतरसम्बन्धिरूपे स्वरूपसम्बन्धेऽव्याप्तेः। तच्च विशिष्टप्रतीतिविषयत्वार्थके विशिष्टप्रतीतिजनकत्वे विशेषणम्। तथाच विशेष्यताभिन्नत्वे सति प्रकारताभिन्ना या विशिष्टप्रतीतिविषयता तदाश्रयत्वे सति द्विष्ठत्वं सम्बन्धसामान्यलक्षणं पर्यवसितम्। विशिष्टप्रतीतौ हि विषयतात्रयं-प्रकारता, विशेष्यता संसर्गता च। प्रकारताभिन्ना विशेष्यताभिन्ना च विषयता संसर्गताख्या, तदाश्रयत्वं प्रकारताद्याश्रयेऽपि सम्बन्धिनि वर्तत एव। घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र तत्तत्कालीनं तत्तद्भूतलं घटाभावस्य भूतलेन सह सम्बन्धः।[९] स एव सम्बन्धः स्वरूपसम्बन्ध इति कथ्यते। इत्थञ्च भूतले संसर्गता विशेष्यता चेति द्वयमपि वर्तते। किन्तु द्वे अपि भिन्ने। तयोरन्तराभासमानत्वेऽपि भेद एव उचितः। ये तु अन्तराभासमानविषयतयोरभेदं स्वीकुर्वन्ति तेऽपि प्रकारताविशेष्यतयोरेवाभेदं स्वीकुर्वन्ति, न तु संसर्गताया अपि। तथा च तादृशसंसर्गताख्य-विषयताश्रयत्वस्य स्वरूपसम्बन्धेऽपि सत्त्वाल्लक्षणसमन्वयः। एतेन सम्बन्धस्य प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिभिन्नत्वे तस्य प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिभ्यामपि कश्चन सम्बन्धो वक्तव्यः, तस्यापि प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिभिन्नत्वे ताभ्यामपि कस्यचन सम्बन्धस्य वक्तव्यत्वेऽनवस्था स्यात्, तदात्मकत्वे च सम्बन्धिभिन्नत्वं न स्यादिति निरस्तं, स्वरूपत्वेऽप्युक्तरीत्या सम्बन्धिभेदस्योपपादितत्वात्। प्रतियोग्यादिभिन्नत्वेऽपि तादृशानवस्थायाः प्रामाणिकत्वेनादोषात्, अन्यथाऽनवस्थाभिया संयोगसमवाययोरपि प्रतियोग्यादिरूपत्वे तयोः पृथक् पदार्थत्वेन परिगणनासङ्गतेः। तस्मात् सम्बन्धो द्विविधः, स्वरूपं तदतिरिक्तश्च। स्वरूपस्य द्विष्ठता पूर्वोक्तरीत्योपपादनीया, तदतिरिक्तस्य च

स्पष्टैव। तथापि तादात्म्यस्य सम्बन्धत्वमङ्गीकुर्वतां नैयायिकानां नये द्विष्ठत्वं न लक्षणघटकमिति ध्येयम्।

जनकत्वपदस्य विषयत्वार्थकत्वं त्ववश्यमेवाङ्गीकर्तव्यम्, अन्यथा परोक्षस्थले विषयीभूतसम्बन्धस्याकारणत्वेन तत्राव्याप्तिः स्यात्, प्रत्यक्षे एव विषयस्य कारणत्वात्। विषयत्वार्थकत्वे तु नैष दोषः, विषयतायाः सर्वत्र समानत्वात्।

किञ्च विशिष्टज्ञानजनकत्वं नाम विशिष्टज्ञाननिष्ठजन्यतानिरूपितजनकत्वम्। जन्यत्वञ्च सम्बन्धघटितनियमघटितमित्यन्योन्याश्रयोऽपि द्रष्टव्यः। अतोऽपि जनकत्वपदं विषयत्वार्थकं वक्तव्यम्।

अत्र गदाधरभट्टाचार्यास्तु- यत्र संयोगसंसर्गकद्रव्यत्वादिप्रकारकभ्रमात्मकं ज्ञानं जातं तत्र संयोगस्य द्रव्यत्वसंसर्गतापत्तिमुद्भावयन्ति। ननु का क्षतिः संयोगस्य द्रव्यत्वसंसर्गत्व इति चेत्? न, तथा सति संयोगेन द्रव्यत्ववान् इति प्रतीतेः प्रमात्वापत्तेः, तत्संसर्गेण तद्वत्ताबुद्धेः प्रमात्वात्। अतः प्रतियोगित्वादिविशेष एव तत्सम्बन्धत्वं वक्तव्यमिति तेषामाषयः।

अत्रेदं विचारणीयं यत् मास्तु संयोगस्य द्रव्यत्वसंसर्गता येन संयोगेन द्रव्यत्ववानिति बुद्धेः प्रमात्वापत्तिः स्यात्। किन्तूक्तबुद्धौ संयोगस्य संसर्गत्वे न किञ्चिद् बाधकम्। अन्यथा द्रव्यत्वप्रकारकसंयोगसंसर्गकबुद्धिरप्रमेति व्यवहारो न स्यात्, उक्तबुद्धेः संयोगसंसर्गकत्व एव तादृशव्यवहारस्योपपन्नत्वात्। नह्युक्तबुद्धौ द्रव्यत्वप्रतियोगिक-संयोगस्य संसर्गता, तस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्। नापि संयोगसम्बन्धांशे द्रव्यत्वप्रतियोगिकत्वस्य भ्रमः, भ्रमत्वस्य तत्प्रकारकत्वादिघटितत्वेन संसर्गांशे भ्रमत्वस्यानङ्गीकारात्; किन्तु संयोगसामान्यस्यैव संसर्गता। तेन सम्बन्धेन तद्वद्विशेष्यकत्वाभावेन भ्रमत्वम्। संयोगेन गुणो नास्तीत्यादावपि संयोग एव प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धः, न तु गुणप्रतियोगिक-संयोगः, तस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्।

एवं पर्यालोचनेनेदं वक्तुं शक्यते यत् भट्टाचार्यास्तत्सम्बन्धत्वस्य निर्वचनमभि-प्रेत्योक्तापत्तिं प्रदर्शयन्ति, सामान्यतः सम्बन्धत्वनिर्वचने तु यथाश्रुतमपि युक्तमेव।

इत्थञ्च समबन्धिद्वयभिन्नत्वदले विशिष्टप्रतीतिजनकत्वदले च नास्ति विप्रतिपत्तिः। सा तु द्विष्ठत्वदल एव। द्विष्ठत्वं हि एकेन सम्बन्धेन पदार्थद्वयवृत्तित्वं, न तु नानासम्बन्धैः, अव्यावर्तकत्वात्, पदार्थमात्रस्यैव नानासम्बन्धैः अनेकपदार्थवृत्तित्वात् घटज्ञानीयविषयतायाः स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन घट इव कालिकादिसम्बन्धेन पटादावपि सत्त्वात् तस्या अपि द्विष्ठत्वापत्तेः। संयोगसम्बन्धो हि द्विष्ठः। तस्यैकेनैव समवायेन पदार्थद्वयवृत्तित्वं सर्वाभिमतम्। तथाहि नित्यत्वे सति अनेकसमवेतत्वमिति जातिलक्षणे नित्यत्वपदानुपादाने संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिरुक्ता, संयोगप्रतियोगिकसमवायस्य

घटभूतलोभयनिष्ठत्वात्, समवायस्य चैकत्वात्। तथाचानेकसमवेतत्वात्त्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय नित्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणम्। भूतलानुयोगिकत्वघटप्रतियोगिकत्वाभ्यां समवायस्य भेदस्त्वकिञ्चित्करः, तथासति एकमात्रवृत्तिपदार्थमात्रोच्छेदापत्तेः, घटत्वादेरपि आश्रयव्यक्तिभेदाद्भेदस्य, तद्व्यक्तित्वादेरपि कालभेदाद्भेदस्य च सुवचत्वात्, औपाधिकभेदसत्त्वेऽप्यनौपाधिकभेदस्य समवायेऽप्यभावाच्च। तस्मात्संयोग एकेनैव समवायसम्बन्धेन द्विष्ठो भवत्येव। किन्तु समवायसम्बन्धस्य तादृशी द्विष्ठता साधयितुं न शक्यते। स हि स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन वर्तते, तच्च प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिरूपं भिन्नमेव। तादात्म्यादेस्तु द्विष्ठता दूरनिरस्ता। तस्माद्द्विष्ठत्वं न लक्षणे प्रवेष्टुमर्हति।

सम्बन्धिद्वयभिन्नत्वं तु प्रागुक्तरीत्या परिष्कृतं साध्वेव। यत्तु सम्बन्धित्वं सम्बन्धाश्रयत्वं तच्च सम्बन्धघटितमित्यात्माश्रय इति, तन्न, घटत्वभूतलत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदस्य सम्बन्धिद्वयभेदपदेन विवक्षिततत्वात्, सम्बन्धित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदनिवेश एवात्माश्रयप्रसङ्गात्, असम्बन्धिनः पदार्थस्याभावेन तादृशभेदस्या-प्रसिद्धत्वात् पूर्वोक्तपरिष्कारे आत्माश्रयाभावाच्च।

तस्माद् विशेष्यताभिन्नत्वे सति प्रकारताभिन्ना या विशिष्टप्रतीतिविषयता तदाश्रयत्वं समबन्धसामान्यलक्षणं पर्यवसितम्। अविशिष्टव्यावृत्तविशिष्टधीनियामकत्वमिति वदतां मणिकाराणामप्ययमेवाशयः। लक्षणेऽस्मिन् तत्र तत्रोत्थापितास्ते ते दोषा यथायथं वारणीयाः।

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Āgama-Tantra : Bird's Eye View*

Shitala Prasad Pandey

There are two fundamental sources of Indian thoughts, famous as Nigama and Āgama or Tantra. The stream of Devotion and Knowledge is incessantly flowing, in both the traditions, from the time immemorial and even today the ever new quarters of spiritual practices are being acquired from them to the aspirants. Mahābhārata proclaims that the means of auspiciousness propounded by Vedas and Āgamas, if adopted by the people, the human being, being free from fear of Birth and death, may sleep soundly.[1]

The Word Āgama has been subject to use in various meanings in Sanskrit Literature, but inspite of apparent disparity, there are often similarities. The word 'Āgama' has been derived from the root 'Gam', with prefix 'Ā' meaning. "that which leads to the actual meaning from alround". Similarly, word 'Nigama'is derived from the root 'Gam' with the prefix 'Ni', meaning "leading to the meaning in its eternity" : thus both the words denote the expression of any knowledge in full. The root 'Gam' has two expressions i.e. the movement as well as the knowledge.[2] Prefix 'Ā' denotes fullness; thus Āgama means complete knowledge, pure knowledge, self-inspired knowledge, uncontaminated knowledge, static knowledge, the most mysterious knowledge, blissful knowledge and the concept and its knowledge of divine scriptures revealing the self-realization.[3] Thus Āgama is the science which reveals everything. Vacaspati Mishra, in his commentary of Yoga Sūtra named Tattva Vaiśāradī, has stated that Āgama is the process through which, the man having enjoyed the worldly pleasure, gets liberation in the end.[4] The word Āgama is described in Upāsakādhyayana as a lore that instructs the knowledge of the meaning of the past, present and future practices, in relation to four Puruṣārthas, discriminating between their adaptability and non-adaptability.[5]

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* Res. Paper, presented at 84th Indian Philosophical Congress, year 2009, Mumbai.

Kullūkabhaṭṭa, in his commentary on Manusmṛti, has propounded two śrutis-Vaidikī and Tāntrikī[6] and thus has accepted the root of both of them in the Vedas Manu, too, has accepted the same. Manu has himself defined śruti as Veda.[7] Thus the origin of Āgama is proved to have taken place in the Vedas. Both of them is eternal and their creator is unknown. Ācārya Abhinavagupta also accepts that all the Āgamas are beginningless.[8] Ācārya Śaṅkara has stated in the commentary of Īśāvāsyopaniṣad that we have heard from the tradition about the knowledge which has come down through the traditional preceptors of the Past.[9]

Swāmī Karapātrijī, while defining Nigama, has propounded that a stream of tradition of knowledge, flowing, perennially from the time of yore, without the knowledge of its maker, is called Nigama.[10] The same definition is applied with slight modification. Āgama is also perennial from the similar continuous tradition, but about its originator, there are different opinions. Naiyāyikas, considering the creation of Vedas, impossible by any human being, opine it to have been created by God and they define the word Puruṣa as Celestial and Omnipotent God.

Thus Āgama and Nigama, both are proved to be God-made. It has been propounded in Īśvara Saṁhitā, too, that the origin of Āgama is similar to that of Veda. Īśvara Saṁhitā has attempted to state that Āgama is the very root of the tree of Vedas and Ṛg etc. are its branches.[11]

By the word "Mūla" (root) it should not be taken for granted that the Nigama has come out of Āgama, rather the word "root", connotes here, is to be taken as it expresses the functional aspect of Veda. This means that it is impossible for Nigama without Āgama to be beneficial for the good of the people or to be in public practice. The tradition of Āgama, too, agrees with this view. In Kulārṇava Tantra, the source of general conduct is said to have been Veda in Kṛtayuga, Purāṇa in Dvāpra and Āgama in Kaliyuga.[12] It is, therefore, evident that the theory and the practice, both run simultaneously; because the pure theory cannot be fruitful. Bhartṛhari has accepted the seed of Āgama in Vedas.[13] He considers that when Āgamic traditions ceased to be in function, their different branches are restored from the vedas as they are implicit in them. Thus the flow of Āgamic tradition proves eternity. The original meaning of Āgama is received from tradition and the source of tradition is Veda. Bhartṛhari has made no distinction between Āgama

and Smṛtis.[14] The tradition, which continues in the form of Preceptor and disciple unabrupted, is alone called Āgama. the commentator of Vākyapadīya, Vṛṣabhadeva, has propounded the same fact by saying it : "the unbroken preaching (to dissolve) by the Mentor[15] and the eternal continuity of preaching without cause.[16] Not only this Vākyapadīyakāra has emphatically stated that only logic without Āgama cannot establish any religious function, even the knowledged of Ṛṣis is also through Āgama[17].

In Vedas, "There is One but the learned ones describe Him variously". "The One, who desires Heaven, must perform sacrifices." "The Knower of the Brahma becomes like Brahma (is Brahma Himself)" these and likewise sentences have been uttered by the seers (Mantra Draṣṭā Ṛṣis). If one pays heed towards them, he would be curious to understand how such pensive realization could have been achieved by any individual and his mind becomes replete with curiosity. The word, 'yajeta' in the sentence "svargakāmo yajeta" quenches this eagerness to know. This (technical) word expresses two Bhāvanās (Śābdī and Ārthī) to perform any sacrifice, which requires commodities (to offer in oblation), the Deity, the sacred formula (Mantra) and the procedure to offer. These procedures are also tested and proved in devotion by a seer (Ṛṣi), like a scientist who recognizes water by the formula H^2O, or any legislature that promulgates rules and regulations to administer the Law passed by it. In the same way the seer, put into practice the method to achieve heaven, as realized by him in trance to beget a truthful result-like oblation goods, Deities and Mantras etc. Thus, as the seer realized the sacred formula, permeated through the Universe, in the same way he put it into practice to give it a practical form of procedure. In fact, this is the Āgama. Nigama is substantive Law and Āgama is the Adjective Law. The only difference between Nigama and Āgama is that Nigama has implicit form of visual knowledge while Āgama is the practical side of it.

Devasūri, in his book Pramāṇanayatattvālokalaṅkāra, defines Āgama as "the feeling (and experience) emerged from the teaching of the faithful mentor". i.e. the Āgama is the knowledge, specified by the experienced knowledge of the faithful preacher.[18] In this context, the word faithful teacher (Āpta person), means the preacher of the self-realized knowledge. In the commentary of "Sāṅkhyasaptati" "Jayamaṅgalā", it has been stated that a faithful person (Āpta) is he who

is free from love and hatred, enemyless, respected by the good people and is busy in his own work.[19] The phrase "Svakarmanyabhiyukto" used here is similar to the phrase "Mahāyānārthakovidams" used for 'Kalyāṇamitra' in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Devasūri also defines Āpta as a person got rid of vices. It means that the voice of such person is never untrue.[20] Carakasaṁhitā explains the word 'Āpta' as a person whose knowledge is infallible, free from ifs and buts, is clairvoyant, whose memory is never destroyed in any case, is biasless and free from the control of love and hatred.[21] These sentences make it clear that Āgama is the procedural side of Nigama.

It can be a debatable matter that the Vedas are impersonal in origin while Āgama is human oriented. The human being achieves his goal by any hook or crook, caused by his natural virtue (instinct) and consequently, he, sometimes goes against Vedic precepts.[22] He may resolve the riddle by continuous practice and may come to know the contradictions; but on spiritual and mental background there is little difference between Nigama and Āgama. Both proceed with the tradition of Mentor and Disciple- one from Śruti and the other from traditional procedure. Vārāhi Tantra accepts Āgama, added with seven characteristics.[23] Every religious and spiritual knowledge claims its origin from God to show its endlessness. Lord Śiva, in Indian tradition is acknowledged as the source of knowledge of all kinds and therefore, Āgama has been accepted to have come out from the mouth of Lord Śaṅkara in order to testify its eternity.[24] Āgama also means supreme knowledge.[25] The knowledge that helps in the realization of self is also called Āgama. Self-realization means to meditate and muse upon the unity between God and soul (oneness with the supreme) i.e. "I am Śiva"[26]. It is written in svacchandatantra that the knowledge, goaded by perception, inference, experience and the sense of knower and known i.e. the seer and the speaker both are included in the word 'Ārthi-Pratyārthi"[27]. Every scripture is in the form of 'word' because there is no knowldege in the world without the form of word. It is also true that every experience cannot be expressed through word. The word is said to Haṁsa (swan)[28] because there is no one to pronounce it or to obstruct it.[29] Thus Āgama is that knowledge that instigates to proceed towards self insight. Dr. H.V. Glasenappa feels that all visible things and their forms are one wholesome unit. Its smallest part, too, affects the biggest

part; because it is beaded with a secret-thread. The everlasting existence never remains separate from it. This is the base of Tāntrika-Philosophy. This also expresses the unity of non-separation between the universal and individual existence and this knowledge of inseparation is the Āgamik or Tāntrika knowledge.[30]

The word Āgama, has been variously used, in the sense of Veda, Śāstra (scriptures) and of fundamental essence of the word-meaning, during his thoughtful journey. It is evident from the different scriptures that Nigamāgama has been differently connotated from the time of Nirukta to the age of poetic literatures, e.g. Nigama has been used in the beginningless tradition of listning as Veda, logical Nigama and in the commercial term, it has been used in the sense of guild.[31] On the other side Āgama is derived from "To come or has come" down as tradition, therefore, it is the traditional knowledge coming down from Mentor-Disciple tradition and the books containing such knowledge are also called Āgama.[32] Ācārya Rāmeśwara Jhā states that Āgama is the self-knowledge that leads to meditative state and thus it is the self-illumination.[33]

Āgama in these different usages, maintained its orginality and philosophers accepted it as a valid proof of knowledge. Later Buddhists also accepted it[34] and thus the theist as well as the atheist, both established it in the case of non-applicability of Perception and Inference etc.[35] On this very basis the traditional paṇḍits have admitted it as a valid means to achieve veracity.[36] Āgama has been quadruplicately explained (1) The statement of a credulous preceptor (Āptadeśātmaka Āgama), (2) the statement of the person (pious) whose reputation is unhampered (Anibaddha Prasiddhirūpa Āgama), (3) the statement of a person of limited repute (Nibaddha Prasiddhirūpa Āgama), and (4) the statement of the person of innate talent (Pratibhātmaka Āgama). The wisdom of the common people, being affected by base traditions and biasness do not get stability as a valid proof, but the statement of the person who has complete and unobstructed realization of the fact to be narrated cannot be suspected upon.[37] The validity of the faithfulness of the pious persons differs with their branches of learning, as Pāṇini and Vararuci are for grammar and Akṣapāda etc. for other branches of knowledge. This is known as Caraṇāptavāda śāstrāptavāda. When the personality gets ground for proof and becomes respected and followed by the people it

takes the form of kokāptavāda. Originally, the word Āpta is based on Paramaparākhyāti and the source of these is the Parāśakti or Pratibhā i.e. self illuminated wisdom.[38]

From the above discussion it can be concluded the Āgama is both means of valid proof as well as śāstra (scripture). Scripture is sermonic in the sense that it teaches knowledge and delimits its procedure. If we cast a cursory glance at the history of Āgama, we come across certain spiritual practices prevalent, even in Vedic periods, without the use of Vedic Mantras. Sometimes, these practitioners composed new Mantras to be used for general welfare. They were devoid of pitch and stress.[39] Thus the Āgama was understood in two parts by the scholars : (1) Vedic and (2) Non-Vedic. The Vedic tradition was taken to be as per the percept of Vedas and the opposite to Vedic tradition. Jainism and Buddhism were taken to be non-Vedic. The Book Tantravārtika delivers a long and exhautive list of Āgamas and their practices.[40] Vācapati Miśra affirms, the tantras of Buddhist etc. as false Āgamas, in his Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī[41]. In Vīramitrodaya etc. all the Āgamas are said to be valid according to the capacity of the individuals who prefers it.[42] In Parāśaramādhavīya, the number of the Devotional Āgamas has been described as six, i.e. Śaiva, Śākta, Saura, Vainayaka, Vaiṣṇava and Skanda.'[43] In the introduction of Bhārgava Tantra, two branches of Tantra : Vedic and Avedic have been accepted.



In the Vedic Āgama consisting of four parts there are its three sub-divisions namely Śaiva, Śākta and Vaiṣṇava. Again Śākta and Vaiṣṇava each are divided into two parts and Śaiva into four. Avedic are Bauddha etc.[44]

In general parlance, Āgama is known as Tantra. The common man takes it to be magic, witcheraft and black magic etc. The cause of this confounding understanding of the term is the ignorance of the correct meaning of the terminology and their actual aspects. Agehānanda Bhāratī and other such scholars state that terminology and its ignorance, apart from this, the want of such words that may express its (Tantra's) true meaning, is the cause of this confusion.[45] The word "Tantra" is derived from the root 'Tanu' to expand and contains the sense of elaborating the subject.

Vācaspati Miśra, Ānanda Giri, Govindānanda and Īśānadeva, in the Īśānaśivagurudevapaddhati" derive this word from the root 'Tati' or 'Tantri', the source of knowledge,[46] even Īśānadeva in his Īśānaśiva-Gurudeva Paddhati' accepts its root as Tatri.[47] i.e. Ajitāgama defines it, "the knowlegde that elaborates reality and Mantras."[48] Viṣṇu-Tantra takes it to mean the "Protection from fear"[49] i.e. the object of Tantra is to protect the aspirant at every step. This meaning is found written in Piṅgala Mata,[50] the book found in the royel library of Nepal. Generally every scientific and philosophical essay, describing the subject symmetrically and in detail was said to be Tantra. Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasada Śātrī takes this to mean 'brief' that shortens the elaborated sense into a brief formula which gives the elaborated sense.[51] Dr. S.N. Dāsagupta describes that the Tantra literature includes every conclusions of Indian culture coming down from Vedic period and has attempted to dispel the oppositions in its own way.[52] According to Suśruta, Tantra is the other name of Āyurveda.[53]

The theories of Tantra and Veda, seem similar on the fundamental facts. The yoke of both is borne by the Trinity of Vāc (speech), Prāṇa (breath) and Citta (consciousness). Their assistance leads to higher state. When the Vāc is main, it is Middle (Madhyamā), when being tightened by the thread of vast intellect, it is called Paśyantī. All three have the access from the subtle to gross.[54] The Unmanifest, equality and completeness are beyond its purview. That is the state of supreme cause.

Here the supreme Reality is everything and it is the expression of both, Veda and Tantra. The difference between these two is of Time and Space.

Consequently, Tantra being universal and for all the Varṇas is cautious about the status of the aspirant. Pancarātra has tried to prove that it has emerged from a lost tradition of Veda[55] from the very ancient time.

Tāntrika practice in Arabian community is called Tasaruf. Prof. Ram Murti Tripathi says that this practice is strangely similar to the practices pervalent in Indian Tāntrika and Yogic systems here in India.[56]

Now-a-days, Āgama-Tantra is realized as one of the special branch of indian literature. Winternitz states that, in truth, the scriptures related to Vaiśṇavas is called Saṁhitā, that related to Śaivas is known as Āgama, and Tantra's sacred books relate to Śāktas,[57] but in truth, the word Āgama, denotes relations to both Śaivas ad Vaiṣṇavas. The Saṁhitā is derived from the root 'Dhā' and with prefix 'Sam'. It expresses the sense 'to collect'. Pauṣkara Saṁhitā explains the term as the book containing the number of verses (ślokes), to the extent of 1200, is Saṁhitā.[58] This word is used for Āgama and Veda, both, but its common use is for Veda. Sri S.C. Nandi Math states that this word Saṁhitā is different from the same word used for the Vedas. The followers of Āgama Saṁhitā, respect their book as adorable as the Vedic Saṁhitā by its followers.[59] Professor Winternitz also accepts that there is no dividing line between the measuring of these two-fold words, in foot-note.[60] Thus it is clear that this word is used for both Nigama and Āgama and this use is handed down from long tradition.

It is, now necessary to consider these two words. Āgama is a word of common use and includes Tantra also in its purview. The Writers of Hindū Tantrism, Saṁyuktā Gupta and Derk Jane Whens Tuen Godrian have laid down some general forms of Tantra-

1. Under the theory of Tantra, with the devotional practice, a parallel path was opened to get the individual liberation, because Vedic practice was considered to be very old.
2. Tāntrika process aims at worldly pleasure, too, while concentrating on spiritual amelioration. Thus the object of devotional practice is

both, celestial and terrestrial pleasure. Here the attainment of divinity is also one of the objects to achieve.[61]

Dr. Prabodh Chandra Bagachi has divided the Trantra in two forms (1) Orthodox and (2) Hetrodox. The first part contains Āgama, Yāmala, Dāmara and the second one includes Kulācāra, Vāmācāra, Sahajayāna and Vajrayāna.[62] Dr. James H. Cogins says that the Tantra is based on an experimental and ostentatious psychology. The individual devotion has expounded it and made it practical by use in daily life. The Tantra scriptures throw an important light on the necessities of the development of humanity which is fulfilled by different Tāntrika rites.[63]

Thus, as it is revealed above, Āgama is the practicla aspect of Nigama and proceed Parallel. In other words both are complementary to each other. On the one hand Vedic Karmakāṇḍa prepares the devotee and on the other Āgama dispels the practical difficulties which put obstacles in the way of the devotee. On the one hand there is background of Divine experience and on the other the support of experience. On the one hand there is Śabda Brahma (infinity of word) and on the other the image of Brahma. In truth Nigama and Āgama are the two eyes of Indian intelligence and in this way these two are the wheels of devotional chariot, without them no desire can be fulfilled.

Notes

1. श्रुतिप्रमाणागमङ्गलैश्च शेते जरामृत्युभयादभीतः।
   महाभारत, शान्तिपर्वणिमोक्षधर्मपर्व, 219/46.
2. जर्नल ऑफ कर्नाटका यूनिवर्सिटी ह्यूमनिटीज, 1970, पृ. 29.
3. जर्नल ऑफ कर्नाटका यूनिवर्सिटी ह्यूमनिटीज, 1970, पृ. 30.
4. आगच्छन्ति बुद्धिमारोहन्ति यस्माद् अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसोपायाः स आगमः। तत्त्ववैशारदी, 1-7.
5. हेयोपादेयरूपेण चतुर्वर्गसमाश्रयात्। कालक्रमागतानर्थान् गमयत्यागमः स्मृतः।
   उपासकाध्ययन, श्लोक 100.
6. टीका कुल्लूकभट्ट मनुस्मृति, 2/1.
7. श्रुतिस्तु वेदो विज्ञेयो...। तत्रैव, 2/10.
8. "अत एव सर्वागमा अनादय एव"- ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविवृत्तिविमर्शिनी, अ. 2, वि. 3, पृ. 94.
9. श्रुतवन्तो वयं धीराणां धीमतां वचनम्। ये आचार्या नोऽस्मभ्यं तत्कर्म च ज्ञानं च विचचक्षिरे व्याख्यातवन्तस्तेषामयमागमः पारम्पर्यागत इत्यर्थः।।
   -ईशावस्योपनिषद्भाष्ये-10.

10. सन्मार्ग, आगम विशेषांक, पृ. 1, सन्मार्ग दैनिक, गोलघर, वाराणसी 1980.
11. ईश्वरसंहिता, 1.24.
12. कृते श्रुत्योक्त आचारस्त्रेतायां स्मृतिसम्भवः। द्वापरे तु पुराणोक्तः कलावागमसम्मत।।
कुलार्णवतन्त्र, उद्धृत, भारतीय दर्शन, पं. बलदेव उपाध्याय, पृ. 664.
13. वाक्यपदीय, ब्रह्मकाण्ड, 134. टीका, पृ. 51-52.
14. श्रुतेरपौरुषेयतया- स्मृत्युपनिबन्धनाविच्छेदाद् विच्छेदाद् अविच्छिन्न श्रुतिस्मृत्याख्य आगमः- वृषभदेव, वा.प., 1/3.
15. वाक्यपदीय, वृषभदेव, 1/27.
16. वाक्यपदीय, वृषभदेव, 1/27.
17. न चागमादृते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते। ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम्।।
वा.पा., 1/141.
18. प्रमाणनयतत्वालोकालंकार, 4/1.
19. स्वकर्मण्यभियुक्तो यो रागद्वेषविवर्जितः। निर्वैरः पूजितः सद्भिः आप्तो ज्ञेयः स तादृशः।
सांख्यकारिका-5, जयमंगलाटीका
20. आगमो ह्याप्तवचनमाप्तिं दोषक्षयं विदुः।
क्षीणदोषोऽनृतं वाक्यं न ब्रूयाद् हेत्वासंभवात्।। प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकार
21. चरकसंहिता, विमानस्थान, 4/4.
22. रुचीनां वैचित्र्यादृजुकुटिलनानापथजुषां, नृणामेको गम्यस्त्वमसि पयसामर्णव इव।
शिवमहिम्नः स्तुतिः-7.
23. सृष्टिश्च प्रलयश्चैव देवतानां समर्चनम्। साधनश्चैव सर्वेषां पुरश्चरणमेव च।।
षट्कर्मसाधनं चैव ध्यानयोगश्चतुर्विधः। सप्तभिर्लक्षणैर्युक्तं त्वागमं तद्विदुर्बुधाः।।
-वाचस्पत्यम्, पृ. 618.
24. आगतं शिववक्त्रेभ्यो गतं च गिरिजानने। मतं च वासुदेवस्य तस्मादागम उच्यते।। -
सर्वोल्लासतन्त्र, 1/15.
25. "आगमो ज्ञानमित्युक्तम्" आगमरहस्य, उद्धृत त्रिपुरार्णवतन्त्र, भूमिका, पृ. 4.
26. आसमन्तात् गमयति अभेदेन विमृशति पारमेशस्वरूपमिति आगमः। तत्रैव
27. गृह्यते ह्यनुमानेन प्रत्यक्षानुभवेन च। अर्थि-प्रत्यर्थिभावेन आगमेन तु लभ्यते।।
स्वच्छन्दतन्त्र, 4/339.
28. शास्त्रं शब्दात्मकं सर्वं शब्दो हंसः प्रकीर्तितः। तत्रैव, 4/341.
29. नास्योच्चारयिता कश्चित् प्रतिहन्ता न विद्यते। स्वयमुच्चरते हंसः प्राणिनामुरसि स्थितः।
तत्रैव, 7/59.
30. "The Notion that the whole universe with the totality of its phenomena forms one single whole, in which even the smallest element has

an effect upon the largest, because secret threads connect the smallest item with the eternal ground of the world. This is the proper foundation of all tantric Philosophy : H.V. Glaşenappa, "Tantrismus and Schaktismus", Ostasiatische Zeitschrist, Vol. 22. p. 120, Berlin, 1936.

31. a. आद्य नैघुण्टकं काण्डं द्वितीयं नैगमं तथा- ऋग्वेद-अनुक्रमणिकायाम्।
    b. निगमाः पूर्वणिग्वेदनिश्याध्ववणिक्पथाः, हैमः।
    c. न्यामतसिद्धे पञ्चावयवन्यायमध्ये चरमावयवे निश्चयार्थे निगमशब्दप्रयोगः- तर्कसंग्रहः
    d. वणिक्पथं पुरं वेदोनिगमाः- अमरकोशः
    e. निगमशब्दो वेदवाची यास्केन तत्र तत्र निगमे भवति इत्येवं वेदवाक्यानामवतारित्वात्। -ऋग्वेदभाष्यभूमिकायाम्।
    f. निगमकल्पतरोर्गलितं फलम् - इति भागवते, 1/3.
    g. नियत्या निर्मुक्ते निखिलनिगमान्तस्तुतपदे निरातङ्के नित्ये निगमय ममापिस्तुतिमिमाम्। सौन्दर्यलहरी-100.
    h. नैगमः स्यादुपनिषद्वाणिजोर्नागरेऽपि च- विश्वकोषः
32. a. अव्यक्ताद्व्यक्तयः सर्वाः प्रभवन्त्यहरागमे। गीता, 8/18.
    b. आगमापायिनोऽनित्यास्तांस्तितिक्षस्व भारत। गीता, 2/14.
    c. ज्ञानशिष्यप्रमेयागमः। भर्तृहरि, 2/15.
    d. आगमै सदृशारम्भः आरम्भसदृशोदयः। रघुवंश, 1/15.
    e. न्याये चतुर्विधं प्रमाणं स्वीकृतमस्ति चतुर्थमागमप्रमाणम्। तर्कसंग्रहः।
33. आन्तरं चित्स्वभावस्य शब्दनं यद्विमर्शनम्। अन्तरंगस्वरूपं तत् प्रत्यक्षस्यापि जीविताम्।। यद् यद् विमृश्यते न तत्तदेव भवेद् ध्रुवम्। आगमः स विमर्शो हि प्रोच्यते मुख्यतो बुधैः।। उपयोगितया तत्र उपचारेण कथ्यते। शब्दोप्यागमशब्देन विमर्शजनकत्वतः।। सन्मार्ग, 'आगम विशेषांक', पृ. 60.
34. बोधिचर्यावतार, 9/41 टीका प्रज्ञाकरमति।
35. प्रत्यक्षेणानुमित्या वा यस्तूपायो न वा बुध्यते। एतं विदन्ति वेदेन तस्माद् वेदस्य वेदता।। तैत्ति. भाष्यभूमिका
36. a. आज्ञा वस्तु समन्ताच्च गम्यते त्यागमो मतः।- पिंगलमत, पाण्डुलिपि, दरबार पुस्तकालय, नेपाल, उद्धृत टी.एस.आर.एल., पृ. 2.
    b. अनेनावगम्यते सर्वमित्यागमः- आगम प्रज्ञान, लेखक- शम्भुलिंगशिवाचार्य, मैसूर, 1930, पृ. 97.
37. ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविवृत्तिविमर्शिनी, भाग-2, वि. 3, पृ. 102.
38. "प्रतिभालक्षणा इयं शब्दभावनाख्य आगम एवेति"। ई.प्र.वि.वि., पृ. 93.

39. a. वेदादृतेऽपि कुर्वन्ति कल्पैः कर्माणि याज्ञिकाः। न तु कल्पैर्विना केचित् मन्त्रब्राह्मणामात्रकात्।। मीमांसादर्शनम् तन्त्रवार्तिक, 1/3/6/527.
    b. स एवं श्रुतिमन्त्रयाद्वेदस्वरविवर्जितः।। तान्त्रिकं मन्त्रमित्युक्तं तदेव श्रुतिचोदितम्।। पराशरसंहिता-12.
40. सांख्ययोगपाञ्चरात्रपाशुपतशाक्यग्रन्थपरिगृहीतधर्माधर्मनिबन्धनानि विषचिकित्सा-वशीकरणो-च्चाटनोन्मादनादिसमर्थ कतिपयमन्त्रौषधिकदाचित्कसिद्धिनिदर्शन-बलेनाहिंसासत्यवचनदमदयदिश्रुतिस्मृतिसंवादिस्तोकाथगन्धवासितजीविका-प्रायार्थान्तरोपदेशीनि, यानि च बाह्यन्तराणि म्लेच्छाचारमिश्रकभोजनाचरणनिबन्धनानि, तेषामेवैतत् श्रुतिविरोधहेतुदर्शन-भ्यामनपेक्षणीयत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते। मीमांसादर्शनम्- तन्त्रवार्त्तिक, तत्रैव, पृ. 328.
41. शाक्यभिक्षुनिर्ग्रन्थसंसारमोचकादीनामागमाभासाः परिहृता भवन्ति। -सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी, श्लोक 5 की व्याख्या.
42. दर्शनोदयः, लक्ष्मीनिवासपुरम्, मैसूर 1933, पृ. 455.
43. शैवं च वैष्णवं शाक्तं वैनायकं तथा।
    स्कान्दं च भक्तिमार्गस्य दर्शनानि षडेव हि।। पराशरमाधवीये 68, पृ. 1.
44. भार्गवतन्त्रम्, उपोद्घात, पृ. 2, डॉ. राघवप्रसादचौधरी, गंगानाथ झा केन्द्रीय संस्कृत विद्यापीठ, इलाहाबाद-2, 1981.
45. The Tantric Tradition, Agehānanda Bhāratī, p. 13.
46. श्री आशुतोष मुखर्जी सिल्वर जुबली वाल्यूम्स 2, भाग-1, पृ. 253, कलकत्ता विश्वविद्यालय, कलकत्ता.
47. ईशानशिवगुरुदेवपद्धति, भाग-3, पृ. 28.
48. अजितागम, वाल्यूम 1, क्रियापाद, पटल 1, श्लोक 115, पृ. 10.
49. सर्वेऽर्था येन तन्यन्ते त्रायन्ते महतो भयात्।
    इति तन्त्रस्य तन्त्रत्वं तन्त्रज्ञाः परिचक्षते।। विष्णुसंहिता, 2/10.
50. a. "तन्यते ज्ञायते नित्यं तन्त्रमित्थं विदुर्बुधाः"।- पिंगलमत (Mss. D.L. Nepal) Quoted in TSRI.
    b. तनुते त्रायते नित्यं तन्त्रमित्थं विदुर्बुधाः।। काशिकावृत्ति 50.
51. Notice of Sanskrit Manuscript, Vol. I, Preface, p. 24, TSR, by H.R. Sastri.
52. श्री आशुतोष मुखर्जी सिल्वर जुबली वाल्यूम तृतीय, भाग-1, पृ 254.
53. इत्यष्टाङ्गमिदं तन्त्रमादितः प्रकाशितम्। सुश्रुत।
54. जपसूत्रम्, भाग-1, पृ. 69, प्रणेता स्वामी प्रत्यगात्मानन्द सरस्वती, सम्पादिका-डॉ. प्रेमलता शर्मा, भारतीय विद्या प्रकाशन, वाराणसी, 1966.

55. मेडिवल लिटरेचर गोण्डा, पृ. 49.
56. तन्त्र और तसव्वुफ, प्रो. राममूर्ति त्रिपाठी, राधा प्रकाशन, इलाहाबाद, प्रथम संस्करण, 1989, पृ. 37-38.
57. प्राचीन भारतीय साहित्य (हिन्दी संस्करण) भाग-1, खण्ड-2, पृष्ठ 245, प्रकाशक- मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, वाराणसी, सन् 1966.
58. पौष्करसंहिता, 40/156.
59. जर्नल ऑफ कर्नाटक यूनिवर्सिटी एण्ड ह्यूमनिटीज, 1970, पृ. 33.
60. प्राचीन भारतीय साहित्य (हिन्दी संस्करण), पृ. 245, मूल एवं टिप्पणी
61. हिन्दू तन्त्रिज्म, संयुक्ता गुप्ता एण्ड डर्कनेज ह्वेनस्टल, गोड्रियन, 30 जे. बर्लिन, 1976, पृ. 6-7.
62. स्टडीज इन द तन्त्राज, प्रबोधचन्द्र बागची, पृ. 45-55.
63. "The Tantraśāstra being based on an experimental and demonstrable psychology and vivified by the breath of personal devotion and made practical by the application in daily life. is bound to exert an ever increasing influence on humanity as it rises towards the needs which the śāstra supplies, including the ritul." -- Shakti and Shākta, by Sri John Woodroffe, pub. Ganesh & Co., Third Edn., 1929, p. 669.

Ethical Vision of Advaita Vedānta

Saroj Kumar Padhi

The Upanishads from the concluding portion and contain the essence of the Vedas, Which are the scripture of Hindu Faith. They record the direct and immediate spiritual experience of the rishis, the seers of truth, and have been passed down orally through a succession of illumined teachers. They treat of the origin and destiny of the Soul, the nature of the Universe and the Nature of Ultimate reality. "The Upanishads are the most rewarding and elevating reading possible in world; they have been solace of life."

Hindu philosophies have discussed ethics both from the subjective and from the objective standpoint. Subjective ethics is related to individual discipline. Its purpose is the purification of the mind (Chitta Suddhi) and the consequent deepening of the inner life. It culminates in the realization of the highest good, which transcends and fulfils all relatives values. This is the ethical stand point of Shankaracharya, Patanjali, Ramanuja and Buddhist philosophers. Though they hold different values about the ultimate meaning of Reality, yet all are unanimously agreed that reality is beyond the ordinary category of good and evil.

Objective ethics deals with social welfare. It is based upon the Hindu conception of duties (Dharma) determined by a man's position in society and his stage of life (Varnashrama Dharma), and also Upon certain Universal duties (Sadharana Dharma) common to all Human beings. But objective ethics is not an end in itself. Ultimately it helps the Individual to attain the knowledge of Atma of God. All through Hindu ethics, Both in its original formulation and in its later developments, the subjective value of action has been stressed.

The Ethical theories of the Hindus are determined by certain metaphysical concepts laid down in the Upanishads, Which contain the wisdom of Vedas, the highest authority of the Hindus in all matters pertaining to their religion and philosophy.

According to the general Upanishadic view the values of an action is to be judged by the degree of personal sacrifice involved. An action is judged meritorious if it invalves a denial of personal comfort (Tapas) together with renunciation (Nyasa) on the doer's port, though the action in itself may not be conductive to the immediate well–being of

others. The objective value of action is not denied. The Chhandogya Upanishad-

स यदशिशिष्यति यत्पिपासति यन्न रमते ता तस्य दीक्षा। अथ यदश्नाति यत्पिबति यद्रमते तदुपसदैवेति। अथ यद्धसति यज्जक्षति यन्मैथुनं चरति स्तुतशास्त्रैव तदेव। अथ यत्तपो दानमार्जवमहिंसा सत्यवचनमिति ता अस्य दक्षिणों (ch.u.III.17)

in these mantras, Upanishad describes life as a sacrifice, which is to be performed by the advance soul without only external ceremonies. In this sacrifice the gifts (Which must accompany a sacrifice) are enumerated as austerities (Tapas), liberality (Danam), Righteousness (Arjavam) Non-violence (Ahimsa) and truthfulness (Satyavachanam), a good action is thus extolled in the Mahanarayana Upanishad.

यथा वृक्षस्य संपुष्पितस्य दूराद्गन्ध वात्येवं पूण्यस्य कर्मणो यथासिधारां कर्तेव हितामवक्रामेद्यद्युवेह वा विह्वयिष्यामि कर्तु पतिष्यामीत्येवममृतादात्मनं जुगुप्सेत। (म.ना.उ.–11)

"As the scent is wafted afar from a tree laden with flowers, so also is wafted afar the scent of a good deed" wicked action are Universally condemned. Self Kmowledge is denied to him, Says the Kathopanishad- नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नशान्तो नासमाहित:। न शान्तमानसो वादिप्रज्ञानेनैनमाप्नुयात्।। (क.उ.1/2/23) who has not turned away from wickedness ,who is not tranquil and subdued, and whose mind is not at peace. According to Chandogya Upanishad- (स्तेनो हिरण्यस्य सुरां पिबंश्च गुरोस्तल्पमावसन् ब्रह्मा च, एते पतन्ति चत्वार: पञ्चमश्चाचरंस्तैरिति।। छा.उ.5/10/9) dire consequences overtake a man "who steals gold, who drinks spirits, who dishonours his teacher's bed, who kills a Brahmin and who associate with men guilty of any of the above four sins" The Taitareyopanishad enumerate the fallowing twelve duties- ऋतं च स्वाध्याय प्रवचने च। सत्यं च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च। तपश्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च (तै. उ. 1/9), each of which is to be accompanied by the study and the teaching Vedas. right dealing and truthfulness, austerities, self-restraint and tranquility; (And the duties of a house holders) feeding the sacred fire and daily obligatory sacrifice(agnihotram), hospitality and courtesy and duties to wives, children and grandchildren.

The general moral tone of the people in Upanishadic time is indicated in the Chhandogya Upanishad – तेभ्यो ह प्राप्तेभ्य: पृथगर्हाणि कारयांचकार स ह प्रात: संजिहान उवाच न मे सतेनो जनपदे न कदर्यो न मद्यपः नानाहिताग्निर्नाविद्वान् न स्वौरी स्वैरिणी कुतो यक्षमाणो वै भगवन्तोऽहमस्मि याव[illegible]

ऋत्विजे धनं दास्यामि तावद्भगवभ्यो दास्यामि वसन्तु भगवन्त इति। छा.उ.5/11/5). By the fallowing statement of king Ashwapati Kaikeya, "In my kingdom there is no thief, no miser, no drunker, no man without an alter in his house, no ignorant person, no adulter, much less an adulteress".

As stated above Upanishadic Ethics is primarily concerted with self discipline leading to the liberation of the individual. The general trend of Indian philosophical thought can be summed up in the words of Bhagavad Gita-

उद्धरेदात्मनात्मानं नात्मानमवसादयेत्।
आत्मैव ह्यात्मनो बन्धुरात्मैव रिपुरात्मन:।।
बन्धुरात्मात्मनस्तस्य येनात्मैवात्मनाजित:।
अनात्मनस्तु शत्रुत्वे वर्तेतात्मैव शत्रुवत्।। श्री.भ.गी 6/5, 6

"Let a man be lifted up by his own self; let him not lower himself; for he himself is his friend and he himself is his enemy. To hom who has conquered himself by himself, his own self is a friend, but to him who has not conquered himself, his own self is hostile ,like an external enemy." So men have to fallow the ethical views of the Bhagavad Gita to get the eternal peace in this mundane world.

In the KathaUpanishad –

पराञ्चिखानि व्यतृणत्स्वयभूस्तस्मात्पराङ् पश्यन्ति नान्तरात्मन्।
कश्चिद्धीर: प्रत्यगात्मानमैक्षदावृत्तचक्षुरमृतत्वमिच्छन्।। (क.उ. 2/1/1)

It states that the sense organs are created to sense the material pleasures and that is why embodied souls are entangled in this phenomenal life of unceasing birth and death, but the calm sages check their sense-organs in order to attain immortality. The Brihadaranyaka Uanishad (III.V.I) exhort us, as conditions for liberation in Brahman, to proclaim the yearning for offspring, Wealth and heavenly world. The ideal of pleaser and the ideal of the good; the two are sharply distinguished, like darknass and light. "he who chooses the pleasant wises the end" and again "the fool choose the pleasant out of greed and avarice.

Each stage of life and position in the society has its appropriate duty, the right performance of which requires self control and austerity. Through the four stage of life a man learns progressive renunciation and gradually becomes purified of all earthly attachments.

During the first stage he is a Brahmacharin ,or celibate student; for twelve years. According to Chhandogya Upanishad- उपकोसल ह वै

कामलयन: सत्यकामे जाबाले ब्रह्मचर्यमुवास तस्य ह द्वादशवर्षाण्यग्नीनारिचचार स ह स्मान्यानन्तेवासिन: समवर्तयंस्त ह स्मैव न समावर्तयति। (छा.उ. 6/10/1) for a series of years he dwells in the house of his teacher, studying the Veda and tending the sacrificial fire. Reverence and obedience mark his relationship with the teacher, at the end of this period, when the student takes leave of the teacher, the latter, as described in Taittiriyopanishad (I-2)- says to him, by way of admonition "speak truth, do your duty, fore sake not the study of Vedas, after you have presented the appropriate gifts to the teacher, take care that the line of your race is not broken, he is further asked not to neglect his health and possession, to honour father, mother and guests to be blameless in act and life, to honour superiors, to bestow alms in an appropriate manner and in all doubtful cases to order himself according to the judgment of approved authorities.

The second stage is called grahastya or the life of a house holders. At this stage the aspirant marries, pursues the study of Veda, performs dwell sacrifices and leads a life of self control.

The final stage of life's journey is reached when after the completion of the third stage, a man renounces the world and becomes a sannyasin. It is also said in the Upanishad, that one can give up the world from any stage of life, whenever one feels dispassion for material things. A sanyashi is a free soul, cultivating the virtues of chastity, poverty, truthfulness and abstinence from doing injury to others.

Every stage has its corresponding duties and responsibilities. it is a duty of Student to acquire knowledge the duty of the house holders to serve society according to his capabilities, the duty of the recluse to lead a life of contemplation and the duty of sanyasi is free from the worldly duties. He relinquishes them when he takes the vow of monasticism. He cultivates the knowledge of reality and constantly radiates that knowledge. He is beyond all categorical imperatives; but no unethical action is passible for him. He is very embodiment of truthfulness, goodness, and fearlessness. He no longer strives ethical perfection; virtues embellishes all his actions. He devotes himself to the welfare of others without seeking any personal gain. Ethical disciplines prepare one of these highest consummations of human life.

Cast duties which have an important social bearing, are described in the Bhagavad Gita (Xviii-42-44) i.e.

शमो दमस्तप: शौचं क्षान्तिरार्जवमेव च।
ज्ञानं विज्ञानमास्तिक्यं ब्रह्मकर्म स्वभावजम्।।

शौर्यं तेजो धृतिर्दाक्ष्यं युद्धे चाप्यपलायनम्।
दानमीश्वरभावश्च क्षात्रं कर्म स्वभावजम्।।
कृषिगौरक्ष्यवाणिज्यं वैश्यकर्मस्वभावजम्।
परिचर्यात्मकं कर्म शुद्रस्यापि स्वभावजम्।।

and also by the various Hindu lawgivers. They constitute the objective morality of the Hindus, that is to say, morality as represented in a code of external acts and requiring outward conformity. The duties relatives to the first three stages of life are similarly described. The cast-system is based on men's admitted inequalities–physical, mental, and spiritual- at the moment of birth. These are the result of action in previous birth and each is himself responsible for his condition. He will attain a higher position in society by cheerfully discharging the duties of his present position.

Objective morality, according to the Bhagavad Gita is determined by a man's position in cast. Moral conduct is relatives to birth and position. It is called Dharma, which is the law of inner growth determining a man's reaction to the outer world. The Brahmins, the king, the merchant, the laborer and the world-renouncing monk must observe their respective dharmas and thus ensure the well-being of society as a whole. A man is warned to pursue his own dharma, however imperfect, and not to try to imitate another man's dharma, however perfect the latter may appear to be. In the Gita स्वधर्ममपि चावेक्ष्य न विकम्पितुमर्हसि। (S.B.G 2/31) Arjun was admonished to pursue his dharma on the battlefield for preservation of the moral order. He had been born in a military caste; hence it was his duty to fight for the discipline of the wicked and protection of the righteous.

The faith full performance of duties purifies a mans heart and mind by removing selfish impulses. Thus he becomes entitled to contemplate profound spiritual truths. In the end, says the Lord–

सर्वधर्मान्परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं ब्रज।
अहं त्वां सर्वपापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः।। (S.B.G 18/66)

The verse states that he should give up all social duties and come to Him alone for shelter. In close association with God a man finds the conclusion of all relative values. Worldly duties prepare him for the fulfillment of his supreme duty, which is realization of God.

Besides the objective duties based on the castes and stages of life, there are laid down the common duties of men, the Sadharanadharma, which are the foundation of moral life. Manu, the lawgiver, enumerates

these common duties as fallows: steadfastness (Dharya), forgiveness (Kshama), good conduct (Dama), no appropriation or the avoidance of theft (chauryabhava), control of the senses (indriya nigrah), wisdom (dhi), learning (vidya), truthfulness (satya) and absence of angar (akrodha).

It will be readily seen that most of the duties mentioned here aim at individual perfection. As stated before, the aim of Hindu ethics is to enable a man ultimately to conquer his lower self and attain freedom from passion, desire and attachment. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (V/ii/1-3) narrates the story, how God, man and demon the three offspring of Prajapati, the creator sought his advice after having spent some time under Him as brahmacharins. In reply to their question He uttered thrice the sound 'Da' which is the first syllable of three words 'Damyata' 'Datta' 'Dayodhvam' meaning respectively self control, Charity and compassion. He asked the God to practice self-control, the man charity and the demon compassion. There exists in society three types of beings: Godlike man, Average human being and refinement, often lacks of self control with regard to certain vital matters, for instance, he may indulge in drink or gambling. Hence he needs to practice self control. The average human being is greedy; he is always on the look out for a chance to grab what belongs to others. Therefore he should practice charity. The demoniacal person is ruthless and cruel. It is his duty to practice the discipline of compassion. The Upanishad says that even now the creator gives the same advice about the moral law to the different types of human beings through the voice of thunder, which makes the reverberating sound Da-Da-Da.

The great purpose of objective morality is to create an ideal society, affording its members Facilities for developing their highest potentialities. Such a society enables men to cultivate the subjective morality ,which aims at the purification of mind.

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ब्रह्मपुराण का काल निर्णय

श्रीकृष्ण त्रिपाठी

पुराण वाङ्मय की अनादिता

वैदिक वाङ्मय की तरह पौराणिक वाङ्मय की धारा अनादि है। लोगों में एक धारणा स्थापित हो गयी है कि पुराणों की रचना वेदव्यास ने की है, किन्तु सावधानी से जब विचार किया जाता है तो प्रतीत होता है कि पुराणों का अस्तित्व एक संहिता के रूप में अनादि काल से चला आ रहा था। इसीप्रकार का स्पष्ट कथन स्कन्दपुराण, रेवामाहात्म्य, १/२३/३० तथा मत्स्यपुराण के ५३वें अध्याय में प्राप्त होता है।[१]

इस तथ्य का प्रतिपादन वैदिक वाङ्मय के अवलोकन से भी होता है। सर्वप्रथम पुराण-वाङ्मय का स्पष्ट उल्लेख अथर्ववेद में प्राप्त होता है। वहाँ 'पुराण' शब्द इतिहास, गाथा तथा नाराशंसी शब्दों के साथ प्रयुक्त किया गया है। इस स्थल पर विचार करने से प्रतीत होता है कि यहाँ इसका प्रयोग एक विशिष्ट विद्या के रूप में किया गया है। पुराण का उदय 'उच्छिष्ट' नामक ब्रह्म से बतलाया गया है। मन्त्र का अर्थ है- ऋक्, साम, छन्द (अथर्व) और यजुर्वेद के साथ ही उस उच्छिष्ट से, जगत्-प्रशासन करने वाले यज्ञमय परमात्मा से पुराण उत्पन्न हुए तथा उन्हीं से देवता भी उत्पन्न हुए।[२] यद्यपि उच्छिष्ट शब्द का अर्थ लोगों ने विभिन्न प्रकार से किया है। किन्तु सायण के अनुसार संसार के समग्र पदार्थों का अवसान होने पर शेष रहने वाले परमात्मा ही उच्छिष्ट हैं। इसी तथ्य का प्रतिपादन अथर्व के दूसरे स्थल से भी होता है।[३] पुराणों का उल्लेख ब्राह्मण-साहित्य, आरण्यक-वाङ्मय, सूत्र-ग्रन्थ, महाभारत[४], रामायण, अर्थशास्त्र, स्मृतिसाहित्य में भी उपलब्ध होता है। इस प्रकार हम देखते हैं कि व्यास के पूर्व की पौराणिक धारा वेद की तरह प्राचीन है और व्यासोत्तर पुराण-धारा व्यास के द्वारा अष्टादशपुराण के रूप में सुव्यवस्थित की गई है। पुराण-धारा वैदिक वाङ्मय का पूरण करती है। इसलिए उसे पुराण कहते हैं- "पूरणात् पुराणम्" (जीव गोस्वामी)। जैसे सुवर्ण अलंकार के त्रुटित भाग को सुवर्ण से ही पूरित किया जाता है, उसी प्रकार से पौराणिक वाङ्मय वैदिक वाङ्मय का पूरण करता है। इसलिए वह वेद के समान ही आदरणीय है। पुराण लौकिक शास्त्र है। यह वेद से भिन्न किन्तु वेद के अनुकूल शास्त्र स्वीकार किया गया है। वेद का स्वरूप सर्वदा के लिए निश्चित कर दिया गया है। किन्तु पुराणों में वक्ता के अनुसार समय-समय पर कुछ परिवर्तन भी होते गए हैं। तन्त्रवार्तिक १/३/३ वेद को अकृत्रिम और पुराण को

कृत्रिम मानता है। निरुक्त की "पुरापि नवं भवति" - यह व्युत्पत्ति भी इसी तथ्य की ओर संकेत करती है। स्कन्दपुराण कुमारिका खण्ड ४०/१३८ का कथन है कि इतिहास और पुराण लोकगौरव से भिन्न-भिन्न होते हैं।[५]

मत्स्यपुराण का स्पष्ट डिंडिम घोष है कि पुराणों का आविर्भाव वेदों से पूर्व काल में हुआ था। ब्रह्मा ने सर्वशास्त्रों में पुराण का ही प्रथम स्मरण किया और बाद में उनके मुख से वेद प्रकट हुए।[६] वायुपुराण भी इसीप्रकार के अभिप्राय को अभिव्यक्त करता है।[७]

ब्रह्मपुराण एवं आधुनिक विद्वान् : पाश्चात्य विद्वान् एवं भारतीय विद्वान् डॉ. हाज़रा प्रभृति का कथन है कि जीमूतवाहन, बल्लालसेन तथा देवण्ण भट्ट द्वारा उद्धृत ब्रह्म-पुराण के श्लोक प्रचलित ब्रह्मपुराण में प्राप्त नहीं होते। इस पुराण ने महाभारत, विष्णुपुराण, वायुपुराण तथा मार्कण्डेय पुराण के अनेक अध्यायों को अक्षरशः अपने में सम्मिलित कर लिया है। इसलिए यह ब्रह्मपुराण प्राचीन यथार्थ ब्रह्मपुराण का मूल न होकर कालान्तर में विरचित प्रक्षेप विशिष्ट पुराण है। यदि प्रयास किया जाए तो प्रक्षिप्त अंश सरलता से बाहर निकाले जा सकते हैं। यह पुराण मूल रूप से १७५ अध्यायों में समाप्त हो जाता है। इसकी समाप्ति के अवसर पर गौतमी गंगा (गोदावरी) का विशद महात्म्य वर्णित है। १७५ अध्याय के अन्त में (८८-९० श्लोक) इस पुराण के श्रवण तथा दान का महात्म्य वर्णित है। इस प्रकार की फलश्रुति निश्चित रूप से पुराण के अन्त ही में दी जाती है। फलतः १७६ अध्याय से लेकर अन्तिम २४५ अध्याय पीछे से जोड़ा हुआ है।

निबन्धकार एवं ब्रह्मपुराण : निबन्धकारों में इसकी लोकप्रियता प्रचुररूप से देखी जाती है। "कल्पतरु" ने कम से कम १५०० श्लोकों को इससे उद्धृत किया है। इनमें ९ श्लोक ही उपलब्ध ब्रह्मपुराण में मिलते हैं।[८] श्राद्ध विषय में सैकड़ों श्लोक कल्पतरु में ब्रह्मपुराण से उद्धृत किए गए हैं। कल्पतरु में इसी पुराण से सर्वापेक्षा अधिकतम श्लोक उद्धृत हैं। वायु तथा मत्स्य का नम्बर इसके बाद आता है। परन्तु इन श्लोकों की प्रचलित ब्रह्मपुराण में उपलब्धि न होने से इसके वर्तमान स्वरूप को अधिकतम प्रक्षेप-विशिष्ट मानना ही उचित है। प्रचलित ब्रह्मपुराण के अनेक तीर्थ विषयक श्लोक (४६ अध्याय से आगे वाले अंश के) 'तीर्थ-चिन्तामणि' में उद्धृत हैं। इसके लेखक वाचस्पति का समय १५वीं शती का उत्तरार्द्ध माना जाता है। फलतः प्रचलित ब्रह्मपुराण का रचना-काल इससे पूर्व अर्थात् १३वीं शती मानना युक्ति-युक्त है। उत्कल के जगन्नाथ महात्म्य का वर्णन[९] भी इसकी आधुनिकता अर्थात् १३वीं शताब्दी की रचना का समर्थन करता है।

पुराणों में प्रक्षेप : इसमें सन्देह नहीं कि अतीत काल में राज्यविप्लव और उलट-पुलट होने से पुराणों की स्थिति में थोड़ा बहुत अन्तर आया है। कई पुराण पूरे नहीं उपलब्ध होते।[१०] कुछ पुराणों में उनकी निर्धारित संख्या से अधिक श्लोक भी

मिलते हैं। मत्स्य पुराण के मत से ब्रह्मपुराण में १३००० श्लोक हैं। ज्वाला प्रसाद ने अपने 'अष्टादश पुराण दर्पण' में लिखा है कि किसी किसी पुराण के मत से ब्रह्मपुराण में १०००० ही श्लोक हैं। उनका कथन है कि एक आदि ब्रह्मपुराण है। वह ८ सहस्र श्लोकों के लगभग है। आदि ब्रह्मपुराण प्रचलित ब्रह्मपुराण से बहुत कुछ मिलता-जुलता है और आर्ष भी प्रतीत होता है।[११] भागवत एवं देवीभागवत १० हजार श्लोक और अग्निपुराण २५ हजार श्लोक-संख्या ब्रह्मपुराण में बतलाते हैं।[१२]

पुराणों में वे ही कथाएँ कालान्तर में जोड़ी गई जिनका धार्मिक एवं दार्शनिक महत्त्व था। जिन कथाओं के जोड़ने से किसी मत, धर्म या दर्शन की महत्ता, श्रेष्ठता प्रतिपादित होती थी और दूसरे प्रतियोगी मत, धर्म तथा दर्शन की निकृष्टता सिद्ध की जाती थी। ऐसी ही कथाएँ कालान्तर में अत्यन्त सावधानी एवं बुद्धिमत्ता के साथ स्थान खोजकर पुराणों में प्रविष्ट करा दी जाती थी। अपने मत, धर्म तथा दर्शन को पौराणिक महत्ता प्रदान करना तथा दूसरे के धर्म-दर्शन को नीचा दिखलाना ही पौराणिक परिवर्धन का लक्ष्य हुआ करता था। अष्टादश महापुराणों में इस प्रकार के सर्वाधिक परिवर्धन का कार्य ब्रह्मपुराण के साथ ही शिवपुराण में हुआ है।[१३]

साम्प्रदायिक विद्वेष पुराणों में वहाँ चरम स्थिति में पहुँच जाते हैं, जहाँ "विष्णुदर्शनमात्रेण शिवद्रोहः प्रजायते" जैसे वचन मिलते हैं। इस प्रकार की विद्रोह-भावना का प्रतिकार पहले भी करने का प्रयास किया गया है। इसीलिए शिव और विष्णु की अभिन्नता का उपदेश- "यथा शिवस्तथा विष्णुः" सदृश वचन पुराणों में बहुशः उपलब्ध होते हैं। स्वयं शिवमहापुराण ने भी त्रिदेवों की एकता का प्रबल समर्थन किया है।[१४]

अति प्राचीन काल से ही पुराणों की श्लोक-संख्या, वर्ण्य-विषय, आदि निर्धारित थे। अधिकांश पुराण पुराण-संख्या, पुराणों की श्लोक संख्या एवं उनके वर्ण्य-विषय का विवरण प्रस्तुत करते हैं।[१५] ऐसी स्थिति में पुराणों में अतिविशाल प्रक्षेपों के लिए स्वल्प अवकाश रहता है। सूक्ष्म दृष्टि से देखने पर, विचार करने पर, भाल पर लगे बिन्दु (स्पॉट) की भाँति, पुराणों में प्रक्षिप्त अंश सरलता से पकड़े जा सकते हैं। पर इसके लिए समय, श्रम एवं सम्पत्ति की प्रबल अपेक्षा है।

ब्रह्मपुराण का काल : पुराणों में जहाँ कहीं भी पुराणों की सूची दी गई है। वहाँ सर्वप्रथम ब्रह्मपुराण का नाम आया है। इसे आदि ब्रह्मपुराण के नाम से भी जाना जाता है। ब्रह्मपुराण का प्रभाव विष्णुपुराण, श्रीमद्भागवत पुराण एवं नारदपुराण पर सरलता के साथ देखा जा सकता है। शंकराचार्य (सप्तम सतक) के दादा गुरू गौडपादाचार्य ने पञ्चीकरण-व्याख्या में "जगृहे पौरुषं रूपम्" (भाग. १/३/१) को तथा उत्तरगीता की टीका में 'श्रेयः श्रुतिं भक्तिमुदस्य ते विभो' (भाग. १०/१४/४) को भागवत के नाम के साथ उद्धृत किया है। गौडपाद का काल आधुनिक गणना के अनुसार भी षष्ठ शतक से अर्वाचीन नहीं हो सकता। इस प्रकार भागवत का काल

षष्ठ शतक से पर्याप्त पूर्व सिद्ध होता है। वस्तुतः भागवत का काल तृतीय, चतुर्थ शतक के बाद का नहीं हो सकता। भारतीय पौराणिक-परम्परा के अनुसार श्रीकृष्ण के इस धराधाम को छोड़ने के तीस वर्ष बाद भाद्र शुक्ल नवमी को शुकदेव जी ने महाराज परीक्षित को भागवत की कथा सुनाई थी।[१६] फलतः भागवत की रचना कलियुग प्रारम्भ होने से तीस वर्ष के भीतर ही हुयी थी। इस प्रकार भारतीय परम्परा के अनुसार इसे पाँच सहस्र वर्ष प्राचीन होना चाहिए।

मत्स्यपुराण के ५३वें अध्याय में अठारहों पुराणों का विषय-सहित वर्णन है। मत्स्यपुराण का उल्लेख महाभारत में पाया जाता है। इसलिए यह महाभारत से भी प्राचीन सिद्ध होता है। देवीभागवत को छोड़कर बाकी पुराणों में ब्रह्मपुराण प्रथम स्थानीय है। ब्रह्मपुराण के २२३ से २२५ अध्याय और महाभारत के अनुशासनपर्व के १४३ अ. से १४५ अ. के साथ और ब्रह्मपुराण के २२६ अध्याय तथा अनुशासन पर्व १४६ अध्याय में बहुत कुछ श्लोकों में अविकल मेल दिखलाई देता है। इसके आधार पर कुछ लोगों का कथन है कि ये श्लोक महाभारत से ही ब्रह्मपुराण में लिए गए हैं। किन्तु अनुशासनपर्व में पठित "इदं चैवापरं देवि ब्रह्मण्यं समुदाहृतम्" (१४३/१६) और "पितामहसुखोत्सृष्टं प्रमाणमिति मे मतिः"। (१४३/१८) इत्यादि महाभारत के श्लोक देखने से ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि ब्रह्म का ही वचन महाभारत में उद्धृत है। अतः ब्रह्मपुराण का काल महाभारत के (ई.पू.५०० वर्ष से पूर्व षष्ठ अथवा सप्तम शती) पूर्व सिद्ध होता है।

अब तक के वर्णन से यह तथ्य प्रकट होता है कि पुराण का अस्तित्त्व वैदिककाल में भी, आज की ही भाँति था। ईस्वी से छः सौ वर्ष पूर्व, आज का पुराण साहित्य निर्मित हो चुका था। यहाँ इतना ध्यान रखना है कि पुराणों में समय-समय पर यत्र-तत्र कुछ परिवर्तन-परिवर्धन हुआ है। किन्तु आधुनिक इतिहासकारों के भी मत से पुराण-वाङ्मय गुप्तकाल तक अपने पूर्णरूप को प्राप्त हो चुका था। यद्यपि उसके बाद भी कुछ परिवर्तन को अस्वीकार नहीं किया जा सकता।

निष्कर्ष : इस प्रकार उक्त विवरणों के आधार पर हम इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुँचते हैं कि ब्रह्मपुराण का काल ईस्वी तृतीय शताब्दी से पर्याप्त पूर्व का है। कुछ प्रक्षेपों के आधार पर इसे १३वीं शताब्दी की रचना बतलाना न तो तर्कसंगत है और न समीचीन ही। शरीर में किसी नवीन अङ्ग के लग जाने से क्या किसी व्यक्ति की आयु कम हो जाती है? यदि नहीं, तो फिर प्रक्षेपों के आधार पर ब्रह्मपुराण को कैसे अर्वाचीन सिद्ध किया जा सकता है? विद्वद्वर्ग इस पर स्वयं विचार करें। वृक्षों की वृद्धि और सरिताओं को उत्तरोत्तर समृद्धि से उनकी आयु पर कोई प्रभाव नहीं पड़ता। तो फिर ब्रह्मपुराण नें, पुराण-वाङ्मय ने ही क्या अपराध किया है, जो उसे हठात् अर्वाचीन सिद्ध करने का प्रयास किया जा रहा है?

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